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PREFACE 
The problem of giving a consistent exposition 
o_f Aristotle's views on man's end in the Nicomachean 
Ethics prompted the writing of this thesis. My 
analysis of the fundamental reason why a consistent 
exposition is not possible stems basically from a 
consideration of the ambiguity of the word "good". 
In terms of Aristotle's thought the end of any activity 
can be good both in the metaphysical sense of complete­
ness as well as in the moral sense of desirability. 
Aristotle's failure to take this distinction into 
account consistently constitutes a fundamental weak­
ness in his discussions on man's final end. 
Siegler's essay, Reason, Happiness and Goodness, 
and Oates' study, Aristotle and the Problem of Value, 
provided me with valuable insights into an understanding 
'of this underlying confusion in Aristotle's ethical 
thought. 
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CHAPTER l :  INTRODUCTION 
Most conunentators on Aristotle's ethics would 
agree with O'Connor's assessment that the "Nicomachean 
Ethics is one of the great books of moral philosophy." (l)
However, it has also been argued that "it is only with 
difficulty that the Nicomachean Ethics can be considered 
as a systematic treatise enunciating a single straight­
forward doctrine."(2) Walsh and Shapiro quote Henry
Sidgwick as saying that "on the whole there is probably no 
treatise so masterly as Aristotle's Ethics and containing 
so much close and valid thought, that yet leaves on the 
reader's mind so strong an impression of dispersive and 
incomplete work."(J} 
Various suggestions have been made to try to explain 
the unsystematic nature of the Nicomachean Ethics. Hardie (4)
proposes that Aristotle may have amended his basic text 
?eriodically without ever writing a final, finished work. 
Another possibility put forward by Walsh and Shapiro is 
that Aristotle did not write a 11 connected ethical work" 
and that his various treatments of related ethical topics 
were only subsequently edited as a single work. (S) It is 
therefore possible that the editor, in order to ensure 
that no important material was omitted or lost, included 
what seemed to him to be all relevant sections dealing 
with one specific concept or problem. (6) It should,
however, be noted that even if it is uncertain as to 
whether Aristotle himself planned the work as it stands 
today, the Nicomachean Ethics is generally regarded as 
"the authoritative statement of Aristotle's system. 1 ( 7
)
The status and authenticity of the other two Aristotelean 
works on ethics, the Eudemian Ethics and the Magna Moralia, 
has been much debated. It is, however, not within the 
scope of this thesis to examine the debate in great 
detail. (S) 
However, even if the Nicomachean Ethics is regarded 
as authoritative and despite the feeling that it is 
"dispersive/ 
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and incomplete" there is nevertheless a fundamental 
problem about·the consistency of Aristotle's views on 
man's end, the central theme. In simple terms this 
difficulty lies in the attempt to reconcile the two "ends" 
put forward by Aristotle, namely perfect and secondary 
happiness. <9> Instead of postulating one kind of happiness
as one is led to believe from a reading of Book I of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, he concludes with two types, and the 
precise relationship between them is not definitively 
elucidated. 
Various commentators have, of course, pointed out 
this problem. Copleston, for example, says : 
"The precise relation of moral action to the 
highest type of human action is left obscure, 
but of course Aristotle makes it quite clear 
in the Ethics that without moral virtue, true 
happiness is impossible." (10) 
,(Whether Aristotle does indeed make it "quite clear" that 
true happiness requires moral virtue must be examined.) 
(ll)
Ross is severe in his criticisms of the dichotomy 
between the two ends. He argues that "though his 
(A+istotle's) formal theory .•• makes the moral life 
subsidiary to the intellectual, this relation is not worked 
out in detail. When Aristotle is engaged in studying the 
moral activities he treats them as good in themselves, and 
the moral agent as finding his motive in nothing beyond 
the act, but its own nobility. In effect he assigns a 
higher value to the moral life than his formal theory 
warrants." (l2)
Contained within this problem is the question of 
the relationship between the political life of co-operation 
(for man is, according to Aristotle, a political animal) (l3)
and what appears as the essentially a-social, solitary 
activity of contemplation. Indeed, how are these seemingly 
incompatible notions of man's end to be reconciled in view 
of Aristotle's contention that the Nicomachean Ethics and 
Politics are not regarded as dealing with separate 
disciplines ? (l4) Aristotle argues that the end of the 
city/ 
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state seems to be a greater and more complete thing 
because "it is more noble and God-like to secure the good 
for a whole people or for city states. 11 (lS) Yet the good
of the state seems to be fulfilled through its members' 
attainment of secondary happiness since perfect happiness 
as contemplation is also said to be "too exalted for mere 
man." (16)
Aristotle's inability to free himself from his 
Platonic background plays an important part in these 
problems. MacIntyre says 
"The treatise which began with an attack on 
Plato's conception of the Form of the Good 
ends not so far away from the.same attitude 
of contempt for the merely human." (17) 
(Macintyre's use of the word "contempt" may well be 
challenged. As we shall see he makes this comment because 
he uses the word "human" in a specific sense as including 
the notion of fallibility. Aristotle's perfect man is 
infallible. ( 18) )
The Platonic element in Aristotle's thought does, to 
a very large extent, underlie many of the problems associated 
with man's end. In order to elucidate this point in greater 
detail let us firstly consider some aspects of Plato's 
thought. 
The Doctrine of the Forms provides Plato with an 
underlying unity in metaphysics, ethics and politics (among 
others). The Republic gives the finest illustration of 
the intimate relationship of these disciplines. The ideal 
life of the philosopher is ideal both in the metaphysical 
and epistemological sense in that the philosopher king has 
attained pure thought and contemplates The Good, as well as 
in the ethical sense insofar as he is a just man. The 
justification for his position in the state is provided by 
the Forms as well as by the service he renders to the 
community. As Jaeger has pointed out, the theoretic life 
and the sphere of political action are reconciled by giving 
science and philosophy a new subject, namely the st�te, and 
by making the highest norms and laws of social action their 
chief/ ..... 
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chief problem, on whose solution hung the welfare of the 
state its elf •. ( 19) This intimate relationship means that
there is no conflict in standards of value. Thus as we 
have already pointed out, an action is good both in the 
metaphysical, ethical and political sense. 
A further characteristic of Plato's thought lies 
in his conception of the essential unity of theoretical 
and practical wisdom. Jaeger expresses this as follows 
"Plato had attached moral insight, the phronesis 
of Socrates, to the contemplation of the Idea of 
the Gocid. 11 (20) 
Whilst phronesis in the ordinary u,sage of Plato's 
time was confined to the realm of political action, Plato 
had extended the use of the word to include the sphere of 
theoretical knowledge of the Forms. Later, however, Plato's 
philosophy moved away from its_close identification with 
the practical sphere, or its similarity to the Socratic 
position, towards an increasingly theoretical standpoint. 
(2l)
Jaeger quotes an extremely interesting anecdote about Plato's 
lectures on the Good. Many came to listen to Plato in the 
hope of learning something about human goods such as wealth, 
health, strength and happiness. But instead, Plato 
lectured on mathematics and astronomy, and finally concluded 
that the Good is one. Hence Aristoxemus' comment: "I think 
it seemed an absolute paradox to them. Thereupon some of 
them despised the matter and others condemned it. 1 (22)
On the one hand, Aristotle tried unsuccessfully to 
effect a clear distinction between metaphysics and ethics 
(including politics). Yet on the other hand having 
attempted that separation, and in his reluctance to abandon 
the Platonic conception of perfect happiness as the 
contemplation of metaphysical truths, he was obliged to 
draw them together. For Aristotle could not accept the 
view that the wicked philosopher could be happy. The 
morally virtuous life must in some way be a necessary 
prerequisite for contemplation. Rejecting the Doctrine of 
Forms, Aristotle was forced to use two standards of value, 
a metaphysical goodness in the sense of completeness <23> ,
and moral goodness in the sense of being desirable. <24>
Aristotle/ .••• 
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Aristotle does not, however, always adhere to this 
distinction with the result that in the argument on 
function, for example, he makes an illicit transition 
from goodness in the former to the latter sense. C25>It
is arguable that the reason for the use of this albeit 
fallacious argument lies in the crucial role played by 
moral virtue. For it is moral virtue whi�h in the sphere 
of secondary happiness ensures that man will direct his 
activities towards the performance of morally good ends. 
Morally good actions will also be shown to be a necessary 
prerequisite for the attainment of perfect happiness. 
The dichotomy in the standards of value also means 
that the essentially moral end of secondary happiness is 
to be judged differently from the metaphysical end of 
perfect happiness. These two spheres are also associated 
with different orders of reason, the former with practical 
reason and the latter with theoretical reason. Hence 
Aristotle once more separates these two spheres in accord­
apce with the common usage rejected by Plato (Aristotle 
does always stress that his starting point is what is 
(26) commonly held to be the case). It will be shown that 
in fact the separation is untenable. (27)
In the Eudemian Ethics a close connection is main-
tained between the realm of moral action and contemplation. 
"Therefore whatever mode of choosing and of 
acquiring things good by nature - whether 
goods of body or wealth or friends or the 
other goods - will best promote the contem� 
plation of God, that is the best mode and 
that standard is the finest; and any mode 
of choice acquisition that either through 
deficiency or excess hinders us from serving 
and contemplating God - that is a bad one." (28) 
The Nicomachean Ethics, however, contains only one 
brief phrase linking the two realms. Aristotle says of 
practical wisdom that it provides for theoretical wisdom 
coming into being. <29> Precisely how Aristotle intends
this to be interpreted must be examined. It will, however, 
be stressed that moral acts which presuppose both the 
possession of a good character as well as the intellectual 
virtue / .... 
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virtue of practical wisdom are a necessary requirement 
for contemplation, nut that the relationship between 
these ends can only be indirect in terms of the fundamental 
dichotomy which has been pointed out!30> rnsofar as the life
of moral virtue, that is a life characterised by the 
consistent performance of morally good acts, perfects man's 
reason, it is an essential prerequisite for the rational 
activity of contemplation which constitutes perfect 
happiness. Furthermore the legislators, the men of 
practical wisdom, have the responsibility of organising 
the state in such a way that its inhabitants are encouraged 
to develop good habits. In a good state the good man will 
overlap with the good citizen. In such a state, moreover, 
the necessary leisure required for contemplation will be 
provided. An educational curriculum which includes the 
study of theoretical disciplines is an obvious requirement 
in order that the philosopher be enabled to contemplate 
�hose theoretical truths which have already been discovered 
by him. 
The split between ethics (politics) and metaphysics, 
practical and theoretical reason, becomes clearer in the 
Magna Moralia. Furthermore the superiority of the theo.­
retical activities is rejected. The analogy between the 
Divine Life, which is self-sufficient, and that of man is 
seen to be misleading, for according to the Magna Moralia 
that analogy does not prove that men need nothing. (Jl) 
Rather moral virtue is held in the highest esteem. For 
moral virtues alone are considered praiseworthy. "No man 
is commended for being wise or prudent."<32>
These arguments on the relationship between the 
life of moral virtue and contemplation might seem to 
support an "evolutionary thesis" regarding the development 
of Aristotle's thought. Jaeger <33> holds that Aristotle's 
early lost works were Platonic stressing for example the 
immortality of the soul as a separate substance, the 
contemplative ideal and the relative unimportance of the 
material world. Jaeger argues that Aristotle gradually 
abandoned this Platonism in favour of an increasingly 
empirical/ 
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empirical position. This idea of a linear transition is 
not, however, completely accepted by recent scholarship!34)
It has been rejected in this thesis. A close examination 
of some texts suggests that "not every aspect of Platonic 
Idealism was annihilated by Aristotle's growing 
appreciation of empirical knowledge and of the dynamic 
aspects of matter. 11 <35> Aristotle did not abandon the 
Platonic ideal of the contemplation of metaphysical truths 
as constituting man's ultimate end. His attempt to reconcile 
the "contemplative" and "empirical" aspects of his thought 
was not entirely successful in view of the fact that perfect 
and secondary happiness belong to two distinct realms 
represented by philosophic and practical wisdom respectively, 
and with different standards of value. It will also be 
shown that Aristotle's psychological treatise, De Anima, 
contains both a Platonic and an empirical conception of the 
soul standing in uneasy juxtaposition with each other. 
Aristotle was to a large extent "the victim of his own 
e�ucation", (JG) unable to free himself entirely from his 
Platonic background. 
It is curious, perhaps, that contemplation, which 
is the highest form of life, that activity which is most 
pleasurable, has so little discussion devoted to it. Indeed 
it is an ideal attained only for brief periods of time. <37>
Nor is Aristotle clear as to the objects of the activity 
of nous. It does not seem possible to come to any definite 
decision as to whether contemplation involves a religious 
or mystical dimension in the light of the limited inform-
ation about it in Aristotle's works. Yet despite the 
fact that the Aristotelean conception of contemplation 
remains obscure, its influence on the development of 
Christian theology in its Catholic form as exemplified in 
the ethical thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, for example, is 
undeniable. 
In elucidating the concept of secondary happiness 
we shall criticise Aristotle for separating the function 
of each particular individual as his own specific calling 
from the function of man as man. This argument is 
derived / .... 
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derived from the work of the psychologist, Abraham 
Maslow, ( 3S) whose thought is distinctly Aristotelean!
39)
Aristotle himself provides a justification for referr­
ing to contemporary psychological theories. He holds 
that the student of ethics "must study the soul."(40)
For if we are concerned with what is good for man surely 
we should know something about the way man behaves? 
Aristotle's recommendation will therefore be taken 
into account by referring at times to some contemporary 
psychological theories which bear on certain aspects 
of Aristotle's thought. In particular the work of 
Maslow and B.F. Skinner (4l) will be consulted for, as 
will be showri, they share certain common factors in 
their views on man with Aristotle. 
Generally regarded as a "common sense" philosopher, 
Aristotle holds his starting point to be what is in 
fact the case. (42> However, a close examination of
Aristotle's discussions on various aspects of man's 
ends shows that he consistently violates his empirical 
starting point. Although, for example, he speaks in 
terms of the function of man qua man, of man as he is, 
it will be argued that Aristotle is rather considering 
the function of man as he ought to be as the basis of 
the content of happiness. Furthermore, whilst Aristotle 
states that all men seek happiness, it becomes clear 
that few are able to achieve.perfect or secondary 
happiness. It seems that only a few intellectually 
gifted individuals attain happiness for ·short periods 
of time. But the vicious and the incontinent man, 
the individual engaging in unnatural actions, slaves 
and women are also progressively eliminated from 
attaining even secondary happiness for they are unable 
to perform morally good deeds. 
Despite the many criticisms which will be 
levelled against Aristotle's conceptions of happiness, 
his basic premise that the good life is grounded in 
the nature of man constitutes an important insight. 
Whilst/ ••.. 
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Whilst his identification of man's specific nature 
with his rational capaciti�s may have been somewhat 
inadequa�e, (43> Aristotle's understanding of hwnan
nature was indeed profound. 
10 
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CHAPTER 2 THE NOTION OF THE END OR GOOD OF ANY ACTIVITY 
The Nicomachean Ethics begins with that well-known 
sentence: 
"Every art and every inquiry, and similarly 
every action and pursuit is thought to aim 
at some good; and for this reason the good 
has rightly been declared to be that at 
which all things aim." (1) 
This sentence provides an extremely good intro­
duction into the problem of Aristotle's illicit blending 
of metaphysical and moral arguments. Thus two unrelated 
standards of value are shown to be juxtaposed. 
What does Aristotle mean by the good to which every 
action is directed? 
2:1 Good in the metaphysical sense. 
In his discussion on the priority of actuality 
over potency, Aristotle says : 
"Everything that comes to 
a principle, i.e. an end. 
a thing is its principle, 
of generation is its end. 
the end and therefore the 
potency. 11 ( 2 )
be moves towards 
The purpose of 
and the purpose 
Now actuality is 
principle of 
In other words actuality is the purpose or goal 
or end of the thing and potentiality is preliminary to 
that end. 
"The work is the end, and actuality is the 
work; and the very word 'actuality' is 
derived from activity and comes to mean 
much the_ same as entelechy or 'complete 
reality'." (3)
That which has attained its end is said to be 
perfect or complete. 
11Things are said to be 'perfect' which have 
attained their end, this being good; for 
things are perfect when they have attained 
their end. 11 (4)
The/ 
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The use of 11 good 11 above is a neutral term 
denoting completion or lacking nothing. For this reason, 
Aristotle can speak of the perfection of the humbug or 
the tl:lief by which he means that they are "complete" 
humbugs or thieves. 
"A physician and a flautist are perfect when 
they lack nothing of the form of their 
peculiar excellence. And likewise we speak 
of a 'complete' humbug and a 'complete' thief, 
indeed we even refer to them as 'good' - a 
good humbug, a good thief." (5) 
On the purely metaphysical level therefore the end 
or good of any action may be that of thieving. In other 
words, the activity of thieving is directed towards the 
end of being a thief, that being the good of that activity. 
However, such an activity is evil or vicious in the moral 
sense, and Aristotle is, after all, writing an ethical 
treatise. 
2,:2 Good and bad actuality. 
Let us develop this argument further by referring 
again to Aristotle's discussion on potency. He introduces 
a moral value standard in his distinction between two 
kinds of actuality, good and bad. 
"It is clear from the following argument that 
a good actuality is better and more valuable 
than a good potency. Whatever we describe 
as potentiality for one thing is always 
potentiality for the opposite (e.g. that which 
we say can be healthy can also be unhealthy) 
and has both potentialities at once: for the 
same potentiality admits of both health and 
disease, or of rest and motion, or of building 
and demolishing, or of being built and being 
demolished. The potentiality for contraries, 
I say, is present at the same time, but neither 
these two contraries nor their actualities (e.g. 
health and disease) can be present at the same 
time. Therefore one of them must be good. 
But the potentiality may equally well be both 
or neither; therefore actuality is better. 
Similarly a bad actuality must be worse than 
its potency, for that which is capable is 
capable alike of both contraries. 11 (6) 
There/ ...• 
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There does therefore seem to be a moral scale 
interposed into a metaphysical argument. Actuality is 
neutral, a good actuality is valuable and a bad 
actuality disvaluable. As Oates argues, this distinct­
ion fits extremely uneasily into the metaphysical 
framework. For as Oates puts it, "Aristotle's theory of 
potentiality and actuality simply does not accommodate 
itself as a ground for a theory of value or worth."(?) 
Indeed since Aristotle is discussing being as being, the 
introduction of the value concepts of "good" and "evil" 
seems to be highly inappropriate. 
The distinction is, however, understandable for 
the teleological arguments are also used in his ethical 
work. Aristotle was perfectly aware that a man can 
choose an evil end just as well as a good one. Hence he 
says "That which is capable of causing motion in a certain 
way can also cause it not in that way; it is if it acts 
rationally."(S) 
For as Aristotle has explained earlier in that 
section : 
11 Some things can initiate processes ration­
ally and have rational potencies, while others 
are irrational and have irrational potencies. 
Rational potencies can belong only to living 
things, whereas irrational potencies can 
belong both to animate and inanimate objects. 
It follows, therefore, with regard to irration­
al potencies, that when the agent and the 
patient meet in a way appropriate to the 
potency in question, one must act and the other 
be acted upon. But in the case of rational 
pote�cies this is not necessary. For whereas 
the irrational potencies are productive of one 
result each, the rational produce contrary 
effects; and if they were actualised necess­
arily, they would produce contrary results at 
the same time. Since this is impossible, 
there must be something else, viz. desire or 
conscious choice to determine which of the two 
contrary results is to follow." (9) 
Man as a rational being can choose good or evil. 
In terms of his chosen end from the metaphysical point 
of view, he can be called a good thief. But from the 
moral/ ...• 
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moral perspective his end is a bad actuality, and, as 
Aristotle will attempt to show, incompatible with the 
final end of happiness. 
The opening sentence of the Nicomachean Ethics 
tacitly seems to assume that the end of the activity is 
good from the moral point of view. The possibility of 
bad actualities which are good in the metaphysical sense, 
cannot be acceptable in the context of an ethical work. 
Yet strictly speaking there does not seem to be any 
reason why they should be excluded. 
It is therefore arguable that one of Aristotle's 
main aims in the Nicomachean Ethics is to clarify 
precisely what kinds of activities will be directed to 
ends which are good both in the sense of completeness, 
that is in the metaphysical sense, as well as being 
morally good, that is desirable. The kind of activity 
required must have the quality of excellence. But since 
AFistotle is concerned with morally good ends he moves 
from this excellence of function (which in man is the 
activity of the rational element of the soul) to moral 
virtue in order to ensure that the ends of man's 
activities as man will be morally good ones. 
The argument on function must therefore be 
examined in some detail to elucidate the above discussion. 
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CHAPTER 3 THE FUNCTION OF MAN AND MORAL VIRTUE 
In order to explicate the content of happiness, 
Aristotle introduces the controversial argument on the 
function of man. He argues that people like carpenters, 
flautists, sculptors and the like have a function or task 
or characteristic activity. In the same way, various 
organs of the body, the eye, the hand, the foot also have 
a function. Man, therefore, surely has a function as 
man, i.e. he has a characteristic specifically human 
activity peculiar to man alone. This activity cannot lie 
merely in the life of nutrition, growth and reproduction 
which man shares with plants and animals. Nor can it lie 
merely in the sentient life common to all animals. What is 
common to all men and unique to man alone is "an active 
life of the element that has a rational principle."(!) 
Continuing his analogy with the craftsman (and organs of 
the body) Aristotle goes on to say that just as the function 
of the good harpist, for example, is to play the harp well, 
so the function of the good man consists in "the activity 
of the soul in accordance with virtue or excellence."(2)
The above argument raises many contentious issues. 
3:1 Does man have a function ? 
It may be granted that a sculptor has a character­
istic activity. We may also perhaps accept that the eye's 
specific activity is to see. Whether, however, the hand 
or foot may �e regarded as having� function is debatable, 
for on what basis would we decide which of the many 
activities of the hand or foot constitute its specific 
function ? Furthermore, can one speak of the function of 
a hand or foot (or even an eye, for that matter) separate 
from the body? 
These difficulties apart, does Aristotle show that 
man has a function ? O'Connor states firmly that "there 
is no reason whatever to take this argument seriously."(3)
Siegler (4) agrees that as it stands Aristotle's "argument" 
is I ....
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is not, in fact, an argument, but points out that had 
Aristotle asserted as a general truth that every natural 
thing has a function, then he could have concluded that 
man has one as well. Perhaps, however, it is possible to 
show that Siegler's suggestion is implicit in Aristotle's 
thought. 
Considering a thing from the point of view of its 
nature, (S)Aristotle says that nature is substance, 
consisting of matter and form, having within it a source 
or cause·of being moved (i.e. the efficient cause). 
Substance is essence, that is, it is what it is and nothing 
else. Nature as essence designates that which makes one 
particular primary substance different from every other 
particular primary substance. Aristotle also speaks of 
the nature of the thing as the process of growth or coming 
to be of the thing. Nature is also the final end or the 
end of becoming, when substance attains its fulfilment and 
is what it is more properly than when it exists potentially. 
, 
It may be argued that function presupposes essence, 
for function is the realisation of essence. It is a 
general truth in Aristotle's thought that every natural 
thing does have an essence. Purpose or function is 
immanent in all living things so that the workings of 
nature are the outcome of processes which are purposefully 
directed. If man's essence is his rationality, the 
process of growth or coming to be is man's function. This 
therefore consists in the active exercise of his rational 
element. The final end or the end of becoming of man as 
a rational being is contemplation. 
Probably, therefore, Aristotle did presuppose in 
his readers a knowledge of his writings on nature. The 
function argument might therefore be intended to have 
implied the exposition above. It would be assumed as a 
general truth that every natural thing has a function, 
including man. Howeve·r, there is a fundamental problem 
about Aristotle's conception of man's function. 
3: 2 / •.•• 
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3:2 What is man's function? 
If, as Aristotle argues, the function of man is 
an aQ�ivity of the soul implying a rational principle, 
it is not entirely clear what he means to include under 
the label "rational principle" at this early stage of his 
argument. He elucidates the phrase "rational principle" 
as follows: 
"Of this, one part has such a principle in 
the sense of being obedient to one, the 
other in the sense of possessing one and 
exercising thought." {6)
Many commentators have argued that Aristotle 
includes the activity of contemplation under the activity 
of "exercising thought�" Gauthier, for example, spe.aks 
of the "two activities of the mind" as "the activity of 
exercising command, by which the mind rules over desire, 
over the body to which it is united and over all that 
which is inferior to it, and the activity of contemplation, 
by which the mind lives, apart from the body, its life as 
a spectator of itself and of all that which is superior to 
't 1 (7)1 • 
Allan too writes that two forms of rational 
activity are being included at this stage. Aristotle is 
therefore speaking firstly of "the free exercise of reason 
in theoretical study, and secondly in the discipline of 
the emotions according to a rule or purpose formulated by 
reason." (S) 
Hardie (9) argues that the phrase "active life" 
(praktike) need not be taken to exclude theoretical wisdom 
and quotes from the politics in support of this view. 
"If happiness is to be equated with doing 
well, then the active life will be-the best 
both for any state as a whole community and 
for the individual. But the active life 
need not, as some suppose, be always concern­
ed with our relations with other.people, nor 
is thinking only effective when it concentrates 
on the possible outcome of action. On the 
contrary, thinking and speculation that are 
their own end and are done for the sake of 
thinking and speculation - these are more 
effective/ 
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effective because they are themselves 
the doing well which is their aim, and 
they·are therefore action." (10) 
Hardie does, however, go on to say that what is
common and peculiar to man is rationality in the general 
sense of which metaphysical speculation is �erely a 
specialised way of bei_ng rational. (ll)
There is, of course, much evidence in the Nico­
machean Ethics that contemplation is at some stage to be 
included in the notion of function. For example, 
Aristotle writes that the happy man "will be engaged in 
virtuous action and contemplation."(l2)Furthermore, the
inclusion of the virtues of theoretical reason may be 
implied in the phrase, "he is happy who is active in 
accordance with complete virtue. 11 <13> Aristotle also 
mentions theoretical wisdom explicitly when explicating 
the phrase "the part which grasps a rational principle 11 f 14 > 
He speaks of two subdivisions within this "part" as the 
scientific and calculative faculties. (lS)
It will also be remembered that in the discussion 
on nature, man's function was described in terms of his 
actualisation in contemplation. 
But the view that contemplation is included in the 
initial formulation of function has been challenged. Many 
commentators have interpreted the phrase regarding the 
rational principle in terms of practical wisdom alone. 
Taylor, for example, when discussing function, 
writes of a _life "consisting in conscious direction of 
one's actions by a rule", implying that a man needs to 
know this rule (through practical wisdom) and to follow 
it. (16)
Ross, writing of what it is that only man can do, 
speaks of the faculty "which has a plan, or rule, within 
which faculty are two sub-faculties, that which under­
stands the rule, and that which obeys the rule."(l?)
Siegler quotes Joachim as suggesting that Aristotle 
is / •.•• 
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is initially concerned with "the good that is doable" 
having set aside contemplation for consideration at a 
later stage. For that activity is not unique as man to 
man. (lS) Indeed Aristotle's description of perfect
happiness as contemplation is generally regarded as 
suggestive of his account of the prime mover in Meta­
physics A.. 
When Aristotle speaks of the "rational principle" 
in his initial formulation of function, there is a case 
,for arguing tnat contemplation should be excluded from 
that activity which is c.ommon and peculiar to man. (l9)
For it does seem only a few gifted men are capable of 
that supre�e activity of reason, which activity is akin to 
that of God, the prime mover. This conclusion seems to 
be borne out by Aristotle's comment that "the function of 
man is accomplished only in accordance with practical 
wisdom together with moral virtue. 1 ( 2o>
The contradictions apparent in Aristotle's thought 
pertaining to the interpretation of function do seem to 
illustrate his inability to work out clearly the implic­
ations of his attempt to separate practical and theoretical 
wisdom. It is arguable that initially Aristotle's aim is 
to ensure that man's actions will be directed towards 
morally good ends, hence his immediate concern is "the 
doable good." At the same time, he does allow for the 
later inclusion of contemplation in terms of the last 
words of this passage : 
"Human good turns out to be activity of the 
soul in accordance with virtue, and if there 
are more than one virtue, in accordance with 
the best and most complete." (21) 
The inclusion of contemplation is then made 
explicit in the discussion on the two parts of the' sou1}22 ) 
There is, however, a far more fundamental problem 
than the controversy about the inclusion of contemplation 
into the concept of function. In terms of Aristotle's 
formulation of function as having a rule and following that 
rule/ ..•• 
rule, it is clear that this excludes the innately 
incontinent man who, by nature, does not follow a rule! 23>
Such men do not have practical wisdom and obviously cannot 
obey the rule given by that virtue. Indeed, if the rule 
is one given by_practical wisdom, that in itself is already 
a virtue presupposed by having a good character and does 
not therefore constitute a phrt of the function of man as 
man, but rather the function.of the good man as a good man. 
Aristotle is talking about what man's function ought to be, 
rather than what man's function is. 
Aristotle's starting point in his discussion on 
function that man is essentially a rational being may be 
therefore challenged. Slaves, for example, also do not 
possess the virtue of practical reason and never will. 
women possess it in an incomplete form.(24> In his
discussion on brutish and morb�d !states, Aristotle admits 
·, •. J 
as an empirical fact that there are people who are not
rational. "They have no better part ... (25>Furthermore
he says that some of the morb�� states arise in individuals
"by nature". (26) Aristotle therefore seems to exclude these
"brutes" from the class man - "they are departures from the
natural norm. 11(27> But this norm is the w;J.y Aristotle
thinks men ought to behave.
Apart from these non rational beings (who are, of 
course, excluded from ever attaining either type of 
happiness), Aristotle does also make this rather curious 
observation which could. perhaps be taken to suggest that 
(some) men are not rational by nature. 
"Reason causes men to do many things contrary 
to habit and to nature whenever they are 
convinced that this is the better course." (28) 
If man does have 
what this is. For it 
us what man's function 
a function as man, it is not clear 
does seem that Aristotle is telling 
ought to be. It ought to be having 
a rule and following that rule. Aristotle, however, writes 
of that "ought" as if it were an "is". 
3: 3 I • • . .
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3:3 Function·and the role of moral virtue. 
We have seen that the function of man in the 
Aristotelean argument may be interpreted to include 
initially the possession of a rule and the ability to 
follow such a rule. When function is treated in terms 
of its excellence the inclusion of practical wisdom and 
moral virtue follow. But the inclusion of moral virtue 
in the discussion on excellence of function has been 
challenged by Siegler. <29) He argues that if man's
happiness lies in activity of soul in accordance with 
virtue, Aristotle makes an illicit transition from 
excellence in reasoning abili�y to excellence in the sense 
of moral virtue or goodness of character. Let us now 
examine Siegler's arguments in greater detail. 
In his analysis of the two senses of the rational 
principle (viz. one in the sense of being obedient to one, 
and the other in the sense of possessing one and exercising 
tpought (JO) ) Siegler interprets this as a distinction 
between "having the ability to reason and the activity of 
reasoning."(Jl) The function of the good man is then "to
act well on reasons or to reason well in these actions. 11 <32>
Now to interpret function as Siegler does, i.e. in terms 
of practical wisdom alone, implies that a good man is one 
who shows skill in reasoning. He can, as Siegler puts it, 
11 plan with precision, and organise his activities so that 
he can achieve his aims whatever they may be. 11 <33> But, of
course, this is not to say that such a man is thereby a 
morally good man,·nor that his action will be a morally 
praiseworthy one. <34> A man may plan a robbery with
precision, carry it out with great organisational skill, 
but that does not make his action good in the sense of it 
being morally desirable. We might perhaps think that a 
thief could be happy. But clearly Aristotle could never 
allow this to be the case. For it is, as Siegler has 
stressed, a necessary condition for acts being good acts 
that they be directed towards nqble ends. And it is 
moral virtue which, according to Aristotle, ensures that 
we / .••. 
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we do direct our activities towards such ends. <35)
Siegler argues that the illicit transition to 
excellence as moral virtue may perhaps be explained in 
terms of a misleading parallel between the harpist and 
man as man. For whilst the good harpist is praised for 
the excellence of his playing, that performance has 
nothing to do with it being morally praiseworthy. But 
man as man can, as Siegler points out, be praised on two 
accounts. Firstly if he reasons well; but secondly if 
he performs this function for the purposes of morally 
good ends or aims. However, "having the right aims is 
unfortunately not any more peculiar to human beings than 
having the wrong aims."(3G) Excellence in reasoning
ability is a necessary condition for moral goodness and 
happiness, but it is not a sufficient condition. What is 
missing is the quality of the end or aim of the action, 
and this is provided by moral virtue. ''Virtue and the 
good man as such are the measure of each thing. 11 <37)
•tvirtue either natural or produced by habituation is what
teaches right opinion about t�e first principle. 11 <38)
Siegler's argument is supported by a later discuss­
ion by Aristotle on moral virtue. <39) Aristotle begins
by saying that "every virtue or excellence both brings 
into good condition the thing of which it is the excellence 
and makes the work of that thing be done well." <4o)
Aristotle goes on to argue that the excellence (or virtue) 
of the horse makes the horse good in itself, good at 
running, at carrying the horseman as well as facing enemy 
attacks.<4ll He then infers that "the virtue of man also
will be the state of character which makes him do his work 
well." ( 42) But surely, one would like to object, there is
a vast difference between the horse as a good horse and a 
man's goodness. The goodness of the horse refers to the 
metaphysical conception of completeness. It has nothing 
to do with moral aims. But man's goodness is more than 
this, and Aristotle is using 11 good" in the case of man in 
'the moral sense. Hence there is an illicit transition 
from excellence or goodness or virtue in the metaphysical 
sense/ •... 
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sense of completeness in the case of the horse to 
excellence or goodness or virtue as moral vir_tue in man. 
It may be suggested that in this argwnent Aristotle 
is himself guilty of committing the fallacy of "Ignoratio 
Elenchi", the fallacy of "irrelevant.conclusion". <43) His
proof that the excellence of function is a moral excellence 
is irrelevant to the conclusion he should have reached, 
i.e. the excellence of function in the metaphysical sense
of completeness.
Aristotle's argument on function and excellence may 
be challenged in another way by an examination of moral 
virtue itself. As Hardie points out, virtues and vices 
belong to the general category of power. (44) Aristotle's
name for the kind of power they are is "state of character". 
("A state of character is that in virtue of which we stand 
well or badly with reference to the passions."(45)) In
the discussion in the Nicomachean Ethics Bk. 1:13, Aristotle 
points out that there are two kinds of powers in the soul, 
• 
rational and non-rational. This point is discussed fully 
in Metaphysics e, the section entitled 11 Rational and non­
Rational Potencies". As has already been pointed out (4G)
the difference between these two potencies is that whilst 
rational powers admit equally of opposite effects, the 
irrational admit of only one. Hardie argues that it is 
not clear into which of these two categories the moral 
virtues do fall. <47) For the problem is that moral virtue
is not an "ambivalent power 11 • The morally virtuous man 
necessarily desires only what is good. Hence in Hardie's 
words 
11 Whereas it requires the external intervention of 
'something else', desire or choice, to determine 
whether the art of medicine is used to cure or 
kill, a moral virtue is itself a disposition to 
desire or choose, and not merely a capacity to 
know; it is not neutral but, by definition, on 
the side of the angels." (48) 
Ross, for example, classes the moral virtues as rational.( 49)
Gauthier says they are rational only by participation r
since/ .... 
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since they require practical wisdom which provides the 
rule. C50)
Fortenbaugh argues that Aristotle developed a new 
bi-partite psychological theory replacing the tri-partite 
account in his ethical and political works. In terms of 
this bi�partite theory the soul is conceived of as 
consisting of alogical and logical halves, the former 
consisting of emotions-which are "cognitive phenomena open 
to reason", whilst the latter corresponds to reasoned 
deliberation. (Sl) The relationship of alogical to logical
is that of obedience of the former to the latter and 
corresponds, in the good man, to the relationship of moral 
virtue to practical wisdom. Whilst Fortenbaugh locates 
the alogical/logical model within the biological faculty 
of intelligence� the emotions are not rational but are 
open to reason. <52> Gauthier says of desire that it is
irrational in essence and becomes a human value by obeying 
�eason. (SJ) Of course the emotions or desires need not 
oecome reasonable; they need not be obedient. Such 
individuals will not be morally virtuous nor practically 
wise. 
It is clear therefore that the "rational" status of 
moral virtues is unresolved, and furthermore that the 
emotions .are not naturally obedient. 
The passage from Metaphysics a quoted above <54> does 
also make another point. If Aristotle were to limit his 
definition of function to rationality alone, then as a 
rational being man can choose between two contrary things. 
In short, he can choose evil just as well as good. In 
Metaphysics 6 Aristotle also speaks of virtue and vice in 
terms of the modifications of things in motion qua motion. 
Thus virtue and vice may be said to show whether things in 
motion act or are acted upon well or badly. "Good and 
evil indicate quality especially in living things and 
among those especially which have purpose (or purposive 
choice)."(SS
} 
Badness therefore arises from a potential­
ity which is capable of either a good or a bad actualisation. 
It / •••. 
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It is clear therefore that acting rationally does 
not imply being morally virtuous. This leads us to a 
discussion on the vicious man. 
3:4 The Vicious man 
It is arguable that there are two treatments of 
vice in the Nicomachean Ethics. Firstly there is the 
spontaneous, vicious action in which the individual, 
dominated by his passions acts impulsively without 
calculation and therefore not in accordance with the 
mean. (S6)But Aristotle does also speak of a wicked,
calculated act as for example in his discussion on the 
smart or cunning man. (S?)In talking about setting a bad 
mark as the end of an action, Aristotle is surely implying 
that the smart man plans his action deliberately, but the 
end he seeks is one which admits of no mean, for example, 
,theft or adultery. ( 58) It seems possible that in his
discussion on function, Aristotle forgets about the second 
kind of vice. <59>Thus in speaking about obeying a rule he
eliminates the first variety of vice, but seems to ignore 
the vicious man who acts rationally insofar as he acts in 
accordance with the practical syllogism. (The exact 
nature of the practical syllogism used by the vicious man 
is not made clear by Aristotle. Difficulties would occur 
in such a formulation especially since the major premise 
is formulated in terms of a moral imperative. (60>obviously
Aristotle would have to say that the end appearing to the 
bad man was merely an apparent good. (6l)) Aristotle's
treatment of vice is one of the least satisfactory aspec·ts 
of his ethics. 
The original choice to be evil is a voluntary one. 
"To the unjust and to the self-indulgent man 
it was open at the beginning not to become 
men of this kind, and so they are unjust and 
self-indulgent voluntarily." (62)
Is this original choice spontaneous or deliberately 
chosen? Aristotle does speak of self-indulgence as 
being/ 
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being chosen deliberately but this i,s probably� 
reference to particular instances of that vie� .. (t>:;3) If 
the original choice was deliberate it would p:t"esumably 
have been chosen as an apparent good. 
The question of the voluntariness of.thi$ original 
choice is complicated by Aristotle's insistence on the 
importance of the environment on moral development. This 
implies that a bad environment cannot (or perhaps is 
unlikely to) lead to the emergence of a good character. 
"It is difficult·to get from youth up a right 
training if one has not been brought up under 
right laws." (64) 
On what basis, therefore, can the original choice 
to be evil be said to be voluntary if the individual has 
been reared in a bad environment? 
Possibly Aristotle was aware of the danger of a 
deterministic position in his thinking on this point. He 
does recommend that there be laws covering the whole of 
. 
one•s life so that one becomes habituated towards virtuous 
living. (GS) And he holds that the best results will be
achieved if that training is carried out by a centralised 
control. (66) But he does also say that one must be born
with an eye to judge rightly and choose what is right. 
Either we do or we do not have this natural endowment. <67)
Hence his remark: "We are ourselves somehow partly 
responsible for our states of character."(GS) Furthermore 
he argues that states of character are not voluntary in 
the same way as actions. We do control the beginnings 
of our state of character, and it was in our power origin­
ally to do good or evil, but the gradual progress of our 
character was not obvious. (G9) Perhaps Aristotle means
that much depends on the correctness of the environment 
in order to ensure the full development Qf a good character 
once one has made that initial choice of virtue. In 
other words he leaves open the alternatives as to which 
forces are at work in the formation of character. (7o>Yet
Aristotle does also say quite definitely that once the 
original/ .... 
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original choice to be vicious has been made, men are 
held responsible for the development of their vicious 
characters. , Indeed he says that "not to know that it 
is from the exercise of activities on particular objects 
that states of character are produced is the mark of a 
· 
(71)thoroughly senseless person." 
The confusion in Aristotle on this issue is clear. 
On the one hand he wishes to ensure that the lives of 
the citizens will be moulded in such a way that their acts 
will be performed according to a consistently moral 
pattern. <72> Yet, at the same time, he insists that
be held responsible for his character. 
a man 
Once the original choice to be evil has been made, 
the vicious man does follow the same mechanics of choosing 
as the virtuous man, that is, he directs his actions 
towards ends, choosing the appropriate means to achieve 
these goals. Being largely responsible for his character, 
�e is responsible for the way the end of any action appears 
to him. But what is evil will appear to him as an 
apparent good. <73) Yet curiously Aristotle also says that
the vicious man is ignorant of the universal rules of 
conduct and deliberately prefers bad to good acts. <74> But
how can Aristotle expect a wicked man to know the difference 
between good and bad if it is only the virtuous man who 
knows these universal principles of action ? If the 
wicked man deliberately prefers bad to good acts, he 
conceives of the former as being good. When Aristotle 
says that the vicious man deliberately chooses to do that 
evil which is in his power to do, <75)for it is irrational
to suppose that the man who acts unjustly does not wish to 
do so, <76) it seems to be the case that the vicious man
nevertheless lives in accordance with principles he 
conceives of as being good, once he has made the original 
choice to be evil. 
As far as choosing the means towards the achieve­
ment of the end, Aristotle admits that one may talk of an 
evil man deliberating. 
"There/ ..•. 
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"There. is a faculty which is called cleverness, 
and this is such as to be able to do the things 
that tend towards the mark we have set before 
us , and to hit 1 t . " ( 7 7 ) 
If, however, that end or mark is bad then clever­
ness with regard to the means becomes mere smartness or 
cunning. 
In the light of the discussion above, it is surely 
permissible to talk of the vicious man as acting 
rationally, of choosing an evil end and cunningly deliber­
ating on the means required for its achievement. Taking 
the function argument in terms of practical wisdom, vicious 
activities could be said to fit in with the phrase 1'an 
activity of the rational principle." The vicious man would 
also be said to be good in the metaphysical sense of 
lacking nothing, he is the complete, vicious man. Man as 
man is capable of acting rationally, with rational excell­
ence to serve both good and bad ends. He can attain a 
good or bad actuality. It is for this reason that 
Aristotle is forced to equate excellence in rationality 
with moral virtue in order to ensure that man's rational 
excellence, his deliberative skill be directed towards the 
performance of noble deeds. Hence in the analogy with 
the craftsman, excellence in the metaphysical sense 
becomes transformed in the case of man to moral excellence. 
3:5 Vice and happiness. 
That there are many vicious men, more so than good 
ones, in fact, is admitted by Aristotle. "Goodness", he 
says, "is both rare and laudable and noble."(?S) Further­
more, the life of pleasure characterising self-indulgent 
men is said by Aristotle to characterise the mass of man­
kind. <79 > Possibly those who live such a life consider 
themselves to be happy, but Aristotle will have none of 
this. Aristotle speaks of the masses with scorn, 
referring to them as beasts. The vicious man could never 
achieve secondary happiness because "what he does clashes 
with what he ought to do" whereas the good man does what-
he / •... 
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he ought to do. (SO)A wicked man cannot be a lover of self 
since he does not gratify his reason. (Bl) (We have seen,
however, that the wicked man can be regarded as acting 
irrationally. Here Aristotle seems only to be thinking 
of spontaneous wicked actions.) At any rate to dis­
courage any possible evil, rational rebels, Aristotle 
makes it quite clear that vice is a dead end. Whilst a 
man becomes vicious voluntarily, "now that they have 
become so it is not possible for them not to be s0. 11 <82>
(It may be queried whether if this is indeed the case, the 
vicious man can still be said to be responsible for his 
actions. )
According to this argument the wicked man can never 
contemplate and cannot therefore attain perfect happiness. 
Gauthier agrees with this. 
"It is intelligence of which vice is the 
perversion .•• the vicious man thus cannot 
be a philosopher and contemplation is the 
privilege of the virtuous." (83) 
It will be argued that moral virtue is a necessary 
prerequisite for contemplatio�. <84!ut unfortunately,
Aristotle does seem to admit the possibility of philoso­
phising without speaking about the necessity for being 
morally good as well. For example, he speaks admiringly 
of men like Thales and Anaxagoras who know remarkable 
and divine things. But they do not seek human goods. 
Does this mean that they are not happy ? (SS) However, the 
unhappy philosopher is an impossibility in terms of 
Aristotelea� arguments. 
3:6 Significance of moral virtue 
Moral virtue obviously plays a crucial role in 
Aristotle's ethical theory. Firstly it ensures that 
man 1 s activities will be directed towards morally good 
ends. As Gauthier has expressed this, 
"If the habitual state which is virtue 
makes us capable of doing virtuous things 
without error, it has above all the effect 
of / •••••• 
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of establishing a kind of kinship between 
us and virtuous things and of thus making 
us spontaneously drawn to them ..•• One 
virtuous man .•• by his very virtue, is 
made to want virtuous things and, when he 
does them, it will thus be intentionally 
and for themselves." (86) 
Secondly, it is clear that in some way a morally 
virtuous.life is a prerequisite of perfect happiness. 
Few man are naturally virtuous. To be virtuous 
in the strict sense involves the habitual performance of 
good deeds and the presence of practical wisdom. 
(B?) 
Clearly Aristotle holds it essential that all men ought 
to be virtuous. His ethics, which purports to start 
with what is the case, is prescribing what ought to be 
the case. His empirical starting point may therefore 
be regarded as having been violated, 
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Appendix : The function of education 
The precise function of education is the subject 
of heated debate among educationalists, philosophers, 
psychologists and the like. The following five possible 
functions, which are among those which are sometimes put 
forward,· for example, Russell and Barnes, (88) are not
necessarily regarded as being mutually exclusive, although 
some might disagree. It will be shown that these features 
of education are found in the ethical and political thought 
of Aristotle. 
1. To encourage each individual towards his own particular
self-realisation; to provide opportunities for every
individual to develop his own potentialities.
2. To instil the custom of critical, impartial enquiry.
3. To instil values into the individual.
4. To teach the individual the inherited knowledge of
his culture.
5. To mould the individual in order that he will fit
easily into.the life of his· particular community.
Using these points as a framework for discussion, 
let us discuss Aristotle's views contrasting them with 
the theories of the Behaviourist psychologist, B.F. Skinner 
and with an Existential-type approach. 
the latter view. 
Let us begin with 
Existentialists stress the need for the young to be 
afforded maximum opportunities to discover their own 
particular abilities, being encouraged to choose freely 
for themselves among the many possibilities before them. 
Whilst initially children might be given certain values 
held in their particular society (since the young do 
require some sort of guide) it would be explained that 
since values are socially constructed, these are not 
absolute. Existentialists would therefore emphasise the 
importance of each individual to think critically and as 
far as possible in an impartial way. Whilst the educator 
has/ .•. 
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has the responsibility for presenting as many sides as 
possible of an argument, and as honestly as he is able, 
each student is encouraged to think and decide for himself. 
He must, however, be able to provide a rational justific­
ation for his choice and must accept the responsibility 
involved in choosing freely. 
It has been argued that initially children would 
be given generally accepted values, being told that these 
could be other than they are. However, Existentialists 
would, in terms of their method of education, (hopefully) 
succeed in instilling certain values which are fundamental 
to any Existential thesis. These include the respect of 
the uniqueness of each individual, the value of personal 
freedom and its concomitant responsibility. As free 
individuals, we determine our future and must thus avoid 
being enslaved by our past hesitage. Existentialists 
�ould therefore probably include a study of the inherited 
knowledge of a culture without absolutizing it. In the 
above senses, therefore, we may say of the values of 
Existentialism that they are llopen-ended". 
Four of the five points listed above have been 
covered. The fifth, namely the moulding of the individual 
in order to fit easily into the life of his community, 
would be abhorrent to Existentialism. Rather the stress 
is on individuality, on the importance of respecting the 
freedom, autonomy and uniqueness of every person in society. 
A positive criticism of this type of education lies 
in a seeming paradox. For by giving the student an 
unlimited range of freedom, we are also imposing certain 
limitations on him. Thus it might be argued that we 
prevent him from discovering those sorts of qualities 
which he might acquire in a less tolerant atmosphere, for 
example, self-discipline and the ability to deal with 
frustrating situations. However, it is maintained that 
the individual who realises his potentialities is one 
whose various needs have been fulfilled. Both Maslow 
(whose views on education resemble the Existential 
thesis/ 
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thesis (B9) ) and Aristotle would regard the un-self­
disciplined individual as being far from self-realisation. 
Skinner, who would never use Existential-type terminology, 
nevertheless implicitly recognises the importance of 
certain needs being fulfilled. His well-educated 
individual too is eminently self-controlled. 
Aristotle's views on education, as.contained in 
the Nicomachean Ethics and Politics provide an interesting 
comparison. For him, the ultimate aim of education is 
happiness or living well, which presupposes that the 
individual has actualised his potentialities as man. 
Part of his educational scheme does include some exposure 
to the inherited knowledge of his Greek culture, though 
in an expurgated form. For "we must keep all that is of 
inferior quality far away from the young, particularly 
these things that contain repulsive evil." <9o) Aristotle's
.actual educative program will not be discussed in detail. 
The point with which we are concerned. is the way Aristotle 
manages to fuse all five points above in his philosophy of 
education, largely through the role of practical wisdom. 
Children are taught good habits, yet Aristotle would not 
hold that if every individual has a good character, each 
acts in the same way as his fellow. The structure of 
the practical syllogism which may be said to provide 11 the 
mechanics of action" makes it clear that Aristotle allows 
for every action to be treated in a unique way. The minor 
premise refers to the particular situation in which the 
individual finds himself and in terms of which he must 
choose the means to enable him to reach his goal. Further­
more, the mean is relative to each individual, again 
seeming to allow for individual differences. It is also 
clear that Aristotle did not consider all individuals 
capable of the same degree of self-actualisation (although 
why this is so is not explained adequately). Slaves, 
women and children participate in varying degrees in the 
virtues in terms of the degree or lack of the deliberative 
faculty in their souls. Unlike Existentialists, therefore, 
Aristotle does discriminate a priori among individuals 
all/ 
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all are not equal. Despite.these arguments, there is 
nevertheless a feeling generated in Aristotle's thought 
that Aristotle's good men will largely resemble the proud 
man. (9l) A city state consisting of a collection of these
worthies would not necessarily be universally acceptable 
in the light of Aristotle's characterisation of that 
epitome of virtue. 
The realisation of potentialities in full, when it 
includes the subdivisions of theoretical wisdom, implies 
that the individuql will have the ability to carry out 
critical and impartial inquiries. 
In a good state, the good man will also be a good 
citizen. (92> The happy man will therefore be one who,
through education, has been moulded to fit into his 
society, performing his political tasks with excellence. 
Aristotle's belief in the preferability of a 
centralised control of behaviour in order to produce the 
happy man and the good citizen finds its echo in the 
albeit more sophisticated theories of the Behaviourist, 
Skinner. There are, however, two fundamental differences 
in their thought, viz. their views on the way man is to be 
conceived of, and their attitudes to punishment. 
Aristotle's concept of man as an autonomous, free 
individual who deliberates, chooses, acts, and is held 
responsible for his actions, is given credit for his 
successes and blamed for his failures, is rejected by 
Skinner as being "pre-scientific". (93>
What, asks Skinner, have we achieved in making the 
world a better place on the basis of this pre-scientific 
way of thinking about a person? How far have we been 
able to explain and to control behaviour ? Of what use 
have been the numerous ethical and religious treatises in 
their exhortations to man to become good? Skinner's 
point is that it is precisely because we do resort to the 
idea of an 11 inner man", a "free self", that we are un­
successful in answering these questions. Skinner there-
fore/ ..•. 
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fore proposes that we now consider man in the "scientific 
way", i.e. we study him in terms of the way he behaves 
in given sets of circumstances. Instead, therefore, of 
speaking in terms of a "body" with a "self"(94>within, we
must now think in terms of "a body which is a person in 
the sense.that it displays a complex repertoire of 
behaviour."(95> Skinner is not denying that there may
be any mental processes, but as a science, behaviourism 
is concerned only with what is publicly observable. It 
is concerned with the stimulus which acts on the organism 
and the response which is the overt or observable behaviour 
of the organism. Hence we see the importance of the 
environment in shaping and controlling behaviour. 
In the light of this argument, the writing of ethics 
must, in Skinner's view, be replaced by a properly super­
vised centralised system of behavioural control. For, as 
Skinner points out, our behaviour is determined or 
controlled by many factors in a haphazard way. These 
f�ctors often compete with each other, the parent with the 
teacher, the philosopher with the advertiser. How, 
therefore can we expect an individual to behave only, for 
example, as the philosopher advocates ? 
What therefore are the aims of the Skinnerean 
Utopia? The main goal is to condition the inhabitants 
of that society towards the achievement of self-control. 
Children are taught to build up "a tolerance for annoying 
experiences 11 ! 96) For example, they are taken for a walk,
return home tired and hungry, and are then made to stand
in front of food for some minutes without eating.
Controllers encourage children to pass the time in a good­
natured way. Thus, in Skinner's words, "a system of
gradually increasing annoyances or frustrations {is set
up) against a background of complete security. 1
1( 97>
Children achieve a tolerance for annoying experiences. 
In short, Skinner's aim is not to control the final 
behaviour, but rather to ensure that the individual will 
achieve self-control, being able to adjust to any situation. 
In / ••.. 
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In this way Skinner would avoid the charge of producing a 
society of mechanised robots • 
. The parallel between Skinner's views above and those 
of Aristotle is quite striking, despite the fact that 
Aristot-le does conceive of man in the "pre-scientific way". 
(Yet, as we have seen, he does recognise the influences of 
various determining factors.) It is surely not too far­
fetched to compare the man who has acquired good habits 
and is therefore self-controlled (9S) with the Skinnerean­
conditioned version above. In the same way too, Aristotle's 
trained man would be able to adapt to any contingencies. 
The performance of morally good actions is never merely 
mechanical. 
Skinner rejects punishment as a means to control 
behaviour. He writes : 
"A person who has been punished is not 
thereby simply less incline� to behave in 
a given way: at best he learns to avoid 
punishment." (99) 
Skinner goes on to argue that the task of a science 
of behaviour is "not to encourage moral struggle or to 
build or demonstrate inner virtues. It is to make life 
less punishing and in so doing to release for more 
reinforcing activities the time and energy consumed in 
the avoidance of punishment." (lOO)
Aristotle would surely concur with this latter 
remark. He does not regard the man who indulges-in a 
moral struggle with any favour,(lOl)although he does admit
that the actual formation of good habits is difficult 
because of the delight one feels in pleasures. (l02)
However, Aristotle does stress the importance of 
punishment in the shaping of behaviour : 
"Again, if the virtues are concerned with 
actions and passions, and every passion and 
every action is accompanied by pleasure and 
pain, for this reason also virtue will be 
concerned with pleasures and pains. This 
is indicated also by the fact that punishment 
is/ .... 
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is afflicted by these means; for it is a 
kind of cure, and it is the nature of cures 
to be effected by contraries." (103) 
"For most people obey necessity rather than 
argument, and punishment rather than·a sense 
of what is noble." (104) 
The efficacy of punishment in the shaping of 
behaviour is subject to much debate among psychologists. 
Summ_arising various theories of punishment, the psycholo­
gists Deese and Hulse conclude that it is possible to ,ain 
the impression that punishment is an ineffective and 
wasteful technique to use in the establishment and guidance 
of behaviour. Adding that punishment does, however, work 
in practice, Deese and Hulse point to the need for further 
research into this sphere of behaviour. 
(lOS) 
Whether, 
therefore, Aristotle or Skinner is correct about the use 
or misuse of punishment in shaping behaviour cannot be 
�nswered at this stage. But the efficacy of positive 
reinforcements seem to be undeniable. 
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CHAPTER 4 : THE STRUCTURE OF A GOOD ACT - THE PRACTICAL 
SYLLOGISM 
4:1 Introduction 
In the previous section it was argued that the 
importance of moral virtue lay initially in its 
direction of man's actions towards noble ends. It was 
also suggested that the life of moral virtue must in some 
way be necessary for perfect happiness. 
contentions must be examined in detail. 
These two 
Let us begin by 
a consideration of the structure of a morally good act in
order to elucidate the role of moral virtue therein. The 
relationship between such acts and contemplation will be 
dealt with in Chapter 9. 
Examples from the Nicomachean Ethics may be cited 
to back up the contention that only the morally virtuous 
man desires a good end. Virtue is said to determine the 
end, whilst practical wisdom enables us to choose the 
correct means in order to attain that goal. (1) 
However, this argument seems to be challenged by 
the following passages : 
"Excellence in deliberation will be correct­
ness with regard to what conduces to the end 
which practical wisdom apprehends truly. 11 (2) 
11Virtue makes the choice right." (3)
It obviously becomes necessary to justify the 
argument given that it is the role of moral virtue to 
ensure that-men's actions are directed towards noble 
ends. This requires a detailed examination of the 
practical syllogism which may be regarded as providing 
us with the "mechanics of action". (Allan speaks of the 
practical syllogism as being an account of "the psycho­
physics of action", that is, what happens to the besouled 
man in his process of initiating change through action.) (4)
It will also, however, be shown tha� the practical 
syllogism is intended as a moral imperative, telling men 
how they ought to act in order to be morally virtuous. 
Some I
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Some commentators have argued that the practical 
syllogism is regarded by Aristotle as an inclusive 
account of the whole process of deliberation and choice 
which characterises voluntary action. Hardie, however, 
rejects this view, arguing that the role of the practical 
syllogism may well be."humbler" than is supposed. (S) 
Hardie backs up his claim by asking how the example given 
in De Motu Animalum can be accounted for in syllogistic 
form. 
"I need a covering, and a cloak is a covering, 
I need a cloak. What I need I ought to make; 
I need a cloak, I ought to make a cloak." (6) 
Hardie also challenges the practical syllogism to 
account for the following passage: 
"They assume the end and consider how and by 
what means it is to be attained; and if it 
seems to. be produced by several means they 
consider by which it is most easily and best 
produced, while if it is achieved by one 
only they consider how it will be achieved 
by this and by what means this will be 
achieved, till they come to the first cause 
which in the order of discovery is last." (7) 
It will, however, be argued that the practical 
syllogism is intended to cover Aristotle's views on 
deliberation and choice. However, since Aristotle himself 
has not provided us with a full, clear, exhaustive 
exposition of the practical syllogism, this argument can 
obviously not be regarded as the last word. {S) It is 
extremely difficult to formulate the major and minor 
premise of.the practical syllogism in such a way to cover 
the scattered examples given by Aristotle in his various 
writings on that subject. <9> The formulation we shall
choose may be regarded as a kind of shorthand which implies 
the detailed discussions given on the nature and function 
of the major and minor premises and the conclusion. (lO
)
A further problem involved in giving a clear account 
of the practical ·syllogism lies in the fact that there can 
never be a direct relationship between the realm of moral 
action (i.e. the practical syllogism) and man's perfect 
end/ •... 
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end of happiness. For the two realms of reason belong 
to different orders of knowledge.(ll) Hence happiness in
the sense of the activity of contemplation can never 
stand as the major premise, that final end for the sake 
of which we deliberate about means. 
But even secondary happiness, which is well doing -
"it is a kind of moral action since it is well doing 11 <12) _ 
never appears as the major premise either, although Aristotle 
implies that it should. For he says that it is "the mark 
of a man of practical wisdom to be able to deliberate well 
..• about what sorts of things conduce to the good life in 
general." ( 13)
The following passage also therefore provides 
difficulties : 
"Honour, pleasure, reason and every virtue 
we choose inqeed for themselves (for if 
nothing resulted from them we should still 
choose each of them) but we choose them also 
for the sake of happiness, judging that by 
means of them we shall be happy." (14) 
The practical syllogism does not and can npt show 
how these ends can also be means towards the attainment 
of perfect happiness. 
There is, however, another difficulty. In his 
discussion on the calculative faculty, Aristotle dis­
tinguishes between the virtues of art and practical wisdom. 
Art is the disposition whereby we make things 11 involving 
a true course of reasoning�"(lS)Ando calls the practical
syllogism insofar as it is concerned with art, the 
productive syllogism. (l6) The main distinction between
the productive and practical syllogisms is that the end 
of the former is a stepping stone to some further end, 
whereas that of the latter is an ,end in itself. "For 
while making has an end other than itself, action cannot: 
for good action itself is its end."(l?) Yet we have 
already seen that virtue is also a means. The contra­
diction has been pointed out (lS) and an attempt will be 
made to overcome the inconsistency by arguing that insofar 
as / -• ••• 
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as moral actions constitute secondary happiness, they 
are ends in themselves. But in some way (to be determined) 
they are also means for the attainment of perfect 
happiness. (l9) For those incapable of the contemplative
life, a morally virtuous life is the self-sufficient and 
final end of their activities. The contemplative life 
is the final and self-sufficient end of a few who are 
probably intellectually gifted. 
Besides moral virtue, there are other 11 constituents" 
of happiness. Aristotle, in the Eudemian Ethics, makes 
a distinction between ''living finely" and "the things 
without which living finely is impossible. 11 <20) One of
these things is health. (2l) (But of course merely being
healthy is not being happy.) Greenwood suggests that one 
should distinguish between those means which are components 
of happiness and those which are external to it. <22>
�ristotle himself did not make such a distinction explicit 
but we may try to discover evidences for it in his thought. 
Walking in order to become healthy.is a means to happiness 
although it is external to that end, whereas the state of 
being healthy and the performance of morally virtuous acts 
would count as components. If we speak about perfect 
happiness, then philosophic wisdom is a component. Aristotle 
seems to recognise this when.he says "As health produces 
health, so does philosophic wisdom produce happiness; for 
being a part of virtue entire, by being possessed and by 
actualising itself it makes a man happy. 11 <23> In the
discussion on the practical syllogism Aristotle seems to 
concentrate.on external means. The relationship between 
external and compo�ent means is unclear. Is it necessary 
to be healthy, for example, in order to be courageous ? 
Presumably the answer would be in the affirmative for in 
terms of Aristotle's conception of man as a unity of body 
and soul, perfection of the soul requires the concomitant 
perfection of the body. Actually being healthy {after 
one has exercised) would be a component of happiness. 
But it is clear that being healthy as a component of 
happiness is different to the performance of a just act, 
for/ 
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for example. Greenwood's distinction has the virtue of 
showing the problems associated with the notion of the 
various means required for the achievement of happiness. 
The practical syllogism, insofar as it provides 
"the mechanics of action" is, as Hardie expresses it, 
"that process in which a rule is applied to a concrete 
situation, the application consisting in the thinker's 
doing something, actually performing as an agent or 
producer."'24) If we refer to the discussion on function,
the practical syllogism tells us how a man ought to act 
in terms of having and obeying a rule. 
As has already been mentioned, the formulation 
chosen as a model for a discussion on the practical 
syllogism is that in De Anima. It is the view of this 
thesis that this is the best and most authoritative 
formulation. c25> Nevertheless in the light of the diffic­
ulties already outlined, this elucidation can only hope 
to be "within the bounds of truth." In terms of the De 
Anima formulation, it is held that the other examples 
given by Aristotle are incomplete. 
The relevant passage from De Anima reads as follows: 
"The major premise is universal, whether 
judgement or proposition, while the minor has 
to do with a particular fact (for the one 
asserts that a man in such a position should 
do such a thing, but the other asserts that 
this present act is such a thing and that I 
am a man in such a position) it is surely 
this latter opinion which causes movement not 
the tiniversal." (26) 
4:2 The major premise 
The major premise provides the starting point o_f 
action. 
"The originating causes of things done consist 
in the end at which they are aimed." (27) 




Aristotle does also say of the major premise 
that its form is "what is best 11 !29 ) The end is "what 
ought to be done, or not to be done. 11 <3o)
The end is the object of the appetite. Aristotle 
distinguishes between desire, inclination (or passion) 
and wish. <3l) Gauthier clarifies these three states as
follows : <32)
Desire is the condition of appetite when it is 
closed to reason. Inclination or passion is the 
condition of appetite wherein appetite partially heeds 
reason. Wish is the condition of appetite when it heeds 
reason fully. 
A wish is therefore characteristic of the rational 
man who is also a morally virtuous man. Since "the end 
appears to each man in a form answering to his character 11 <33>
it is clear that in the case of the good man, his wish is 
not for an apparent good. Rather "that which is in truth 
an object of wish is an object.of wish to the good man, 11 <34>
How do these remarks relate to moral virtue ? 
We never, says Aristotle, deliberate about the end 
of an action, only about those means we require to achieve 
that aim. (JS) For example, if I am a doctor, I do not 
deliberate whether the aim of my actions is to secure the 
health of my patients or not; I only deliberate how to 
make them healthy. An ana-logy can be drawn in the 
sphere of moral activity. If I have a good character, 
if I have been correctly brought up to have good habits, 
then I do not deliberate as to whether or not I will 
perform good actions. Once I have chosen to be good I 
have an habitual wish to perform good deeds. Moral 
goodness ensures that the agent will act for the sake of 
a noble end. As Fortenbaugh puts it, "The morally 
virtuous man has been habituated to believe that 
certain kinds of action are good and desirable. In other 
words, he has acquired goals which are action-guiding. 11 <36)
He has become well-disposed with regard to an emotional 
response/ 
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. · . i (37)response to a situat on. As Gauthier puts this 
point, a good character ensures that we have the right 
intentions habitually. We will do things which are 
objectively virtuous for their own sakes. <3B)
There are, •obviously, many different kinds of 
good acts, for . example_, acts of courage, j ustic.e, 
liberality and the like. If I have a good character I 
will always strive to perform these acts. But what is 
an act of courage, or justice or liberality? 
I know what an act of courage is ? 
How do 
Writing about the courag·eous man Aristotle says, 
"The man, then, who faces and who fears the right things 
and from the right motive, in the right way and at the 
right.time, and who feels confidence under the correspond­
ing conditions is brav.e; for the brave man feels and acts 
according to the merits of the case and in what ever way 
the rule directs."(39)
Let us now fuse this definition with the formulation 
given in De Anima <4o) in delineating the major premise. 
"A man who faces fear, should fear the 
right things from the right motive in 
the right way at the right time." 
Now let us consider how a man becomes brave. Is 
it not through repeated acts of bravery that a man is 
habitually disposed to perform brave acts ? (4l) In short, 
through the performance of particular acts we come to 
know the universal formulation - we know what courage is. 
This argument sounds like an example of induction. Ross 
says of induction that it was for Aristotle "(essentially)
a process not of reasoning but of direct insight, mediated 
psychologically by a review of particular instances. 11 <42>
Aristotle speaks of intuitive reason as grasping the 
minor premise of the practical syllogism. <43) But
according to the argument above there is also an element 
of intuitive reasoning involved in knowing the major 
premise (as is the case in the categorical syllogism). 
so 
Indeed it is held that the distinction between theoretical 
and practical wisdom is not tenable, and that theoretical 
�isdom plays a role in formulating the end. (44>
The major premise, as stated above, is a formulation 
of a general moral rule. Ignoring (as Aristotle does) the 
role of theoretical wisdom in being able to arrive at such 
rules, it is through practical wisdom that we know the 
moral rule. We have already seen that practical wisdom 
tells us what means to choose to attain an end, but as 
numerous commentators (45> have pointed out practical reason 
has the function too of knowing general moral rules and 
then applying them to particular cases (which latter 
activity wi.11 involve knowing what means to choose). Thus 
as Aristotle puts it, "A man has practical wisdom not by 
knowing only but by being able to act. 11 <46>
In terms of the objections made at the beginning 
of this chapter, it is clear that moral virtue and practical 
wisdom both play an integral role in clarifying the end of 
any action. Not only must a man be well-disposed to seek 
always to perform good actions, that is, be morally virtuous, 
but he must also know what good actions are, he must know 
the general rules. Aristotle says this knowledge is 
provided by·practical wisdom. But it has been argued 
that insofar as there is an element of what we have called 
"induction" practical wisdom does also seem to involve 
theoretical wisdom. Indeed it is clear that inductive 
knowledge cannot be separated from moral deeds. This 
point will again emerge in the discussions on the minor 
premise. 
4:3 The minor premise and the conclusion. 
The minor premise tells us about the particular 
circumstances of the action. 
Let us once more consider the brave man, that is 
the man who is habitually disposed to perform deeds of 
courage. He finds himself in a particular situation - for 
example he sees a burning house with a child trapped 
inside./ 
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inside. In terms of the De Anima model, the minor 
premises are 
(i) I am a man in the face of fear.
(ii) This is an act of courage - I have the right
motive, this is the right way and the right
time to fear.
Let us elucidate these propositions. 
In terms of the twofold function of practical 
wisdom, I recognise firstly that this particular situation 
·I find myself in is an example or an instance of the
general moral rule of courage. Furthermore, in the 
light of my habitual intention to perform courageous acts, 
I must, secondly, deliberate about the means I must choose 
in order to achieve that end. I must decide on the right 
way to act. The right way lies in a mean which is 
relative to me and which depends on my particular tempera­
ment as well as the circumstances of my situation. I know 
I must avoid cowardice, but that !_must also not be fool-
hardy. In deliberating about the means (which involve the 
notion of a mean) I am deliberating about that which lies 
in my own power and can be done by me , · through my own 
efforts. ( 47)For example, if I am not a particularly
athletic kind of person, I will not plan my act of rescue 
to involve any acrobatic feat. Referring to the account 
of deliberation mentioned earlier (4B) there are two kinds 
of alternatives open to me : 
(i) I may decide that there are several means available
to me to rescue the child; I will then consider which
is most easily or best produced.
(ii) I may decide that there is only one possibility and
I must then consider how to put this into practice!49>
Referring once more to Aristotle's theoretical/ 
practical reason dichotomy, it is surely clear that the 
former must in some way play a role in deliberation. For 
example, I must have some scj..entific knowledge about how 
fire is kindled and extinguished. Aristotle does speak 
of / ..•. 
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of intuitive reason as involved in grasping the minor 
premise. <5o) Ross· says of the ultimate minor premise
that it is grasped by a kind of perception, a "direct 
unreasoned type of perception which seems to be found in 
individuals who have had a certain amount of experience 
in life:'<51>1n, this way, Ross distinguishes the intuitive
reason of practical wisdom from that of theoretical 
wisdom. Nevertheless, as we have pointed out, the 
separation does not work. There does appear to be strong 
evidence for a kind of induction operating in the major 
premise as well. Indeed, one cannot isolate the sphere 
of moral action from theoretical knowledge. 
The ability to deliberate well is, as Aristotle 
puts it, that correctness of deliberation which tends to 
attain what is good. (52) It is "rightness in respect both
of the end, the manner and the time. 11 <53> Hence when 
Aristotle says that "it is characteristic of men of 
practical wisdom to have deliberated well, excellence in 
deliberation will be correctness with regard to what 
conduces to the end which practical wisdom apprehends 
truly", (S4)he is referring to the deliberation directed
towards discovering the mean which tells the right way to 
act in order to achieve the end in question. ( 55)
Besides excellence of del:j.beration, the man of 
practical wisdom has the virtue of understanding which is 
the "exercise of the faculty of opinion for the purpose 
of judging what someone else says about matters with which 
practical wisdom is concerned, and of judging soundly. 11 <56>
Judgement which is "the right discrimination of the 
equitable II may either b.e sympathetic or correct, that is, 
it discriminates what is equitable correctly or it judges 
what is true. <57> In short, understanding and judgement
are concerned with a grasp of general rules as well as 
their application to the concrete situation. 
The discussion above covers the role of practical 
wisdom in the sphere of deliberation. In terms of the 
objections raised at the start of this chapter we do still 
have/ .•.. 
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have to explain in what sense virtue may be said to make 
the choice right. 
To recapitulate the formulation of the minor 
premise given above - we said (ii) This is an act of 
courage. I have the right motive, this is the right way 
and the right time to fear. (SB)
It is clear that having the right motive comes 
from one's state of character. The importance of moral 
virtue in the·process of choosing means will be discussed, 
but let us firstly say something about choice itself. 
"Choice," says Aristotle, "cannot exist either 
without reason or intellect or without a moral state."(59>
For choice involves desire and reasoning with a view to 
some end. Choice is "deliberate desire of things in our 
power."(GO) In order for a choice to be a good one, it 
�ust firstly be related to the right object which must be 
what is good, that is, our desire must be right. (6l)
Since, secondly, choice involves a rational principle and 
thought, one's reasoning must also be true. (G2) This
means that choice lies in what is intermediate, that is in 
the mean. (63)
The importance of moral virtue in the process of 
choice is well-illustrated by Burnet: 
"On a given occasion there will be a 
temperature which is just right for my 
morning bath. If the bath is hotter 
than this, it will be.too hot; if it is 
colder, it will be too cold. But as this 
right temperature varies with the con­
dition of my body, it cannot be ascertained 
by simply using a thermometer. If I am 
in good general health I shall, however, 
know by the feel of the water when the 
temperature is right. So if I am in good 
moral health I shall know, without appeal­
ing to a formal code of maxims, what is the 
right degree e.g. of indignation to show 
in a given case, how it be shown and to-
wards whom." (64)
In / .... 
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In other words, the importance of moral virtue 
i-n choosing means is that one chooses what is good and
noble in its own right. (GS) It therefore becomes clear,
as Taylor puts it, why Aristotle demands "goodness of
character as a preliminary condition of intellect or
judgement in moral matters." (G6) Hence Aristotle's
observation, "this eye of the soul (practical wisdom) 
acquires its formed state not without the aid of virtue. 1 ( 67)
Thus "the object of reason in the calculative faculty is 
truth corresponding to right desire" (or goodness of
character) • ( 68) 
The actual choice to perform a particular act 
constitutes the conclusion of the practical syllogism. 
Having chosen, there is yet another faculty which is "such 
as to be able to do the things that tend towards the mark 
we have set before ourselves, and to hit it."(G�) This is 
the faculty _of cleverness which takes care of the things 
to be done to carry out our choice. The importance of 
moral virtue is stressed, for if the agent does not aim 
at noble ends, cleverness is merely smartness or cunning. 
4:4 Discussion 
When, therefore, we speak of an action which is 
characterised by having been deliberately chosen, the 
initial wish has been provided by reason with the means 
to become fulfilled - it becomes deliberate choice. 
To choose deliberately is therefore to choose in the 
light of general principles. Hence, as Hardie expresses 
it, 11 to syllogise in action is to apply a rule of the 
form 'such and such a man should act in such and such 
ways with a view to realising an end. ,n(?O) The act can
only be good if the agent is morally virtuous for only 
in such a case are his actions directed towards noble 
ends. Furthermore, in Aristotle's view, it is only the 
virtuous man who will choose the right means, who will 
deliberate correctly·, and whose cleverness will be praise­
worthy. 
This discussion on the nature of the practical 
wisdom/ 
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wisdom makes it quite clear why practical wisdom and 
moral virtue require each other. 
"The syllogisms which deal with acts to 
be done are things which involve a start­
ing point, viz. since the end i.e. what 
is best, is of such and such a nature, 
whatever it may be (let it for the sake 
of argument be what we please) and this 
is not �vident except to the good man, 
for wickedness perverts us and causes us 
to be deceived about the starting points 
of action. Therefore it is evident that 
it is impossible to be practically wise 
without being good." (71) 
The wicked man, ruined by pleasure and pain, is 
unable to see "any such originating cause 11 < 72 > and his 
actions can never be directed towards noble ends. 
Strictly speaking, therefore, he cannot have practical 
wisdom, since it is "the mark of a man of practical 
wisdom to be able to deliberate well about what is good 
and expedient for himself, not in some part�cular 
�espect, for example, about what sorts of thing conduce 
to health or to strength, but about what sorts of thing 
conduce to the good life in general." <73)
Whilst, therefore, Aristotle restricts the 
possession of practical wisdom to the morally virtuous 
man, it has been argued that a man may deliberate 
excellently in order to achieve an evil end. If 
"excellence" is used in the metaphysical sense of "lacking 
nothing", that is a skill in reasoning which enables the 
deliberator to take all contingencies into a�count, then 
deliberative excellence in this sense could fall within 
the scope of function as discussed by Siegler. Certainly 
Aristotle does admit that the evil man can also be clever. 
The clever, bad man, can deliberate correctly and as a 
result of his calculation can attain his evil aims. (74>
This argument obviously only applies to the deliberately 
performed wicked act. The other kind, vicious act, the 
spontaneous act, is not deliberative. Aristotle says of 
the appetites that if they are "strong and violent they 
even expel the power of calculation." <75> Allan points
out / •... 
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out that "the self-indulgent man should be regarded as 
a responsible agent acting consistently upon principles 
for which he deserves to be blamed. There are perverse 
major premises and acts which follow necessarily from 
them." (76)
Thus although Aristotle does not specifically 
illustrate the mechanics of choice in the case of the 
vicious· man, it is clear that such an individual can 
deliberate correctly. There are, says Aristotle, 
several ways of using the phrase "correctness in 
deliberation. 1 ( 77 > But he limits "correctness" to
excellence in relation to a good end, eliminating the 
idea of correctness as skill. Thus moral goodness be-
comes an integral part of practical wisdom. The wicked 
man can therefore never be practically wise, in terms of 
the Aristotelean conception of it. 
The major premise of the practical syllogism is
not formulated as "a man in such a position does such a 
thing" but rather a man ought_ to do such a thing when in 
such a position. A man "ought to choose that which is 
intermediate, not the excess or defect, and •.• the 
intermediate is determin� by the dictates of the right 
rule."(?B) Practical wisdom tells us what the right rule 
is, but it cannot exist apart from moral virtue. <79)
It is not the case that man's function insofar as 
it is an act�vity of the rational element consists in 
having a rule and the ability to follow that rule. Rather 
this is what his function ought to be. He ought to 
syllogise in the manner of the good man. 
The importance of moral virtue in Aristotle's 
discussion on the practical syllogism which deals with 
the "mechanics of action" is clear. Any action, in order 
to be good, must be good both in will and in deed. (BO)
In other words the intention of the agent must be right. 
It is not enough that the act have a virtuous character. 




them; in the first place he must have knowledge, 
secondly he must choose the acts, and choose them for 
their own sakes, thirdly his action must proceed from 
a firm and unchangeable character."(Sl) Moral virtue 
is that state of character which ensures that man 
directs his acts to good ends. Not only is moral 
virtue important in this sense, but Aristotle holds 
that only the good man will choose the.correct means so 
that the deed, in exemplifying the mean, will be right. 
Moral vi�tue and practical wisdom work together harmon­
iously in the morally good man. 
4:5 Hampshire on thought and action. 
Perhaps one of the best modern criticisms of 
Aristotle's practical syllogism is to be found in the 
work of the so-called Nee-Aristotelean, Stuart Hampshire. 
Hampshire (82) has criticised.Aristotle's doctrine 
of the practical syllogism as being an inadequate 
account. He says that "there are too many different 
levels of rationality and deliberateness in conduct, too 
many varieties of half-intentional action and half­
conscious thought for any tidy formula to fit."(S3) We
still, for example, know very little of the way the 
unconscious works and its role in the realm of action. 
(Certainly Aristotle was unaware of the possibility of 
unconscious motivation.) 
Hampshire's own account of thought and action is 
more detailed and one of its main contributions is 
arguably his rejection of the Aristotelean separation of 
theoretical and practical wisdom (or knowledge). 
Hampshire argues that both inductive and intentional 
knowledge are necessary and complementary for any action. 
Both kinds of knowledge are a prelude to an action, 
whereas for Aristotle it is only practical wisdom which 
is concerned with doing. It has, however, been argued 
that theoretical reason does play. a role in the perform­
ance of moral acts insofar as it is concerned with the 
formulation/ ..•. 
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formulation of the major and minor premises. Hampshire 
argues that a person needs to use inductive methods to 
predict what will happen in nature, and then he decides 
on his intention which is supported by reasons. But 
inductive knowledge must precede intentional knowledge 
because any attempts are defined by one's expectation of 
their effects. 
According to Hampshire, freedom lies in the 
effectiveness of intentions. Intentions are formed on 
the basis of inductive knowledge. The mo�e reliable 
our inductive knowledge, the more effective our intentions 
and the greater our freedom. An individual is less free 
when his intentions are increasingly worthless as a basis 
for predicting his actions. His inductive knowledge will 
be so unreliable that his actual action will·be at 
variance with his intentions. Hampshire argues that 
·the greater our knowledge of human nature the fuller our
inductive knowledge and the more information we have to
. 
take into account when forming intentions and decisions.
Through deliberate self-reflection an individual can
therefore increase his freedom as his inductive knowledge
becomes more and more reliable. He must also examine his
beliefs (which are determined by his social environment
in every situation he "finds hims·elf. For· Hampshire,
therefore, a man has the choice either of submitting
passively to those influences which determine his inductive
knowledge, or of deliberate self-reflection, in order to
understand and possibly to change some of those
influences,·thereby increasing his freedom.
If we refer to the discussion on the theory of
agency which follows this section, (B4>it becomes clear
that, in fact, Aristotle's thought could lend itself to
a theory of freedom somewhat similar to Hampshire's
position, which may be called "soft 11 determinism. For
Aristotle does, as we have seen, admit of determining
factors. Yet he does also presuppose man's freedom
to choose in his philosophy of action. (SS)But Aristotle
was / •.•• 
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was clearly not fully aware of the tensions in his 
ethical thought between determinism and freedom. In 
any case, the separation of theoretical from practical 
thinking was distinct, and Aristotle could not admit the 
former into the realm of the latter given their separate 
functions and objects of �nowledge. A theory of "soft" 
determinism is therefore impossible in terms of the 
principles of Aristotle's thought. 
4:6· Aristotle and the theory of agency. 
It may be shown that Aristotle's views on freedom 
implicit in his discussion on voluntary acts may be said 
to constitute an example of a theory of agency. 
In his discussion on the distinction between 
voluntary and involuntary actions, Aristotle ascribes two 
fundamental conditions to the former. Firstly the agent 
,is the moving principle of the action, that is, he is 
self-moved and not compelled by any external agency. 
Secondly he has knowledge of the action and the objects 
with which the action is concerned. (8G)
As Richard Taylor points out, Aristotle's arguments 
fit into a general theory of agency. <87> Such a theory,
as Taylor formulates it, is an attempt to overcome a 
deterministic position which would hold that no man can 
be morally responsible for his actions. Taylor therefore 
speaks of two requirements for such a theory. <88)
(i) There is a reason for everything that
_happens.
(ii) Human acts, however, are contingent.
In other words, a theory of agency (of which
Aristotle's thought would be an example) implies that 
"an act for which an agent is responsible is performed 
by him but that he, in turn, is not causally necessitated 
to do it."(S9) An agent is therefore a being who acts.·
It is not the case that behaviour is a causal consequence 
of the way that a being is acted upon. 
Taylor / .•.. 
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Taylor goes on to argue that such a theory 
involves firstly the agent performing certain acts 
rather than being determined by antecedent states and 
events in his history. Secondly it involves a concept-
ion of causation whereby the notion of an agent causing 
an act means that he originates that act. And as 
Taylor points out, "this is evidently the conception of 
Aristotle who spoke of living things as 'self-moved' . . (9o)
Although the theory of agency is possibly a viable 
way out of the freedom-determinism dilemma, the problem is 
that Aristotle does explicitly mention certain determining 
influences on the individual. Hence this theory may be 
regarded as an inadequate "solution" - a "solution" in 
terms of "soft" determinism seems a better proposition. 
But this is precluded by Aristotle's formal theory of the 
two kinds of reason whereby theoretical reasoning is 
excluded from the sphere of moral action. 
The freedom-determinism problem is not merely of 
academic interest, Let us consider briefly the question 
of imputing responsibility. Aristotle does, of course, 
deal with this point arguing that an individual is held 
responsible for any action if he was the moving principle 
of that action and if he knew the particular circwnstances 
surrounding that action. It is difficult to assess the 
importance of the environment and one's upbringing in 
deciding responsibility. But as Haksar (9l) has pointed 
out, whilst considering whether the individual could help 
doing what he did at the actual time of the action in 
question is a necessary condition for deciding respon­
sibility, it is arguably not a sufficient condition. An 
additional factor might well be "how far we could have 
helped things in the past. 11 <92) As has already been
pointed out, Aristotle was aware of the role of the 
environment on the formation of character. But he did 
also insist that each individual be held responsible for 
his character. <93> This tension remains an unresolved
issue in Aristotle's ethical thought. 
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CHAPTER 5 :  THE SPECTRUM FROM VIRTUE TO VICE 
5:1 Introduction 
One of the corner-stones of the Socratic ethic is
the maxim 11Virtue is knowledge", and its corollary, "No 
man does evil willingly." We have already seen that 
Aristotle rejects the idea that evil actions are invol­
untary. Vice is voluntarily chosen by the individual 
who is held responsible for that choice. The maxim does 
also imply that the man who knows what is good will do 
what is good. In terms of the practical syllogism this 
means that once the correct minor premise has been joined 
to the relevant major premise, an action necessarily 
follows. Yet it was clear to Aristotle that there are 
men who do know what is good, who know what they ought to 
do, and yet fail to do so. It was therefore necessary 
for him to try to explain the phenomenon of incontinence. 
Being nevertheless in sympathy with the Socratic position, 
Aristotle did try to present his explanation in terms of 
a distinction in uses of the word "know". 
Besides incontinence or moral weakness, Aristotle 
describes a wide spectrum of good and evil actions. These 
have been listed in terms of the Socratic position. 
The importance of moral virtue is clear when we 
consider which acts are to be pardoned and which are 
blameworthy. For only those individuals who, although 
their acts are evil, nevertheless possess a good character, 
will be pardoned. The good man who involuntarily, or in 
anger, performs an evil action is pardoned, for such acts 
are not vice in the strict sense. 
In this chapter we shall deal briefly with the 
various types of virtuous and vicious acts, paying 
particular attention to incontinence proper and the 
sphere of unnatural acts. Incontinence has always 
presented problems in interpretation. It will be shown 
that in fact Aristotle does present a coherent account. 
Ari.stotle' s / ..•. 
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Aristotle's attitude to incontinence also provides 
interesting material for discussion. 
to be self-controlled at all times? 
Should men strive 
His discussion 
on unnatural acts raises the controversial question of 
what constitutes "normal" behaviour. 
5:2 Knowing what is good and doing what is good. 
5:2:1. The morally virtuous man and the god-like individual. 
In terms of the Aristotelean argument, the knowledge 
possessed by the morally good man belongs to the sphere 
of practical wisdom. It has been seen that practical 
wisdom implies the possession of moral virtue. Making an 
explicit reference to Socrates, Aristotle says: 
"Socrates then thought the virtues were rules 
or rational principles (for he thought they 
were, all of them, forms of scientific know­
ledge) while we think they involve a rational 
principle." (which is practical wisdom). (1) 
The good man ideally not only performs good actions 
but his intentions are good since they proceed from a 
good charaeter. 
Aristotle points out that it is possible for men to 
become gods through an excess of virtue, although this 
state is rarely found. (2) In the Politics, writing about
the outstanding man, Aristotle writes that "if there is 
one man so superlatively excellent (or several but not 
enough to make the whole complement of a city) that the 
goodness and ability of all the rest are simply not to be 
compared with his (or theirs), such men we take not to be 
part of the state but to transcend it. 1 ( 3) These men are
superior to the rest of the citizens both in political 
ability and virtue and must therefore be beyond the 
ordinary laws of the state. 
The question arises as to whether such paragons are 
to be identified with those rare men who may attain perfect 
happiness. Although Aristotle disliked any kind of 
departure from the normal (the god-like man is contrasted 
with/ .•.. 
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with the brute who is said to be "beyond ?tll ordinary 
standards by reason of vice. 1 ( 4)) he admits in the
Politics that such men could not be ostracized. These 
men would therefore govern. The parallel with The 
Republic is obvious. But Aristotle does also imply 
that the contemplative life is beyond politics. To 
talk about gods in political terms, performing brave or 
liberal acts is absurd. (S) Perhaps we might distinguish 
between the perfectly happy man.of perfect virtue and the 
excessively virtuous man; the former would engage in 
contemplation, the latter would be the ruler. But this 
is unsatisfactory because Aristotle never speaks of law­
givers in the Nicomachean Ethics as being excessively 
virtuous. 
It is indeed curious to find Aristotle's dislike 
of extremes extending to excessive virtue. For surely 
yirtue can never be excessive since it is by definition 
concerned with the mean between excess and defect. Could 
• 
one accuse Aristotle of putting forward an ethics of 
medio<:1:rity? Such a criticism would, however, be 
unfair for Aristotle does say that "in respect of its 
substance and the definition which states its essence 
virtue is a mean, with regard to what is best and right 
an extreme. 1 ( 6) Yet Aristotle's uneasiness about excess­
ively virtuous men is inexplicable. 
5:2:2. Incontinence in respect of victory, gain and honour. 
Aristotle distinguishes between those things which 
producing pleasure are necessary. That is, those things 
concerned with food and sexual intercourse, and those 
things which are worthy of choice in themselves but admit 
of excess. These latter are victory, gain and honour,(?) 
and are "generically noble and good" and we do not blame 
men for desiring them, or being affected by them, but only 
if these things are loved excessively. (The influence of 
( 8)the Homeric tradition is very marked in this argument.) 
Yet/ •••• 
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Yet Aristotle. does also say that those who 11 busy them­
selves more than they ought about honour" do know wl:lat 
is good but their acts, whilst being good, can never­
theless be regarded .as going to excess. <9> Strictly
speaking; such acts are evil insofar as they do not 
embody the mean, but Aristotle cannot bring himself to 
say so. The agent who pursues victory, gain or honour 
in excess is regarded as good and his acts may well be 
praised. (lO)
5: 3. Kn·owing what is good and doing what is evil. 
5:3:1. Involuntary actions. 
Involuntary actions are those 11 which take place 
under compulsion or owing to ignorance."(ll) We are not
concerned at this point to examine compulsion and the 
nature of involuntary acts. The question to be answered 
in this discussion is what exactly is the nature of the 
t'gnorance which is said to characterise an involuntary 
act. 
It is, says Aristotle, acting by reason of ignorance, 
being ignorant of the circumstances of the act and the 
objects with which it is concerned. (l2) These include
ignorance of who one is, what one is doing, what or whom 
one is acting upon, what instrument one is using, how one 
is acting and to what purpose. Ignorance of any one of 
these factors renders an act involuntary. (l3}
Hamburger (l4) attaches contemporary legal labels 
to Aristotle's examples of the kinds of involuntary acts 
possible, (lS)thereby illustrating the modern relevance of
his distinctions. 
(i) Mistake: I did not know it was a secret: it slipped
out of my mouth by mistake.
(ii) Error in objectio: I give medicine to save a man
but it kills him because it contains poison.
(iii) Error in persona: Thinking someone (a shadow per­
haps) is an enemy, I kill him and find out he is
my I . . . .
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my friend. 
(iv) Aberratio ictus: I fence without realising that
the button at tne end of the sword is off, and
I wound my opponent.
The �gent performing an involuntary act is not 
therefore ignorant of the universal principles of action 
(the major premise) and has a good character even although 
the act is evil. He cannot be blamed for that act -
rather his deed is pardoned or pitied. (lG)Furthermore, he 
will.repent that action which has caused him pain. 
(l?)
(We shall see how the involuntary is contrasted with the 
non-voluntary in chapter 5:4:1:3.) 
5:3:2. Incontinence in respect of anger. 
A man may indeed know what is good but will per-
form an evil deed as a result of anger. But such an act 
,(which is voluntary) is, according to Aristotle, "less 
disgraceful" than an incontinent act, and the angry man 
' 
(18)is more easily pardoned. 
Aristotle's attempts to justify the higher status 
of anger are interesting. He says that "anger and bad 
temper are more natural than appetites for excess, that 
is for unnecessary objects". (l9) In terms of Aristotle's
thesis on man's function., "a ppetites for excess" must 
indeed be less natural if man is a rational being. But 
a point made in this thesis is that it is because man 
"naturally" does have "appetites for excess" that 
Aristotle's definition of function is as it is; He tries 
to justify his argument further by explaining that "anger 
runs in the family", and that it is, to an extent, open 
to argument. (20) (Vice in the sense of a passionate
action is not open to logical argument. <21>) Anger is
also regarded as being more open than criminal plotting, 
it is accompanied by pain rather than pleasure, and the 
agent is more likely to regret his action. <22>
An act performed in anger is a spontaneous 
voluntary / .... 
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voluntary act, and although the act itself is unjust, <23>
this does not imply that the agent himself is evil, "for 
the injury is not due to vice. 11 <24> The action is there­
fore "rightly judged not to be done of malice afore-
. (25)thought." 
Any such act falls under the label of acts 
performed in ignorance. "The man who is ••• in a rage 
is thought to act as a result not of ignorance but of 
(rage) yet not knowingly but in ignorance."(2G
) 
In
other words rage is the cause of his ignorance. The way 
this lack of knowledge is to be explained is unclear. 
An .act of anger is, according to Aristotle, "thought to 
be less than any others object of choice. 11 <27
) 
There
seems to be a similarity between acts of anger and the 
impulsive form of incontinence, despite the distinction 
made earlier in this section. Perhaps the lack of 
knowledge in the angry man is also explicable in terms 
of the impetuous form of incontinence wherein excitable 
• 
people "by reason of the violence of their passions do 
not await the argument, because they are apt to follow. 
their irnagination. 11 <28> (Yet we have also seen that acts
of anger are open to argument.) All it seems that one 
can suggest is that in some way the major premise must 
be temporarily obscured. 
Although Aristotle lumps together acts' performed 
by the man in a rage and the man who is drunk in his 
voluntary-involuntary distinction, <29> it is surely the
case that they are vastly different acts. An act done 
in anger is excusable; the same cannot be said about 
drunkenness. (JO) The drunk man is a man of evil character 
and has no knowledge of the major premise. <3l)
5:3:3 Incontinence proper. 
5:3:3:1. Introduction. 
It has already been pointed out in the introduction 
to this chapter that, according to Socrates, incontinence 
·was / ••.•
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was impossible. For if a man does know what is the 
best way to act, he could not but act in that way. Yet 
the facts of ordinary experience tell us otherwise. It 
is clear therefore that Aristotle felt the need to explain 
incontinence and did so within the Socratic framework of 
"virtue is knowledge." 
In keeping perhaps with his distinction between 
natural and habitual virtue, Aristotle speaks of an 
innate as well as an habitual incontinence. The latter 
type is, he says, more easily cured than the former for 
although it is difficult to change a habit, nevertheless 
a habit is more easily changed than one's nature. (32)
If Aristotle admits that incontinence may be innate, 
that is part of man's nature,·then it seems that to speak 
also of man's function in terms of having and following 
a rational principle <33) is inaccurate, since this is 
not common to all men. In short, Aristotle's definition 
qf man•s function does seem to be what man ought to be 
like. 
Aristotle makes a further distinction between 
spontaneous incontinence or impetuosity and weakness. In 
the former, the individual does not deliberate, being led 
by hJs emotions. The latter state is characterised by 
the individual deliberating but failing to adhere to the 
conclusions of his deliberations because of his passions! 34 ) 
This distinction is surely in keeping with Aristotle's 
identification of two kinds of voluntary action, 
spontaneous and deliberate, for incontinence is voluntary! 35)
Aristotle de.votes little discussion to impetuosity. Let 
us therefore examine his account of weakness in some 
detail. 
The weak man is one "who is carried away as a 
result of passion and contrary to the right rule - a man 
whom passion masters so that he does not act according 
to the right rule, but does not master to the extent of 
making him ready to believe that he ought to pursue such 
pleasures/ .••• 
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pleasures without reserve."(3G) Thus although both are
concerned with bodily pleasures, the incontinent man 
is contrasted with the self-indulgent man, the former 
being only half-wicked for his purpose is good; he does 
· 
(37} not act of malice aforethought. . For whilst his 
action is voluntary, since he acts in a sense with 
knowledge of what he does and of the end to which his 
act is directed, he does not think he ought to pursue 
(38) bodily pleasures. ·. But the reason for his failing to 
abide by the rule lies in the excess delight he takes in 
bodily things. (39> He is therefore said to act with
appetite and not with choice. (4o) Indeed he is said to
act contrary to his wish for he does those things he 
thinks he ought not to do. (4l) Hence Aristotle says that
the impulses of incontinent people move in contrary 
directions, for whilst the rational principle "urges them 
�right and towards the best objects, there is found in 
them also another element naturally opposed to the 
rational element which fights and resists that principle. 11 <42>
An incontinent person is there.fore at variance with 
himself, having appetites for some things and rational 
desires for others. (43>
The point which bothers Aristotle is how to 
explain incontinence in terms of a lack of knowledge. 
How, in other words, is it accounted for in the formal 
terms of the practical syllogism? 
The incontinent man is not ignorant of the major 
premise for he is not classed as a vicious man. Does 
this mean that his ignorance is of the minor premise ? 
If so, incontinence seems to fall within the class of 
involuntary actions, and then Aristotle's arguments are 
inconsistent. 0 'Connor does come to this conclusion. <44)
Yet although Aristotle does not make this explicit, it is 
clear that incontinence can not be an involuntary act 
since it is acting in ignorance where ignorance is the 
cause of the act but ignorance is in some way due to 
appetite. What needs to be explained therefore is in 
what/ 
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what way the appetites obscure knowledge in the 
incontinent man,_ and to what aspect of the practical 
syllogism this ignorance relates. As will be shown, 
it is the conclusion which is obscured. 
5:3:3:2. Incontinence and Temperance. 
(45) It is generally agreed that Aristotle quotes 
two practical syllogisms to illustrate incontinence. 
These are : 
(i) Dry food is good for every man, I am a man, such
and such food is dry. (4 6)
(ii) Nothing sweet ought to be tasted. 
everything sweet is pleasant. <47>
This is sweet, 
Two questions arise. Firstly, do both syllogisms 
in fact illustrate the concept ·of incontinence ? Secondly, 
;is Aristotle's account of that concept coherent? 
, Before beginning the discussion it must be pointed 
out that as these syllogisms stand in the text, they are 
incompletely formulated in terms of the arguments given 
earlier on the nature of the practical syllogism. <4B)
They will therefore be enlarged upon in this exposition, 
As we have pointed out, Aristotle, in contrasting 
the incontinent and self-indulgent men, says of the former 
that he pursues the present pleasure although he does not 
think that he ought to do so. <49> These pleasures are
the necessary pleasures associated with the body, that is 
those concerned with food and sexual intercourse. (SO) By
saying that the ·incontinent man does not feel he ought to 
pursue these_pleasures of touch and taste, Aristotle is 
surely implying that the major premise must be the same 
as that for the temperate man. For the incontinent 
man is not self-indulgent: his character is not perverted. 
In terms of the arguments given in the discussion-on the 
practica·l syllogism, and being half-wicked insofar as he 
does not abide by his deliberations, the incontinent man 
must/ 
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must be regarded as being sufficiently good to know the 
universal principles of action. Let us now examine 
some of Aristotle's remarks on temperance and self­
indulgence. 
"The temperate man occupies a middle position 
with regard to these things (i.e. what is 
pleasant, pertaining to food and sexual 
.intercourse). For he neither enjoys the 
things the s·elf-indulgent man enjoys most -
but rather dislikes them - nor in general 
the things he should not, not anything of 
this sort to excess •.• but the things that, 
being pleasant, makes for health or for good 
condition, he will desire moderately and as 
he should. 11 ( 51} 
Thus in the temperate man the appetitive element 
will be in harmony with the rational principle, for when 
the appetites are too strong or violent, they expel the 
power of calculation. Hence it is essential that these 
pppetites be few and moderate. (52> Aristotle says that._
"the temperate man craves for the things he ought, as he 
dught and when he ought. 11 <53>
Using these passages let us consider the two 
syllogisms above. At first sight the connections with 
temperance are clear. Dry food is presumably something 
"making for health 1T and perhaps not the sort of food that 
the self-indulgent man would enjoy to excess. The second 
syllogism specifically mentions pleasure. 
In terms of the discussions on the major premise, 
it is suggested that the major premise be formulated 
(in a gener�l sense) as follows : <54)
"A man in such a position should do such a thing" 
becomes "A man in the presence of pleasurable things 
(food and sexual intercourse) should crave for what he 
ought, as he ought, when he ought." 
Applying this to the two examples given, it is 
possible to suggest the following formulations of the 
respective practical syllogisms : 
(i) A / ••••
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(i) A man in the presence of pleasurable things should
eat dry food.
I am such a man. 
Such and such food is dry. 
This is such and such food. 
(ii) A man in the presence of pleasurable things should
not taste anything sweet. <55>
I am such a man. 
This thing is sweet. (Everything sweet is pleasant.) 
5:3:3:3. Incontinence and ignorance. 
Now the question arises - in what sense the 
incontinent man is said to be ignorant. 
Before giving this answer, it is stressed that in 
this thesis it is maintained that Aristotle's account does 
not presuppose the presence of two conflicting syllogisms, 
�specially in the case of (ii). (S6} Hence the sort of
solution given by Allan, for example, is rejected. 
Allan's argument assumes that there are conflicting 
syllogisms depending on the competition between an 
appetite in the form of a desire and one in the form of 
(57) a wish. Arguing that since the appetite has two
objects, the good and the pleasant, Allan maintains that 
the conflict between these appetites depends on the 
difference of "imaginative pictures (which) vary in 
degree of strength and vivacity. 11 <5B) When therefore a
conflict occurs it will be decided by the 11 strength of 
the contending imaginative picture�. 11 <59>
It is the case that Aristotle does hold that 
thinking requires the presence of images. (60) But as
Walsh points out, (Gl)Allan's explanation poses several
queries. For example, in what sense can it be said that 
there is a difference in strength between pictures? 
Furthermore Allan's argument implies that when the wish 
wins the agent acts through imagination. But Aristotle 
says that a man only acts in accordance with the imagin-
ation/ ..•• 
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ation when 11 the mind is temporarily clouded over by 
feeling. 11 <62> This is an important point for Aristotle
does say that excitable people who suffer from the 
impetuous form of incontinence 11 by reason of the violence 
of their passions do not await the argument because they 
are apt to follow their imagination. 11 (GJ) Allan's analysis 
appears therefore to misinterpret the relationship between 
wish, imagination and incontinence as weakness. 
There are, says Aristotle, two senses in which we 
use the word "know". Firstly a man may know and use his 
knowledge. But a man may, secondly, know, but although 
he has the knowledge he is not exercising it. (G4)The
distinction between the possession and exercise of know­
ledge is, as so many commentators have pointed out, 
directly comparable to Plato's discussion in the Theaetetus 
on memory in terms of the aviary image. (G5) What
Aristotle seems to be contending is that the incontinent 
man does have the required knowledge for action, but that 
he does not use it. Hence he is said to have it "at the 
back of his mind" as it were.<�G) 
Let us consider the first syllogism in the light 
of the distinction above. 
The individual in the particular situation knows 
he ought to eat dry food. But either he will not know 
that the ·£ood in front of him is X food (which -is an 
example of dry food), or else he does know that the food 
is X food but he knows it-only at the back of his mind; 
that is, he is not actually exercising his knowledge. 
Does this example illustrate incontinence ? There 
is certainly no suggestion of passions as being the 
"cause" of ignorance. Is this rather an example of an 
involuntary act.ion ? It. is arguable that ignorance in 
this example falls under the label "error in objectio" 
and hence it does belong to the category of involuntary 
acts. 
Ando says that "incontinence and involuntariness 
·should /
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should be distinguished not by the degree of ignorance, 
but in respect of whether this ignorance is concerned 
· 
(67) with facts or values." But does the example of the 
dry food include a value judgement which it should if it 
is to be regarded as incontinence ? Surely it does not. 
Aristotle says of the incontinent man that he can 
use the language that flows from knowledge but this proves 
nothing. (GS) The incontinent man's utterances mean
nothing more than an actor's speech or the recital of the . · 
(69) · verses of Empedocles by a drunkard. The problem is 
that Aristotle does specifically mention the incontinent 
man in relation to these kinds of "knowing" and in 
connection with the dry food syllogism. But agreeing 
with Kenny (?O) it is held that this is in fact not an 
example of incontinence but an illustration of how.the 
two senses of knowing can occur. 
,Introduction to this thesis, it 
food syllogism has perhaps been 
Referring to the 
is suggested that the dry­
erroneously included by 
an editor in such a way that it appears as an example of 
incontinence. There is no way of rela�ing this syllogism 
to the descriptions given by Aristotle of the incontinent 
man. The second syllogism, however, is an account of 
incontinence and will be shown to be consistent with 
these descriptions. 
In speaking about the ignorance of incontinence, 
Aristotle says that it is caused by the passions which 
"actually alter the;bodily condition."(?l) In other 
words, the incontinent man is in a different state to 
the temperate man, and is similar to the man who is 
asleep,. mad or drunk. (72 ) The altered bodily. condition
is the conflict between reason (as a rational wish) and 
desire. ·The incontinent man is gripped by a conflict 
of appetites. Aristotle says 
"Appetites may conflict when reason and 
desire are opposed, and this occurs in 
creatures which have a sense of time 
(for the mind [reason] advises us to 
resist with a view to the future, while 
desire/ •••. 
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desire- only looks to the present, for 
what is momentarily pleasant seems to 
be absolutely·pleasant and absolutely 
good, because desire cannot look into 
the future.") (73) 
· 
That is why Aristotle says that the incontinent 
man, at the time of his action, thinks he ought to pursue 
the·
,
resent pleasure although he does not always think
( 4) so. 
Let us now consider the second syllogism. The 
agent is in a particular situation where he sees something 
sweet before him. He recognises that this is something 
sweet and everything sweet is pleasant. He knows, however, 
that he ought to avoid tasting sweet things for he is not 
a vicious, self-indulgent man. He therefore chooses not 
to taste. However, since he is not temperate this is not 
a fixed, habitual response. Although his rational 
principle does "urge him aright towards the best objects" (75)
he is not virtuous in the strict sense and cannot there­
�ore be said to possess practical wisdom in its complete 
form. He is not habitually disposed to choose in the 
right way, for the right motive, at the right time. The 
point is, however, that he does know what he ought to 
choose. Now a man can be moved by desire as well as by 
reason. (7G} Desire for something arises if an argument
or one's perception tells us that a particular thing is 
pleasari·t. (77> The incontinent man, since he is not
morally virtuous, does not "desire and act in accordance 
with a rational principle."(7S} His desire is not
subservient _to the rational principle, and he takes, more­
over, an excessive delight in the pleasures of food and 
touch. There is therefore a conflict between the 
rational principle urging him to choose what he ought, 
and the other element, which is 11 naturally opposed to the 
rational principle (and) which fights and resists 
principle. 11(79) He is at variance with himself, having
appetites for some things and rational desires for 
others. (SO) Thus Aristotle says that 11 the impulses of 
incontinent men move in contrary'directions,"(al) Since
there/ •... 
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there is not .the habitual subjugation of the passions·, 
it is clear that the agent will taste the sweet food; 
he thereby acts contrary to his wish doing those things 
he thinks he ought not to do. <82)
What about the ignorance of incontinence ? It is 
not knowledge of the universal premise which is "dragged 
about" as a result of the state of passion of the 
individual. It is argued in this thesis that what is 
obscured is the knowledge of the correct conclusion: 
"I ought not to taste this thing." We_ interpret the 
phrase 11 the .last premise being an opinion about a 
perceptible object 11 and that which determines that we 
shall act, in the above sense. <83) For Aristotle has
said previously that "when appetite happens to be present 
in us, the one opinion bids us avoid the object, but 
appetite leads us towards it. 1 ( 84) What is therefore
�omehow known at the back of one's mind is that one ought 
to avoid tasting a particular perceptible object. In 
this sense it is held that what is dragged about as a 
result of passion belongs to the realm of perceptual 
knowledge. <05) What would have been the rational choice
preceding a temperate act is obscured because of the 
conflict in the incontinent man. (86)
Aristotle says that in a case where we have the 
premise "everything sweet ought to be tasted," (that is, 
the universal or major premise) followed by the minor or 
particular premise, this is sweet, the man who can act 
and is not prevented must act accordingly. <87) As Kenny
argues (SS) it is clear that desire acts as a hindrance 
to the performance of what would be a temperate act. 
Desire prevents the putting into practice of the correct 
syllogism, and therefore acting morally. 
In a sense, therefore, the incontinent man behaves 
under the influence of a rule; it is appetite which is 
contrary to the right rule. (89)
5:3:3:4 I . . . .
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5:3i3:4. Conclusion. 
We have argued that only the second syllogism 
illustrates the concept of incontinence. It is held 
that the agent must know that the thing before him is 
sweet, otherwise he will not desire it. What is 
obscured by his desire is the knowledge of the correct 
conclusion that he ought not to taste what he has 
tasted. He has the knowledge but is not using it. It 
is therefore clear, as indeed Kenny points out, <9o) that
to accuse Aristotle of not being able to account for the 
case of the man who deliberately does what he knows to be 
wrong when he does it, is unfair. C9l) Aristotle does
deal with such a case. In opposition to Walsh <92> and 
Ross, <93>we agree with Kenny <94> that the absence of the
concept of will in Aristotle's account of incontinence 
does not constitute a weakness in his exposition. 
Continence may be regarded as a stage prior to 
temperance, and one stage "higher" than incontinence. As 
, 
Walsh argues, Aristotle's arguments seem to imply that the 
continent man does have the wrong desires but that his 
good responses are more habitual so that reason conquers 
these desires. But even this achievement is not habitual 
for the continent man is not yet morally virtuous and 
practically wise in a fixed sense. <95>
It is clear that the temperate man, by definition, 
will never slip. He suffers no instances of moral 
weakness. Whether such individuals do actually exist is, 
of course, debatable. Whether they should be the acme 
of moral effort is even more debatable. Indeed Macintyre (9G)
argues that "fallibility is central to human nature and 
not peripheral to it." He goes on to say that any 
portrait of a man who is infallible "cannot be the portrait 
of a human being. 11 <97> Maclntyre's point is that, as in 
the case of Jesus, we need to be shown the way a good man 
grapples with temptations in order to discover the perfect 
man rather than the perfect man. Paraphrasing Hardie (9B)
MacIntyre / •... 
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MacIntyre would surely hold that the saint or mo�al hero 
was the continent man who struggled successfully against 
his desires, rather than the temperate man. 
Macintyre's views would be abhorrent to Skinner. 
The Skinnerean good man, like the Aristotelean model, is 
always self-controlled and will consistently and habitually 
perform the right actions. Skinner <99> holds that moral
struggles waste valuable time which could be better used 
in creative activities. He points out that moral struggle 
is an integral aspect of "pre-scientific 11 moral literature, 
for it is those who are engaged in a moral struggle who 
receive credit for being "moral heroes", having "inner 
virtues". But in the case of Aristotle, the man who 
deserves praise is the self-controlled, temperate man 
whose reason has habitually mastered his desires. 
5: 4. Not .knowing what is good and dotng what .is evil. 
We have thus far been dealing with natural actions. 
Only natural actions, whether good or bad, fall within the 
realm of legal and moral respo"nsibility. Within the 
sphere of vice Aristotle does also distinguish certain 
actions as being "unnatural", that is, corresponding to 
the sphere of "abnormal" behaviour. 
5: 4: 1. Natural actions. 
5: 4 : 1: 1. The Vicious man. 
We have already discussed the vicious man in 
general terms in chapter 3:4. He is ignorant of the 
universal principles, the correct major premise, for he 
has a bad character. He acts deliberately from choice. 
Hence he is vicious and the injury he inflicts constitutes 
a vicious act. 
5:4:1:2. Negligence. 
Discussing vice in terms of legal and moral 




(i) The agent is· ignorant of laws he ought to know
and which are not too difficult to understand.
(ii) The agent is ignorant of something through care­
lessness, for the agent does have the power of
taking care. (lOO
)
In both cases the agent's ignorance is held to be 
his own fault, for this ignorance is concerned with the 
universal principles of actions and he, being the moving 
principle of his actions, is responsible for that 
ignorance. 
5:4:1:3. Drunkenness. 
Aristotle says of the drunk man that it was 
originally in his power to get drunk or not. Since 
�runkenness is the cause of a man's ignorance, a drunk 
act being one performed in ignorance, the drunk man is 
blamed for his actions. Indeed the penalties are to be 
doubled. 
(lOl) 
Aristotle could of course be challenged by using 
studies showing the influence of the environment on the 
development of alcoholism. But, as has been suggested 
in an earlier discussion on vice in chapter 3:4, there 
is an unresolved tension in Aristotle's thought between 
man's freedom to choose and various determining influences 
on the formation of his character. 
5:4:1:4. Norr-Voluntary actions. 
These acts do seem to fall under the general 
category of vice. A non�voluntary act (in contrast to 
an involuntary act) is one in which the agent feels no 
anger at himself for the act he has performed by reason 
of ignorance. (l02) He does not, therefore, repent his
action. Although it has been queried whether there is a 
real difference between involuntary and non-voluntary 
acts, it does seem (as Ross has pointed out) that the 
distinction/ ...• 
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distinction is primarily one related to the character of 
the agent. For what is being indicated is "whether an 
act was or was not consistent with the agent's general 
11(103) d 1 b character. A non-voluntary act woul sure y e 
blameworthy. 
5:4:1:5. concluding remarks. 
Aristotle's identification and description of a 
wide variety of actions in terms of responsibility does 
illustrate the thoroughness with which he attempted to 
clarify this concept. (l04l Adkins argues that Aristotle's
11 solution 11 to the problem of moral responsibility is 
unsatisfactory. (l05)However, it is not clear whether one
can accept Adkins' argument that the traditional Homeric 
values, i.e. the "spectacular" virtues of courage, leader­
ship and liberality preclude the possibility of a 
�atisfactory solution. It is agreed that these virtues 
do form part of the moral background to Aristotle's 
thought. (l06) But in the light of the expositions above
it cannot be agreed that Aristotle's views on responsib­
ility were confused because of his conception of virtue. 
It is held that Adkins' thesis, whilst being difficult to 
follow, is not convincing. (lO?) .. At the same time,
Aristotle's exposition.is not completely satisfactory 
for, as was pointed out in chapter 4:6, whilst Aristotle 
was aware of various determining influences on the form­
ation of a man's character, he did not reconcile this 
point with his conception of man as a free agent. 
5:4:2. Unnatural Actions. 
Unlike vicious acts, unnatural actions are beyond 
the law. Although they are amore alarming" than vice, 
they are nevertheless less evil. (lOS) For those men whose
actions are said to be unnatural are regarded by Aristotle 
as being non-rational. They have no better part, whereas 
the vicious man, whose acts are natural, has his reason 
perverted / .... 
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perverted. (lo_9) Hence "the badness of that which has
no originating source of movement is always less hurtful 
and reason is.an originative source."(llO) The unnatural
or non-rational states include the brutish (for example 
human cannibalism), those states which result from 
disease (for example some forms of madn·ess), and the . 
(111)morbid states. 
The existence of these non .... rational individuals 
illustrates once more a view put forward in this thesis 
that man's function ought to be an activity of the soul 
which implies or follows a rational principle. 
not clear what man's function is. 
It is 
We would agree with Aristotle that madness is 
beyond the law in the sense that such individuals cannot 
be held responsible for their actions. 
consider morbid states. 
Let us,. however, 
Aristotle's examples of this type of unnatural 
behaviour include plucking out one's hair, finger-nail 
biting, chewing earth or coal, and sodomy. (ll2) The
question of whether these 11perversions 11 are merely 
eccentricities raises the controversial subject as to 
what constitutes "normal" or "natural" behaviour. This 
topic is the subject of some debate among psychologists 
and sociologists. 
The psychologist Buss, (llJ)for example, in out ...
lining some of the problems which complicate attempts 
to delineate the spheres of normality and abnormality, 
mentions th:r;ee approaches. There is firstly the attempt 
to define normality statistically; secondly, considering 
normality as ideal mental health; and thirdly the attempt 
to clarify precisely what abnormality consists in. (ll4
)
It is within this third category that we see a resemblance 
to Aristotle. Buss argues that individuals are considered 
to be abnormal insofar as they manifest the criteria 
of discomfort, inefficiency and bizarreness in their 
behaviour. (llS) It is arguable that Aristotle's views on
morbid/ •..• 
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morbid states· contains some observations corresponding 
to the criterion of bizarreness. 
"Bizarreness", says Buss, 11 is abnormal deviation 
· · . (116) from accepted standards of behaviour." Of course,
as Buss points out, not all deviations are to be 
regarded as abnormal (or unnatural). What these 
deviations are depend· on social sanctions and do there­
fore ultimately illustrate cultural relativism. In 
general, behaviour is regarded as bizarre in one 
particular culture if the individual does not learn the 
rules of his society or if, having been socialised and 
therefore knowing such rules, he nevertheless breaks 
them. 
Normality is therefore partly a social convention. 
It may also be argued that it is relative. The sociologists 
Berger and Luckm.ann (ll7) have put forward an extremely
lnteresting thesis supporting the idea of ethical relativism. 
T..hey argue that values, institutions and roles are socially 
d.etermined since society is a human product. To reify 
values, to conceive of them as other than the products of 
a particular s.ocial organisation is to forget this 
primordial inter-relationship between man and his particular 
society. Normal behaviour is therefore arguably the 
shared convictions about patterns of behaviour which are 
agreed to be appropriate to a particular social group. 
The essentially relativistic nature of values does there­
fore seem to be supported by this argument. 
Althqugh Aristotle would not admit it, it could 
be argued that cannibalism among the Black Sea tribes (llB)
may have been socially accepted within that society and 
therefore constituted "normal" behaviour. Even eating 
coal in some societies, for example, could be said to 
illustrate cultural relativism. However, Aristotle's 
�osition is one of ethical absolutism. Rejecting the 
doctrine of Protagoras that man is the measure of all 
things, Aristotle tried to establish objective moral
standards which would serve as a framework of reference 
within / .... 
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within his society. His position was therefore that 
the good man, the rational man who also directs his 
activities towards the pursuit of noble deeds, is the 
measure of each thing. (ll9
) 
But alth�ugh he took as his
starting point the values actually held in Greek society 
at that time, Aristotle's treatment of these values 
suggests that he conceived of them as,being universally 
valid. (l20) In short, he regarded rational behaviour in
the sense specified in his ethical thought as providing 
a universal, objective standard. The thesis put forward 
by Berger and Luckrnann does, however, provide an 
extremely persuasive argument in favour of an ethical 
relativism. 
Aristotle's treatment of objective and subjective 
standards of value will be examined in detail in chapter 8. 
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CHAPT�R 6 : SOME ASPECTS OF HAPPINESS IN THE SECONDARY 
SENSE 
6:1. Recapitulation 
The consistent performance of morally virtuous 
actions constitutes the life of secondary happiness. (l)
For it is such activities which, according to Aristotle, 
befit man's human state. Through moral virtue man's 
acts are directed towards noble ends. By means of 
practical wisdom the choice of the correct means to 
achieve these ends is ensured. A man cannot therefore 
be good in the strict sense without being practically 
wise, nor practically wise if he is not also morally 
virtuous. <2> Referring back to the arguments on function
in chapter 3, it is clear that the realisation of function 
in its initial, narrow sense, i.e. covering the "doable 
good"(J)leads to happiness in the secondary sense. 
Whilst moral virtue and practical wisdom are 
necessary conditions for secondary happiness, they are not 
sufficient. . Aristotle speaks_ also of the need for 
external goods, some degree of wealth, fortune and 
health. (4) As was pointed out, (S)Aristotle does not
clarify the precise relationship of these mea�s to the 
end of secondary happiness. Furthermore it must not be 
forgotten that there are also certain things which, if 
absent, remove the lustre from happiness, namely good 
birth, good children and beauty. (6) It may well be true,
as Huby suggests, that Aristotle's li_st of the things 
necessary for happiness is 11 a com on sense one."(?)_ It 
is-also clear from a consideration of these requirements 
why the Aristotelean conception of happiness is best 
translated as. living well. 
Yet how many individuals will attain that end? 
Certainly vicious and incontinent men, those practising 
unnatural activities, slaves and women are excluded from 
the achievement of secondary happiness. For they are all 
unable to acquire the necessary virtues. The rational 
faculty/ 
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faculty of the vicious and incontinent man is not 
exercised in order to perform morally good deeds. 
Although the vicious man may be said to act rationally, 
and might achieve metaphysical excellence insofar as 
he is a "complete" thief, his acts are not desirable. 
Having once made the choice to be wicked, he cannot 
cease to be so and is thus denied the chance to be happy. 
Unnatural individuals, slaves and women are deficient in 
their rationality. Referring back to the discussion on 
function (B) it is therefore arguable that the Aristotelean 
conception which forms the starting point of his enquiry 
is the function of the way men ought to be. His claim 
to start with what is in fact the case <9> may therefore 
be regarded as having been violated. 
The way the state is run is obviously an extremely 
important factor in the attainment of secondary happiness. 
�ristotle makes it perfectly clear that the greatest 
opportunities for attaining happiness will lie in the 
best-organised state} lO ) This point will ·be dealt with 
in chapter 9. 
If we consider man from the point of view of his 
human state, the performance of morally virtuous deeds 
may be regarded as desirable in themselves. Nothing 
need be sought beyond the performance of a morally good 
act:ivity. A specific morally good action is good both 
in the sense of it being desirable as well as having the 
metaphysical characteristic of completeness. In the 
sense of these acts being ends in themselves, secondary 
happiness does obey the criteria of self-sufficiency 
and finality. (ll) But secondary happiness is not man's
ultimate end. The perfectly happy man requires not 
only righteousness and moderation, but also philosophy. 
The relationship between the performance of morally good 
acts and the activity of contemplation will be elucidated 
· in chapter 9 .
6:2 Moral/ •••• 
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6: 2. Moral obligation. 
In the discussion on function it has been argued 
that man is not naturally disposed to live in accordance 
with a rule, that is to be morally virtuous and practic­
ally wise. Aristotle's work is therefore prescriptive, 
advocating how a man ought to live his life. Why ought 
a man to live thus ? 
Allan <12> argues that Aristotle "takes little or 
no account of the motive of moral obligation." It is 
true, as Gauthier (l3) points out, that Aristotle does not 
actually discuss the concept of duty. But he does 
specifically argue that acting according to a rule is the 
way men ought to act. Practical wisdom is imperative, 
"it issues commands since its end is what ought to be 
done or not to be done."(l4) The rule provided by
practical wisdom acts as a standard for behaviour. As 
Gauthier says, "if the rule insofar as it is an imperative 
l[\akes the act which it commands a duty, it is because it 
enunciates moral obligation."(IS) We shall argue that, in 
his discussion on natural justice, Aristotle seems to be 
approaching the formulation of a natural law theory. In 
terms of this theory, rational moral standards trans­
cending the diversity of ordinary standards, are normative 
principles insofar as man must live in accordance with 
his own rationality in order to live a good life. (l6)
Olle Laprune speaks of this moral imperative in Aristotle's 
thought in terms of an aesthetic arrangement rather than 
in legal terms. Yet his views are substantially in 
agreement with the argument above. He writes (l?)that
"(practical wisdom) prescribes a beautiful arrangement, 
a beautiful configuration of the soul and of life .... 
The form which it gives is thus aesthetic rather than 
legal. It arranges mind and feeling, assigning every-
thing to its place, thus determining conduct: and the 
analogy is much less to a law which commands than to an 
internal principle of harmony." Thus one ought to live 
a / • •. • 
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a planned life of moral virtue and practical wisdom 
because this is the appropriate life for man as a 
rational being. 
A life in accordance with the rule prescribed 
by practical wisdom also brings rewards both to the 
individual and to his society. 
Discussing the good man's relation to himself, (lS)
Aristotle says his opinions are in harmony with each 
other. (l9) He desires the same things with all his soul.
He wishes to live and be preserved, and especially his 
reason. Trying·always to realise the good in action, 
he wishes always for himself what is good or seems good 
to him. He therefore lives with himself with pleasure. 
The recollections of his past acts are delightful and 
his hopes for the future are always good and pleasant. 
Moreover the performance of virtuous acts is a pleasurable 
activity. Hence he profits himself by doing noble acts. 
Furthermore accruing from a life of moral virtue 
is, as we shall see, the reward of contemplation. For 
only such a life can enable the gifted individual to 
achieve perfect happiness, the supremely pleasurable 
activity. 
But the good man will also benefit his fellow man, 
unlike the wicked man, who following his evil passions, 
"will hurt both himself and his neighbours. 11 <2�) Since
one's friend is like another self, egoism in the ethics 
of Aristotle may be held to have the same characteristics 
as altruism; <2l) The good man performs many acts for the
sake of his f::iends. Desiring the good for himself, he 
wishes to realise in his acts what is good for the best 
part of himself. Since his friend is a second self, he 
wishes also what is best for his friends. The good man's 
friendship thus involves having a sympathetic conscious­
ness of the other's existence obtained by association 
with the other, by conversing and exchanging ideas. <22>
If everyone tried to outdo his friend in the elevation of 
his character through the performance of good acts, the 
welfare/� ... 
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welfare of all would be affect�d, for each individual 
would thereby realise his own goodness of character. 
In short, the good man not only prof�ts himself 
by doing noble deeds, but performs many acts for the 
salce of his friends as well as for his country. If 
necessary he will even die for his friends. <23) Indeed,
if everyone did perform virtuous deeds, "if all were to 
strive towards what is noble, and strain every nerve to 
do the noblest deeds, everything would be as it should 
for the common weal, and everyone would secure for him­
self the goods that are greatest. 1 ( 24)
Furthermore insofar as the performance of these 
moral acts contributes to the smooth running of the state, 
so too do they contribute to the leisure required for the 
contemplation of the intellectually-gifted few. <25>
Hence arguing against Allan it is held that whilst 
Aristotle I s thought is obviously not. a Kantian-type 
ethics, the concept of duty, though not central, is never­
theless implied. Furthermore., it has been shown that 
insofar as the good individual's life, epitomising the 
concept of harmony, is in accor¢i with the rational harmony 
of the universe, it brings its own rewards to that 
individual, his fellows and the state ·as a whole. 
6:3. Concluding remarks. 
The above exposition constitutes a partial attempt 
to clarify the concept of secondary happiness. The 
question of what standards of value apply to this sphere 
will be discussed in relation to those which Aristotle 
uses to characterise perfect happiness. For it will be 
argued that the dichotomy which exists between the 
essentially moral standards belonging to the realm of 
morally virtuous actions and the metaphysical standards 
applicable to contemplation is an extremely important 
factor in explaining why the relationship between the two 
ends/ 
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ends can only be an indirect one. (2G)
Furthermore a fuller understanding of the nature 
and purpose of secondary happiness can only be achieved 
by considering it in re·lation to perfect happiness. (27)
Such an analysis obviously presupposes a prior examin­
ation of contemplation itself w (2B) It will be shown that
whilst secondary happiness seems to be a substitute for 
perfect happiness for those unable to obtain that end, 
Aristotle argues that it is also a necessary condition 
for contemplation. This point may also be explained 
by making use of Hardie's concepts of an inclusive and 
a dominant end. (i9)
The underlying presupposition that man's 
happiness lies in the actualisation of all his possibil­
ities is held to be an extremely important concept. 
Clearly, however, a full understanding of this idea 
requires a consideration of� ends as put forward in 
,the Nicomachean Ethics. Reference will be made to 
the work of the psychologist, Abraham Maslow, whose 
thought on that concept may be interpreted as being 
Aristotelean. An important criticism which emerges 
from this discussion is directed towards Aristotle's 
conception of man's function. For it is held that 
self-actualisation includes not only the function of 
man as man, but also the function of each particular 
individual, that is the specific calling of every man 
insofar as he be an artist, business man, craftsman 
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CHAPTER 7 CONTEMPLATION 
7:1. Introduction. 
It has been argued that the function argwnent is 
intended eventually to cover the activity of contemplation 
as well as the performance of morally virtuous acts. The 
problem is, however, that whereas contemplation is man's 
end from the metaphysical point of view,the morally 
virtuous life is man's end from a moral point of view. 
The relationship between these two ends must therefore 
be examined. 
Before dealing with this problem, it is necessary 
to elucidate the nature of contemplation. That activity 
is, however, problematic, and the lack of clarity about 
what is regarded by Aristotl� as man's highest achievement 
stands as a severe criticism of it as a tenable concept. 
Contemplation, according to Aristotle, is the 
activity of philosophic or theoretical wisdom which is 
the superior part or the best thing in manf 1 )Philosophic 
wisdom is the most highly perfected forms of knowledge, 
comprising intuitive reason combined with scientific 
knowledge of those objects which are highest by naturef2>
We therefore contemplate the best knowable things, those 
truths which have already been attained through science 
and intuitive reason. (J) Perfect happiness, says Aristotle, 
is some form of contemplation and it extends as far as 
contemplation does. (4) For, as Aristotle argues in terms
of his chara_cterisation of the content of happiness, "if 
happiness is an activity in accordance with virtue, it is 
reasonable that it should be in accordance with the 
highest virtue; and this will be that of the best thing in 
us. 11 (S) This best thing is reason which more than any­
thing is man. (G) The contemplative life is one which is 
best and most pleasant for man, a life proper to reason. (7)
In terms of Aristotle's characterisation of happiness it 
alone is.truly final and most self-sufficient, aiming at 
no/ 
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no end beyond itself and being loved for its own sake. (S) 
It is strange that a work concerned with a 
consideration of what is the best life devotes proportion­
ately so little space to an exposition of perfect 
happiness. Furthermore, as will be shown, Aristotle's 
elucidation of contemplation is extremely unsatisfactory. 
We·are given no definitive account of the objects of 
contemplation. The contemplative activity of the rational 
element nous raises further problems involving Aristotle's 
psychology. The relationship between secondary 
happiness, the life of moral virtue, and perfect happiness 
as contemplation is not made explicit. Why is it that 
not all men become philosophers ? Is it simply that they 
have not enjoyed the necessary training or is it the case 
that only sorne·are intellectually gifted? Whether or 
not contemplation is to be conceived of as an essentially 
,selfish ideal since the contemplative intellect is neither 
practical nor productive raises further questions regard­
ing the desirability of such an end for man who is, after 
all, a political animal. These and other points will 
be discussed in some detail in order to attempt an 
evaluation of man's end in its perfect form as contemplat­
ion. 
7:2. Contemplation and its objects. 
A justification for philosophic wisdom as the most 
perfect forms of knowledge is found in the Metaphysics. 
It is the most universal discipline, its objects being 
the most primary and furthest removed from sensation. It 
is concerned with knowledge of what �s most knowable, 
that is, the first principles and causes of all things 
for it is through these that other things are known. <9>
Hence Aristotle says in the Nicomachean Ethics that the 
wise man possesses the truth about first principles as 
well as knowing what follows from these principles. (lO)
Philosophic wisdom is the ruling or governing science 




world. (ll) As Ross <12> has pointed out, Aristotle'13
characterisation of philosophic wisdom as the most 
authorit�tive science presents certain difficulties. 
For in what sense can theoretical wisdom be said to 
issue any commands? Aristotle has made it quite clear 
that the theoretical intellect is not practical, nor is 
it productive. (lJ) Politics, on the other hand, is
spoken_of as the most authoritative discipline in that 
it legislates with a view.to the end of man and the 
state. (l4) Yet Aristotle says of philosophic wisdom that
it knows for what purpose every act takes place, that 
is, it knows the final caus_e or the good in each 
particular instance and the final good in nature as·a 
whole. (lS) As Ross (lG) points out, the notion of a final
cause is therefore ambiguous. Indeed Ross holds that 
Aristotle's argument, although used to prove metaphysics 
to be the highest form of knowledge, could nevertheless 
only prove ethics or politics to be the most authoritative 
wisdom. If we-refer to the earlier discussion (l7} on
the notion of an end or good of any activity, then it is 
arguable that Aristotle uses the word "good" in two senses 
when discussing the respective claims of the theoretical 
and practical disciplines to be _the most authoritative. 
Clearly politics, insofar as it is concerned with the 
state, is the most authoritative in seeking the end or 
good which is most desirable, that is, what is good in 
the moral sens��JS)But metaphysics or. theology is concerned 
with the final cause or the good in the metaphysical sense 
of completeness. However even if philosophic wisdom is 
the most authoriative science in this metaphysical sense, 
it cannot issue any commands and legislate with a view 
to man's moral end. 
We have said that contemplation is the activity 
of philosophic wisdom. When writing about the two parts 
of the soul which grasp a rational principle, Aristotle 
says of one that it is that by which we contemplate the 
kinds of things whose originative causes are invariable, (l9)
and/ ..•• 
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and it is in this sense that we use the word contemplat­
ion. Yet it should also be noted that Aristotle does 
also use the word in connection with other activities. 
Indeed Aristotle does also say that there is one part 
by which we contemplate variable things. (20)He also
writes that the supremely happy man's purpose is to . (21) contemplate worthy actions. In another passage we
read that the contemplation of a great and beautiful 
work of art inspires admiration. <22> This looseness in
usage leads to the problem of precisely what are the 
invariable things which are being contemplated. 
It has already been mentioned that philosophic 
wisdom is concerned with the first principles and causes. 
In short we contemplate being. First philosophy or 
theology studies all the causes or principles of being 
qua being. <23> "There is a science which investigates that
which is, as being and the attributes .that belong to it 
in virtue of its own nature. 11 <24> Theology is therefore
distinguished from other sciences by its subject matter. 
It studies all that there is as being. This, of course, 
implies that it deals with the first causes and principles 
of reality as a whole. It studies the primary kind of 
being, that is, that being which gives to all other things 
their fundamental character. Theology is the most 
primary as well as the most universal of all sciences. 
However, apart from theologY.. the theoretical 
, 
sciences do also include physics and mathematics. <25> As
Hardie_<26> has pointed out, Aristotle does not give any
definite indication whether or not the objects of physics 
and mathematics are also to be included as objects of 
contemplation. Ross argues that physics may well be 
included insofar as it is "the study of the non-contingent 
element in contingent events. 1 ( 27> But Aristotle says
that there is a kinship between man's reason which is 
divine and the objects of that reason. <28> It is not
clear how the objects of physics may be conceived of as 
divine. Aristotle does say that the heavenly bodies 
are/ .... 
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are divine and therefore those things which are highest 
by nature. <29> But it is astronomy which studies the
planets, and insofar as it deals with substance that is 
concrete but eternal, astronomy is that mathematical 
discipline most akin to philosophy. (JO)However, Aristotle 
does not imply that the objects of mathematics are 
divine. (Jl) Whether or not contemplation includes the 
objects of physics and mathematics is therefore unclear 
despite the fact that philosophic wisdom is the union of 
intuitive reason and scientific knowledge. Possibly 
the planetary bodies,.insofar as they also form part of 
the complicated cosmological system comprising the prime 
mover, the intelligences and the spheres are included 
for they are divine and invariable in terms of Aristotle's 
thought. 
Since contemplation is concerned with those trut�s 
already discovered, Hardie, for example, has criticised 
Aristotle for ascribing to perfect happiness only "the 
j�ys of knowing," thereby excluding "the joys of research."(Ji) 
The latter may however be considered as part of secondary 
happiness for Aristotle does say, when talking about the 
good man's relation.to himself that "his mind is well-
stored with the subjects of contemplation."<33> 
Taylor's (34> suggestion that Aristotle intends 
"the genuinely aesthetic appreciation of good literature 
and music and pictorial and plastic art" to be included 
in the activity of contemplation is rejected despite the 
quotation trom the Nicomachean Ethics above. (JS) As 
Ross (3G)points out there is simply no evidence for ·such.
an argument. 
Theology, the study of being as being, does also 
include Aristotle's conception of the final cause, the 
prime mover, God. Insofar as the philosopher contem­
plates truths of being including God, it may be tempting 
to attribute the character of religious worship to 
contemplation. In the Eudemian Ethics (37> this does 
seem / .... 
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seem to be a correct interpretation. Jaeger's (JS)
thesis is of course that the Eudemian Ethics, as an 
early work, is still heavily influenced by Platonism.
: (39) It has been argued that Aristotle did not entirely
emancipate himself from his Platonic inheritance and it 
is not possible to state categorically that the 
activity of contemplation, as conceived of in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, is a·purely intellectual act 
involving no religious dimension. For it is not clear 
whether Aristotle abandoned the view expressed in the 
last work,· De Philosophia, in which he speaks of the 
feeling of awe men experience in the presence of that 
which is higher than they are. <4o) Hardie denies that
there was a religious dimension present in Aristotle's 
mature thought. Hardie claims that there is insufficient 
evidence for claiming that contemplation includes "either 
religion as something on its own or religious emotion 
associated with non-scientific forms of experience. 1 ( 4l)
Whether or not contemplation was conceived of by Aristotle 
as a religious experience is therefore unclear. A 
typical passage in the Nicomachean Ethics does not, 
however, seem to support such a claim : 
"The activity of God, which surpasses all 
others in blessedness, must be contemplative; 
and of human activities, therefore, that 
which is most akin to this must be of the 
nature of happiness." (42)
What is undeniable, however, is the influence 
of the contemplative ideal on the development of Western 
theology, and especially the thought of St. Thomas 
Aquinas. 
7:3. Aristotle's conception of man's soul. 
Contemplation, as an activity of the best thing 
in man, nous, is an activity which has no bodily 
concomitant. Aristotle says that "the excellence of 
the reason is a thing apart. 11 <43> Nous is an element 
in/ .... 
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in the soul which is separable from man's body. <44>
Moreover, 11 reason more than anything else is man. 11 <45>
What Aristotle is suggesting is that contemplation as 
perfect happiness lies in an activity of an element of 
the soul, the most divine element in man's nature, small 
in bulk, but supreme in power and worth, the most 
authoritative part of man. (4G) Yet Aristotle began his
search for happiness by insisting that his concern was 
with man as man. <47) This led him to an elaboration of
the three powers or elements of man's soul and the view 
that each is said to contain its "predecessor" in a 
"potential" way. Hence the rational element in man 
contains the perceptual and nutritive elements. <4B) In
other words, the exercise of man"s rationality_presupposes 
sense perception, and bodily passions require rational 
moderation. Yet perfect happiness, we now learn, is a 
purely intellectual activity - the possibility of dis-
embodied rati"onal thinking is admitted. Gauthier 
expresses this as follows : "Mind, apart from the body, 
lives as a spectator of itself and all that is superior 
t 't 11 (49) 0 l. . 
Once more therefore we find in Aristotle's thought 
an unresolved tension between what is essentially a 
Platonic view of the soul and the more empirical conception. 
On the one hand Aristotle considers man as part of nature 
and therefore describable in terms of matter and form,• 
potentiality and actuality. Yet on the other hand, the 
Platonic view of body and soul being different substances, 
the former material, corruptible and destructible, the 
latter immaterial and immortal, is never completely 
abandoned. Hardie expresses this as follows : 
11 In most of what Aristotle says about human 
nature we find combined or juxtaposed a 
biological view of man as one animal among 
others, and a Platonic or near Platonic 
view of man as a spiritual or mental entity 
in association with a living body." (50) 
This/ .... 
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This dichotomy has·of course been the subject of 
heated controversy. Nuyens, (Sl)in the tradition of
Jaeger, has postulated an evolutionary theory of soul. 
According to Nuyens, Aristotle in his early thought was 
essentially Platonic, conceiving of the soul as a 
separate substance in the body. Tn the intermediate 
stage of his thought, Aristotle is said to have regarded 
the body as an instrument of the soul, drawing a 
comparison with a pilot (soul) steering the ship (body). 
The conception of the substantial unity of body and soul 
belongs to the mature period of Aristotle's thought. 
However, Nuyens' theory is not persuasive for 
within one work, De Anima, Aristotle speaks both in terms 
of the substantial unity of body and soul as well as 
admitting the existence of an element of the soul which 
is separate, disembodied and eternal. 
In De Anima the word "psyche" which is usually 
translated 11 soul 11 also means conuciousness and the 
principle of life. The life principle of any organism 
is shown in the way that organism functions. The soul 
of a plant is shown in its powers of nutrition and repro­
duction, while that of an animal is indicated in these 
powers as well as the powers of sensation as sense 
perception, instinctive desire and movement. Man's soul 
includes these "lower" powers as well as the power of 
thinking and intelligence. C52>
In short, Aristotle may be said to have postulated 
a type of "e.volutionary" view of nature wherein higher 
organisms include within them the powers of the lower. 
Such an "evolutionary" scale in nature culminates in 
man. (53>
Yet despite these powers in the soul it must be 
stressed that the soul is to be regarded as a unified 
whole. (54)
From the metaphysical point of view the soul is 
the/ 
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the form of the body. It is the actuality of the 
body. (55> The soul is the way the body works, it is
the body in action and neither body nor soul can there­
fore exist apart from each other. (56> Aristotle does not
suggest that the soul is a substance and that man's 
nature is dualistic. He makes it quite clear, for 
example, that a state-of-mind like anger has a bodily 
asp.ect. (57) Perception is "a movement of the soul through
(58) the body." Hence Aristotle says "so one need no more
ask whether the body and soul are one than whether wax 
and the impression it receives are·one. 1 ( 59> As Ross
puts it, "all psychological phenomena are essentially 
psychophysical."(GO)
Yet despite this thesis of a be-souled body 
conceived of as a unity, Aristotle nevertheless shows 
the influence of the Platonic conception of soul. For 
example, he says "but mind seems to be an independent 
substance engendered in us, and to be imperishable."(Gl) 
He also comments that "in the case of the mind and the 
thinking faculty nothing is yet clear, it seems to be a 
distinct kind of soul and it alone admits of being 
separated as the immortal from the perishable." <62>
Furthermore, in his epistemology the doctrine of 
active reason suggests that there is in each individual 
a kind of surplus of form which is not taken up in the 
organisation of the body, and that this can itself serve 
as "matter" to the impress of intelligible forms. (G3)
The distinction between active and passive reason has 
been the subject of much philosophic debate, this debate 
falling beyond the scope of these comments, but it is 
surely arguable that the characterisation of active reason 
as independent of the body, containing no unactualised 
potentialities and knowing always what it knows, is 
reminiscent of the activity of nous insofar as it contem-
plates. However, it must be remembered that Aristotle 
does not specifically state in the Nicomachean Ethics 
that/ 
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that nous is active reason. 
As the "pure never-ceasing activity of thought", (G4)
contemplation does seem comparable to the intellectual 
exercise of the prime mover which is pure form. However, 
Aristotle does not mention God in his discussion on 
passive and active reason in De Anima even though there 
is a very definite similarity between the description 
there of the increasing pure activity of thought and that 
ascribed to the prime mover in the Metaphysics. 
(GS)
Is there any suggestion that in view of the possible 
similarity between the activity of� and that of God 
that contemplation may be a mystical experience ? In the 
last work On Prayer Aristotle says that. 11 God is either 
nous or something beyond �-l' (GG) Aristotle does 
argue that."where objects differ in kind, the part of the 
soul answering to each of the two is different in kind, 
since it is in virtue of a certain likeness with other 
Q.bjects that they have the knowledge they have. 11 <67)
Clark, (GS) for example, interprets contemplation as a 
mystical experience basing his view on the argument that 
�' as the prime mover, is also that whose presence in 
us we.do occasionally realise. During the activity of 
contemplation, according to Clark, we have an intuition 
of the world as a unitary whole, and we are made aware of 
the very nature of things. Clark compares contemplation 
to the enlightenment of the doctrines of Ch'an Buddhism. 
It is true that insofar as contemplation is of being as 
such, man may be said to become aware of the very nature 
of things during that activity. However, whether 
contemplation therefore has a mystical nature as Clark 
claims is unclear. Certainly Aristotle offers no 
conclusive evidence for the "correctness" of any partic­
ular interpretation of the nature of contemplation. 
Even if it were to be interpreted as a mystical experience 
of God, Aristotle's notion o f  God is an "arid" one. (69>
God's knowledge is of Himself alone� He cannot know any-
thing/ •... 
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thing of the -world of huma� experience. As Ross puts 
it, "the prime mover is not the creator of the universe, 
for both matter and the subordinate forms are uncreated 
and eternal; nor is He a providential ruler, since His 
thought is of Himself alone; nor is He a God of· love, 
since emotion of any sort would mar His life of pure 
contemplation. 11 <7o)
Returning to the discussion on soul, the question 
arises whether the Platonic doctrine of a disembodied 
soul and the theory of a substantial unity of body and 
· (71) soul are reconcilable. Jaeger, for example, argues
that they are incompatible, the doctrine of� belonging 
to an earlier period. The· evolutionary theory of 
Aristotelean thought has been rejected and it is extremely 
difficult to see how these two doctrines could be 
synthesized into a simple, coherent whole. Hardie says 
;they may be reconciled, arguing that "Aristotle never 
regarded acceptance of the biological view as involving 
, 
the rejection of tpe doctrine that a man's mind or an 
element in it is in some sense independent of his body. 11 <72>
Hardie himself attempts a reconciliation in terms of an 
epiphenomenalist argument. He defines epiphenomenalism 
as "a term for the doctrine that the mind, being dis­
continuous and dependent on the body, is not a thing in 
its own right but is incidental to the body, which has a 
certain degree and kind of complexity. 11(73> The burden
of Hardie's suggestion is "not that Aristotle has a good 
case for holding that thought, unlike sensation, has no 
bodily organ, but that he would have a good case if the 
dependence of thought on the body were understood, and 
could only be understood as epiphenomenalism understands 
't .. (74) 
l. • 
The mind-body question is, of course, one of the 
perennial problems of philosophy. Certainly Aristotle 
seems to have wanted to retain both his theory of body 
and soul in terms of the substantial unity of matter and 
form as well as to allocate to that small rational entity, 
nous / ..•. 
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nous, a speci:al status. 
--
He did not effect a synthesis. 
Epiphenomerialism is itself subject to much criticism 
and there is no indication in Aristotle's thought that 
he would have agreed to that type of solution. 
7:4. Contemplation as an ideal. 
We have seen that Aristotle considers the activity 
of man's most divine element, nous, in accordance with 
its proper virtue, contemplation, to constitute man's 
perfect happiness. (75> However, if man doe.s attain this
end, it is only a temporary achievement. God is always 
in that state; man achieves it sometimes for brief periods 
of time. (?6) To live such a life consistently is,
according to Aristotle, too high for man since he lives 
it by virtue of that which is divine in himself. <77> Thus
man's final end, perfect happiness, turns out to be an 
�deal. Nevertheless we must strive to make ourselves 
immortal, we must "strain every nerve to live in accord­
a'nce with the best thing in us." (?S) The strange paradox
has been reached that after insisting that unlike Plato, 
he (Aristotle) is determined to discover those goods 
which are achievable and attainable, Aristotle ends up 
with a Platonic-type ideal. (79> Furthermore, the
precise nature of this ideal is not clearly elucidated 
nor is it certain whether every individual who has 
attained secondary happiness is capable of moments of 
perfect happiness. Presumably in view of the fact that 
Aristotle does not make use of a Foundation Myth;80>
perfect happiness is available to those who are morally 
good and whose education has included the theoretical 
disciplines. Yet one would be inclined to suppose that 
only a few who are intellectually gifted would in fact 
be capable of contemplation. Perfect happiness is, after 
all, limited to philosophers and whilst-every philosopher 
must also be a virtuous man (as will be argued in the 
next subsection) the opposite seems dubious. Hence it 
seems/ 
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seems that Aristotle was almost forced to recognise 
that a life of moral virtue constitutes happiness in 
an albeit secondary degree. (Bl)
It has been argued that a morally virtuous life 
is a necessary prerequisite for contemplation. This 
claim must-be justified in some detail. Prior to this 
undertaking, some of the problems underlying that 
relationship will be discussed. 
7:5. Problems regarding the relationship between 
secondary and perfect happiness. 
Some of the problems involved in giving a satis­
factory account of the relationship between man's two 
ends have already been dealt with. 
The dichotomy between the two realms was illus­
trated in the discussion on man's soul. Contemplation 
is an activity of disembodied reason whilst the life of 
mpral virtue is concerned with man's passions, with bodily 
actions. 
A further difficulty lies in a difference between 
the intellectual and moral virtues. 
virtues admit of a mean. 
For only moral 
"Virtue must have the quality cif aiming 
at the intermediate. I mean moral virtue 
for it is this that is concerned with 
passions and actions, and in these there 
is excess, defect and the intermediate." (82) 
Contemplation cannot have a mean. Practical 
wisdom is not required for the perfection of the virtues 
of the theoretical intellect. 
It has also been argued that in terms of the clear 
distinction made by Aristotle between theoretical and 
practical reason (despite the untenability of such a 
distinction) it is logically impossible for the major 
premise of the practical syllogism to be a proposition in 
terms of theoretical reason. (SJ) The relationship between
the/ •.•• 
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the morally virtuous life and contemplation cannot be a 
direct means-end one. Hence whilst Ross and de Vogel, (S4)
for example, point out that Aristotle does not attempt to 
deduce the necessity for any moral virtue from the 
activity of contemplation, it is clearly impossible for 
him to have done so within the framework of his own 
thought. It cannot be argued that any or every moral 
action performed is undertaken directly for the sake of 
perfect happiness. 
A fur�her problem lies in the different standards 
of value used by Aristotle in each realm. This question 
will be dealt with separately �nd in detail in the next 
chapter. 
There seems to be a confusion in Aristotle's 
thought on the status of moral deeds in relation to 
contemplation. For Aristotle says of the man who is 
contemplating that he needs no noble deeds; they may even 
be said to be hindrances. (SS) Contemplation is after all
a completely intellectual act. Yet Aristotle does also 
say that contemplation seems to "need external equipment" 
though only a·little and certainly less than does moral 
virtue. <86) When man as man lives a "humanl' as opposed
to a "divine" life, he is required to perform certain 
moral actions. <87)
It is clear, however, that the performance of 
morally virtuous deeds must in some way be a prerequisite 
for contemplation. For otherwise why should any individual 
form good habits? A man could merely study philosophy 
in order to be happy. It is surely logically possible 
in terms of the Aristotelean separation of metaphysics 
and ethics that a man become an excellent metaphysician 
without being a morally good man <88 1and vice versa of 
course.) This is possibly suggested in Aristotle's 
discussion on Thales and Anaxagoras who have philosophic 
but not practical wisdom. (S9) We have see» that practical
wisdom and.moral virtue are interdependent. The 
implication/ •... 
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implication may well be that Thales and Anaxagoras are 
not morally good. 
Yet it is argued in this thesis that Aristotle 
could not hold such a position, and that the point 
raised above must be regarded as being inconsistent with 
the main thrust of his argument. For having assigned 
to contemplation the status of-being the best activity 
of man, constituting his highest and most perfect 
happiness, it would be totally absurd if the morally 
vicious man could become happy merely through the study 
of philosophy. Having separated the metaphysical from 
the ethical realm, Arj,stotle is now forced to bring them 
together in some way in order to show the necessary role 
of a mo�ally virtuous life in the attainment of perfect 
happiness. It is clear, however, in view of the points 
raised above, that whilst the life of moral virtue or 
'secondary happiness must in some way be a necessary 
grerequisite for contemplation or perfect happiness, 
the relationship between the two ends can only be an 
indirect one. 
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CHAPTER 8 :  TWO STANDARDS OF VALUE 
8:1. Morally virtuous acts. 
8:1:1. Introductory remarks. 
Having discussed some of the problems which 
preclude the postulation of a direct relationship 
between man's two ends, the dichotomy between the 
standards of value used by Aristotle to characterise 
each realm will be elaborated upon. It will be seen 
that the values used in the sphere of secondary happiness 
are initially moral, derived ultimately from the ethical 
values of Aristotle's era. However, Aristotle extends 
his argument to suggest that his critical clarifications 
of these values are in accord with transcendent meta-
physical standards having a universal application. This 
contention is challenged in terms of Berger and Luckmann's 
·, 
tllesis which is contained in their work The Social Con-
struction of Reality. The va.lues applicable in the
sphere of perfect happiness are metaphysical ones only.
In order to gain a fuller understanding of 
Aristotle's views on standards of value, we shall discuss 
briefly what is meant by the "conventional morality" of 
a society and a role of the ethical philosopher in terms 
of that conventional morality. 
Any society may be said to be characterised by a 
certain order, stability and direction. It may be argued 
that these characteristics are due t mainly to two forms of 
social control which operate in order to regulate human 
behaviour. These two forms of control are law and what 
might be called the "conventional morality" of that 
society. (l) By this latter term is meant the manners,
customs, religious views and generally accepted moral 
code held by most people in that society. In sociological 
terms these forms of social contract work because the 
individual/ ..•• 
-· 114
indiv;i.dual is socialised into behaving ·in accordance 
with the norms and mores of his ·society. .  However, the 
term "conventional morality" is somewhat wide for it· 
does not necessarily imply that there is a general con­
sensus on any one issue. <2) In Aristotle's society there
was a wide spectrum of opinion on various moral.issues; 
Aristotle himself, whilst claiming to take as his 
starting point what is the case, (3) does also say on
one occasion that it.is superfluous to examine all 
opinions on happiness in any great detail. ·The multitude, 
he says, "talk at random about almost everything •. I' ( 4) 
·
Yet he does in fact critically discuss a broad spectrum 
of views on the nature of happiness and virtue in the 
Nicomachean Ethics. Whilst the term "conventional 
morality" may be vague and perhaps an over-simplification, 
it is nevertheless a useful one for making a distinction 
between what are the essentially uncritically'-held moral 
opinions of society in general, and those critical 
reflections made on these opinions by the ethical 
philosopher. 
8:1:2. Some thoughts on a role of the ethical philosopher. 
Taking Socrates as perhaps the mos.t famous example, 
it is arguable that at least one task of the ethical· 
philosopher is to examine critically ·and to clarify the 
fundamental assumptions of the conventional moraiity. (S) 
This does not necessarily mean that the philosopher will 
reject the conventional morality in toto or in part - he 
may not necessarily repudiate all tradition, the heritage 
of the collective wisdom of the ages (as is the case in 
some Existential thinkers). However, it is possible
that his elucidations will lead him to propose 
alternatives which will then be defended by rational 
arguments. Plato, for example, in the first book of 
The Republic.· shows the conventional definition of justice 
as put forward by Cephalus to be inadequate. (6) Plato
gives/ •••. 
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gives the conception of "each according to his due" a 
specific interpretation in the light of his own 
philosophical thought. 
Turning now to Aristotle, it is clear that he 
does recognise the above two forms of social control. 
Thus he writes at the conclusion of the Nicomachean 
Ethics as follows 
"When these matters have been studied we 
shall perhaps be more likely to see with 
a comprehensive view which constitution 
is best, and how each must be ordered, 
and what laws and customs it must use, if 
it is to be at its best." (7) 
Aristotle does examine the morality of his time, 
constantly taking words like "happiness", "voluntary", 
"incontinence", "justice" and·the like and elucidating 
the way they are ordinarily used, both for the purposes 
of clarification and also ·perhaps recommending changes. 
' ( 8) As Huby, for example, has pointed out, Aristotle's 
method does parallel that of some modern linguistic 
analysts. It is felt Aristotle would have agreed with 
this famous comment made by Austin : 
"Certainly, then, ordinary language is 
not the last word; in principle it can 
everywhere be supplemented and improved 
upon and superceded. Only remember it 
is the first word. 11 (9)
However, Aristotle does claim more for his 
clarifications than does a philosopher like Austin. For 
it is arguable that in his rational elucidations as a 
practically wise man, Aristotle conceives of his 
conclusions as having a universal validity. He seems 
therefore to be moving towards the idea of a natural law, 
the conception of some sort of transcendent rational 
order which underlies the multiplicity and diversity of 
the universe and which imposes a standard on man's 
behaviour insofar as he must act rationally. (lO) This is 
suggested by the following arguments. 
In/ •••• 
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In making the distinction between natural and 
conventional justice, Aristotle argues for there being 
certain "rights and duties"(�l) which do "everywhere
have the same force and do not exist by people's thinking 
this or that, 11 <12>as well as conventional laws which are
created by particular states for particular purposes and 
may therefore vary accordingly. 
"Things which are just by virtue of 
convention and expediency are like 
measures •••. similarly, the things 
which are just not by nature but by 
human enactment are not everywhere the 
same since constitutions are not the 
same though there is but one which is 
everywhere by nature the best." (13) 
The clarifications and recommendations made by 
Aristotle would not be understood by the common herd. 
The Nicomachean Ethics and Politics are not moral hand-
�oaks for the majority. Aristotle says quite bluntly 
that his lectures are beneficial only to those who already 
desire and act in accordance with a rational principle 11 (l4) 
and thus therefore excludes those who are young, both in 
the chronological and the moral sense as well as those 
who are not properly educated. These would have been 
written for the "true student of politics •.• (who) is 
thought to have studied virtue above all things; for he 
wishes to make his fellow citizens good and obedient to 
the laws."(lS) Hence the rational clarification is
obviously only appreciated by those who already act 
rationally. "For he who lives.as passion directs will 
not hear argument that dissuades him, not understand it 
if he does."(l6)
8:1:3. Background to Aristotle's ethical thought. 
Let us discuss briefly some aspects of the con­
ventional morality of Aristotle's era. 
Although the age of Homer was long since over, the 




The good man in Homeric times was "brave, skilful 
in war and peace; and (he) must possess the wealth and 
(in peace) the leisure which are at once the necessary 
conditions for the development of these skills and 
. (17) natural reward of their successful employment." The 
successful man was the warrior, the wealthy man, the 
possessor of social status. Hence virtue or excellence 
was interpreted in terms of skills, physical gifts and 
certain inherited advantages. The Homeric man's chief 
aim was the attainment of success or fame. (lS) What
Adkins calls the "quiet virtues" of the co-operative 
excellences were present but less highly admired since, 
in that society which was essentially competitive, skill 
or courage were vital for survival. (l9)
The development of city states (as opposed to the 
household system of organisation in Homeric Ages) led to 
the emergence of new moral insights. The so-called 11 quiet 11 
virtues, of which justice came to be considered the most 
important, tended gradually to become dominant. Thus 
Aristotle says, quoting the proverb of his time, "In 
justice is every virtue comprehended. 11 <20> A good man is
now no longer merely successful - he is also just. 
Although Homeric virtues persisted they were not 
always suited to civic life and some tended to be 
restricted to war and performances in the games. <21>
Euripides, for example, was critical of the Homeric hero. 
In his play Electra he speaks of the self-controlled man 
who "administers well, both their cities and their own 
households, whereas those who are nothing but senseless 
lumps of muscle are mere ornaments of the market pl_ace, 
for a strong arm does not even endure a spear thrust any 
better than a weak one. 11 <22> The emphasis is very
definitely changing towards self-control and justice 
which are regarded as essential to the stability and 
prosperity of society. The abi.lity to administer well, 
the/ 
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the intellige·nt handling of one's own and the city states' 
interests belong to the virtue of practical wisdom. The 
use of coined money with the consequence of new ways of 
acquiring wealth did enable any man to achieve status 
and position. The democratic tradition ensured that all 
could participate in civic life and hence a new standard 
of behaviour appears beside the good warrior, namely the 
good citizen. The new conventional morality, combining 
the Homeric tradition of courage and liberality with civic 
virtues and administrative skill, is perhaps best 
illustrated in the famous "Funeral Oration" given by 
Pericles. <23>. There we have the explicit reference to a
"belief in courage.and manliness", the citizens' pride 
in democracy and the equality of all before the law, the 
importance of "actual ability", the need for "proper 
discussions" and deliberation on important issues. How­
ever, there was also the problem of a possible dichotomy 
between the good man and good citizen. The relativism 
of the Sophists made this danger clear, and the great 
Greek philosophers Socrates, Plato and Aristotle were 
concerned that the good man and good citizen should co­
incide. This was, in their view, possible only in a 
good state. (24>
8:1:4. Objective standards of value. 
If we now examine the moral virtues in the Nico­
machean Ethics, this background is clearly illustrated. 
The four cardinal virtues of wisdom, temperance, courage 
and justice undoubtedly provided the backbone of the 
conventional morality of Aristotle's time. Not only do 
we find these discussed in Plato's thought, but also in 
works by Xenophon, Isocrates and Demosthenes. <25> But
Aristotle does also include virtues concerned with honour 
and wealth. Indeed his spectrum of virtues provides us 
with a panorama of the inherited tradition of his era. 
Aristotle does clarify precisely in what sense he 
conceives of these virtues, and in so doing introduces 
rationality/ .... 
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rationality as an objective .standard. It is the mean 
which provides such a standard. This point might be 
disputed for the mean is said to be chosen relative to 
the individual. 
justified. 
The above claim must therefore be 
Before doing this, however, it must be stressed 
that the doctrine of the mean was itself a part of the 
conventional morality; it belonged to the "collective 
wisdom" of that era. Heraclitus had spoken of fire 
being kindled arid quenched in measure. The Pythagoreans 
had called for moderation in drinking, eating and sport. 
Theognis spoke of walking quietly in the middle of the 
road. <26> Euripides wrote: "Flee thou extrernes. 11 <27> In
The Republic Plato said that a man should "choose the 
middle course that avoids both extremes, for in this way 
he will attain the greatest possible happiness. 11 <28>
,Thus as Gauthier points out, by the time Aristotle wrote 
his ethics, "the idea of the mean had invaded all regions 
�f life and thought. 11 <29>
It will be remembered that moral virtue is, in 
the ethics of Aristotle, that state of character which 
is concerned with choice. Or one might put this in 
other words - moral virtue is the state of soul from 
which the choice of an action originates. The point 
already stressed in this thesis is that only the 
morally virtuous man will choose what is good. What 
therefore is the good which the morally virtuous man 
chooses ? The answer given by Aristotle is that "virtue 
is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in 
a mean, that is the mean relative to us, this being 
determined by a rational principle, and by that principle 
by which the man of practical wisdom would determine 
't "(JO) I h t th d I h .  f h t . d i .  n s or e goo man s c oice o w a is goo 
lies in that good exemplifying a mean. Although the 
mean is relative to us, depending on our individual 
temperament and the particular circumstances of the act, 
nevertheless/ .... 
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nevertheless Aristotle does not speak of it as a 
relative standard. Rather it is "an extreme with 
regard to what is best and right."(3l)
Nor, as Gauthier stresses, does Aristotle intend 
that the choice of the mean be left to "the arbitrary 
appraisal of the subject. 1 ( 32
> 
Aristotle does try to
clarify in what sense the mean operates as an objective 
standard. He says : 
"In all states of character we have 
mentioned, as in all other matters, 
there is a mark to which the man who 
has the rule looks, and heightens or 
relaxes his activity accordingly, and 
there is a standard which determines 
the mean states which we say are inter­
mediate between excess and defect, being 
in accordance with the right rule." (33) 
The mark to which the man who has the rule looks 
is later clarified as those things which are "just, noble 
�nd good for man."<34> The right rule, as we saw, is the
mean chosen by practical wisdom. Since practical wisdom 
is a true and reasoned state.of capacity to act with 
regard to things which are good or bad for man, it is 
clear that the standard according to which practical 
reason fixes the mean is that which is conducive towards 
the achievement of morally good ends. As Gauthier says, 
the mean will therefore be "a conformity of action to 
the moral law. 11 <35) Thus, only the morally virtuous man,
through the exercise of his virtue of practical reason 
will choose in such a way that any· act he performs 
embodies the mean. It will be truly just, courageous, 
temperant and the like, and will therefore be an act 
which is good or noble for himself as a man. But insofar 
as these conditions have been fulfilled, the action may 
also be said to be good for all men, and it thus embodies 
an objective standard of value. Hence Aristotle speaks 
of the man of practical wisdom, the phronimos acting as 
a norm. "Regarding practical wisdom we shall get at the 
truth by considering who are the persons we credit with 
it. / .... 
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. t ,, 
( 36)
1 • The phronimos is the man who is not only able 
to deliberate well about what is "good and expedient for 
himself" but also about what sorts of things are con­
ducive to the good life in general. <37>
Hence practical wisdom (in the morally virtuous 
man, the man of good character) constitutes an objective 
standard of value. Thus although the performance of a 
brave act as manifested by different good men will vary 
from individual to individual, from situation to situation, 
nevertheless Aristotle suggests that it will be possible 
to recognise acts of courage as being thus, provided one 
has practical wisdom, that is one is a phronimos as is 
the individual who does actually perform that deed. Men 
like Pericles epitomize the phronimos. {JS) 
A further way the phronimos acts as an objective 
standard is shown in Aristotle's discussion on the train­
ing of the young. Initially the young learn good habits 
by following standards provided by the legislators, who 
would be men of practical wisdom. It is only after their 
characters are formed that they habitually desire the 
good or the noble. Thus they choose virtuous acts for 
their own sakes and employ their own practical wisdom in 
order to discover the mean. 
Insofar as the phronimos is also a man of good 
character, the good man or spoudaios acts as·a standard 
of value. Hence Aristotle says "each state of character 
has its own ideas of the noble and the pleasant, and 
perhaps the good man differs from others most by seeing 
the truth is each class of things, being as it were the 
norm and measure of them. 11 <39> The good man alone judges 
well about what is good and noble, <4o}hence "virtue and
the good man seem ••• to be the measure of every class 
of things."(4l} In this way therefore Aristotle tries to
avoid the relativism of a Sophist like Protagoras, for 
the good man alone, insofar as he is the measure of things, 
provides an objective standard of value. 
Despite/ .••. 
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Despite .the derision and/or amusement sometimes 
heaped on Aristotle's great-souled or proud man, <42> it
is clear that this paragon, exemplifying the phronimos 
and spoudaios, possessing all the virtues in their 
entirety, is an important objective standard of value. 
Pride, says Aristotle, is the "crown of the virtues, for 
it makes them greater and it is not found without 
them. 11 <43> As Gilbert and Sullivan might say, he is 
the very model of a model virtuous man. 
It is thus clear, as Menan has pointed out, that 
moral principles are. not derived from .a pre-existing, 
metaphysical absolute. They are, instead, derived from 
concrete situations of life. <44> ,Oates
<45> argues that
because there is a disjunction in Aristotle's thinking 
between being and value, he is forced to seek other 
criteria to stand as objective, moral standards lest he 
,lapse into the relativism of a Sophist. Aristotle there­
fore uses goodness of character and practical wisdom as 
those standards, and in so doing he does clarify the 
conventional morality of his time. In short the objective 
standards which apply to the sphere of the doable good 
are ultimately those of his own society, after he (as a
man of practical reason) has evaluated them critically. 
Insofar as they conduce to his own happiness, so too do 
they conduce to the happiness of mankind in general. 
Allan says of the man of practical wisdom that he is 
"to some extent a faithful interpreter of prevailing 
moral standards, who can point out what society would 
demand in a given case. But again - and this side of 
the picture ought not to be ignored - he has considered 
these standards more carefully than the average man� (46)
he can justify them by a philosophical view of man's 
place in the universe, and perhaps in some rare cases 
propose to modify them."(47>
The arguments above seem, however, to be destroyed 
by the following passage : 
"Those / .... 
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"Those who object that that at which all 
things aim is not necessarily good are, 
we may surmise, talking nonsense� For 
we say that that which everyone thinks 
really is so, and the man who attacks 
this belief will hardly have anything 
more credible to maintain instead." (48). 
The problem is that Aristotle uses the word 
"everyone''. <49> This does not fit in at all with what
has been said thus far and if accepted, would seem to 
render Aristotle's views on objective value standards 
as incoherent. In view of the various other remarks 
made by him on the good man and man of practical wisdom, 
and remembering his low opinions of the common herd, {SO)
it seems that this is a piece of careless writing. 
We have argued that in clarifying the conventional 
morality of his era Aristotle puts forward objective 
value standards applicable to the realm of secondary 
happiness. Yet it does seem that he also suggests that 
these values have an objective existence beyond the 
limits of his own particular society. This is arguably 
implicit in· his conception of natural justice and also 
in the discussion on unnatural actions. (5l) Thus whilst
Aristotle's moral standards are not derived from a pre­
existing metaphysical absolute, it may nevertheless be 
argued that there is an implicit Platonic assumption 
of some sort of underlying rationality which acts as a 
universal, transcendent standard in the realm of morally 
virtuous acts. <52> However, as we have already argued,
the thesis put forward by Berger and Luckrnann in favour 
of ethical relativism is a persuasive one. The 
essentially relativistic character of moral values is 
clearly illustrated by their arguments. <53)
8:1:5. An Existential criticism. 
The view that it is the prevailing values which, 
after critical elucidation, should act as standards of 
behaviour / .... 
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behaviour, is one whi�h has been attacked by Existential 
thinkers • .  Nietzsche, for example, said : 
"My teaching is this, that the herd seeks 
to maintain and preserve one type of man, 
and that it defends itself on two sides -
that is to say against those which are 
decadents from its ranks, and against 
those who rise superior to its dead level." (54) 
The implicit anti-Aristoteleanism is clear. It 
has been argued that the good man of practical wisdom 
who is epitomised in the proud man does act as a standard 
of behaviour. Insofar as he has these attributes, his 
actions are predictable. 
acts embodying a mean. 
He will always perform virtuous 
Aristotle does reject those who 
are "decadent" - they are not even rational. Further­
more, we have seen that he feels uneasy about exceptionally 
good men. 
Aristotle would find Dostoyevsky's Underground Man 
abhorrent. That individual rebels against a society 
so rationally organised that everyone will know what to 
do for his own advantage and will then do it. In such a 
society, 11 there will be no more incidents or adventures 
(55) in the world. 11 The Underground Man goes on to say 
"One's own free unfettered choice, one's 
own caprice, however wild it may be, one's 
own fancy worked up at times to a frenzy -
is that very 'most advantageous advantage' 
which we have overlooked ••.. And how do 
these wiseacres know that a man wants a 
normal, a virtuous ·choice ? What has made 
them conceive that a man must want a
rationally advantageous choice ? What man 
wants is simply independent choice, what-
ever that independence may cost and where-
ever it may lead." (56) 
The problem, of course, in aetheistic Existential 
philosophies is to avoid moral anarchy. Since God is 
dead, everything does seem to be permitted. For 
Existentialism, in its stress on acts of free commitment 
which do not shelter behind ready-made values, provides 
no blueprint for ethics. It is perhaps possible to 
argue/ .... 
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argue that any action may be justified under the banner 
of authenticity or good faith. However, most Exist­
entialists have recognised this problem and have 
attempted to include inter-personal relationships as an 
essential part of authenticity or good faith. (S?)
It might possibly be suggested that Aristotle 
tries to effect a compromise between an absolute and a 
situation ethics. For what the individual does actually 
do in any particular situation is contingent upon his 
personality and the specific circumstances in which he 
finds himself. Yet this seems to be only partly true. 
For, as has been argued, (SB)it does seem that actions will 
be performed in predictable ways by those who are 
practically wise and morally good. An Aristotelean 
society would be so rationally organised that there would 
be no place in it for the eccentric, and perhaps the truly 
creative individual. <59>
8:1:6. Subjective standard.of value. 
Pleasure is the subjective standard of value used 
by Aristotle in the realm of morally virtuous acts. 
"We must take as a sign of states of 
character the pleasure or pain that 
ensues on acts; for the man who abstains 
from bodily pleasures and delights in 
this very fact is temperate, while the 
man who is annoyed at it is self-indulgent." (60)
Now since there are proper pleasures for every 
activity, and since activities differ in respect of 
their goodness or badness, "the pleasure proper to a 
worthy activity is good, and that proper to an unworthy 
activity is bad. 11( 6l) It is the morally good man alone
who is the judge of what is truly pleasant. 
"But in all such matters that which appears 
to the good man is thought to be really so. 
If this is correct, as it seems to be, and 
virtue and'the good man as such are the 
measure of each thing, those also will be 
pleasures which appear so to him, and those 
things pleasant which he enjoys. 11 (62)
Thus/ 
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Thus the good man knows he is performing a 
morally good act in terms of the pleasure accompanying 
that act. 
Yet we may query this conclusion when considering 
courage. Aristotle argues that it is when man faces 
what is painful that he can be called courageous. 
Although the end which the brave man sets himself is 
pleasant, for example, honour or the crown won in a boxing 
match, the wounds or blows suffered will be painful. 
Aristotle says that the courageous man bears these pains 
because it is noble to do so. He then contradicts 
the pleasure criterion as follows : 
"It is not the case, then, with all the 
virtues that the exercise of them is 
pleasant, except insofar as it reaches 
its end." (63) 
Thus although the blows are painful, the achieve­
ment of honour is pleasant. Therefore it seems we must 
conclude that as the pleasure criterion does not apply 
to the performance of courageous acts, it cannot be a 
consistently-held subjective value standard (as indeed 
it should be, in terms of the discussion on pleasure in 
Book X). 
A further difficulty related to the good/bad 
actuality problem has been pointed out by Oates. (G4 ) For
in the light of the arguments above, what are we to make 
of Aristotle's distinction between good and bad pleasures ? (GS)
As Oates puts it, the problem is "how an activity functions 
sometimes as a symptom of value or worth, and at the same 
time, there be such a thing as a bad activity. 11(66)
Clearly Aristotle is aware of the difficulty inherent in 
his basic premise that pleasure is bound up with the 
particular activity it completes. (G7) In the metaphysical
sense, Aristotle would presumably have to agree that.the 
activity of stealing, if performed with excellence, would 
be pleasurable, although not as pleasurable as the 
activity of contemplation. But since he intends pleasure 
to / .... 
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to be a criterion of moral value, he is forced to dis­
tinguish between good and bad pleasures in the moral 
sense. Thus it is only those pleasures which attend 
on the performance of morally good acts which can be 
thought of as good pleasures. 
It is also interesting that in the scale of 
superiority of pleasures, Aristotle makes those of sight 
superior to those of touch, and those of hearing and 
smell superior to those of taste. (68) The latter clearly
refer to those necessary pleasures associated with the 
body, that is sexual intercourse and food, (G9) These
pleasures, unlike sight, so easily admit of excess in 
which case they would be bad pleasures associated with 
bad actualities. It is only the good man whose activities, 
being good both in the metaphysical and moral senses, who 
will enjoy good pleasures. <7o)
8:2. Metaphysical act of contemplation. 
There is an objective and subjective standard of 
value in the realm of perfect ·happiness. 
8:2:1. Objective standard of value. 
We have already seen that Aristotle's description 
of contemplation may be said to parallel that of the 
activity of the prime mover. (7l) Contemplation is the
best activity since reason is the best thing in us and 
the objects of reason are the best of knowable objects. 
It is the most continuous and most pleasurable of all 
activities. (72)
In the Metaphysicst-.<73te read that "thought which 
is independent of the lower faculties must be thought of 
what is best in itself." Aristotle says that "it (thought) 
becomes intelligible by contact with the intelligible so 
that thought and the object of thought are one. For that 
which is capable of receiving the object of thought, that 
is / •... 
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that is, the essence of thought, and it is active when 
it possesses this object." Hence Aristotle goes on to 
say that activity is the divine element in thought, 
and that actual· contemplation is the best and most 
pleasant of all activities. God, the prime mover, is 
always in that state. We only attain it sometimes. 
The· contemplation of the happy man therefore 
derives its objective value from its similarity to the 
activity of the prime mover. There is no possibility of 
moral standards of value operating in the sphere of 
perfect happiness, nor can the prime mover function as 
a value sanction in the realm of practical or productive 
actions. <74> The prime mover's activity is solely
thinking on thought. 
8:2:2. Subjective standard of value. 
The above arguments do also show that pleasure is 
a subjective criterion in the activity of contemplation 
as well. Moreover this pleasure must resemble that of 
the prime mover. In Book Vll of the Nicomachean Ethics 
Aristotle prepares the reader for this point by arguing 
that "God always enjoys a single and simple pleasure; 
for there is not only an activity of movement but an 
activity of irnmobility. 11 <75> This immobility clearly
excludes any action in the practical sphere being part 
of contemplation. 
Pleasure attending the activity of theoretical 
wisdom is hence analogous to the activity of the prime 
mover. Aristotle speaks of pleasure in a "metaphysical'' 
sense, when arguing that Hthat which is proper to each 
thing is by nature best and most pleasant for each thing; 
for man, therefore, the life according to· reason is best 
and pleasantest, since reason more than anything else 
is rnan. 11 <76> Although the finest pleasure is that which
accompanies the best activity Aristotle does not advocate 
a hedonistic position. Pleasure is not sought for its 
own _sake. Rather pleasure completes the activity "as an 
end/ 
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end which supervenes as the bloom of youth does on 
those in the flower of their age. 11 <77>
8:3. Conclusion. 
It is clear therefore from this discussion that 
there is no systematic unity in the standards of value 
used by AristQtle in his ethical thought. 
In the sphere of morally virtuous acts the 
sta.ndards used are essentially moral ones. There is 
also the implication of a transcendent moral law, which 
is also a metaphysical standard, against which acts are 
measured. But there is no room for the purely meta­
physical criterion of excellence as completeness. The 
excellence of an activity must be a moral excellence too for 
it to count as embodying practical wisdom and for its 
pleasures to be good in the moral sense. 
In the sphere of perfect happiness, moral 
�tandards are absent. The excellence of theoretical 
reason is metaphysical and pleasurable without the added 
need for moral criteria. Indeed theoretical wisdom is 
definitely regarded as separate from practical wisdom. <78)
Since it is only the moral virtues which admit of a 
mean, <79>practical wisdom is not an essential prerequisite
for the ability to contemplate. 
But Aristotle does intend the realm of secondary 
happiness to be a requirement for the metaphysical 
contemplative activity. 
elucidated. 
This relationship must now be 
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punishing a man for that crime. To a very large
extent, therefore, the law exists in order to uphold
certain moral standards in society and moral codes
teach us to refrain from certain acts forbidden by
law. There is also a general feeling that individuals
have a moral duty to obey laws. It is generally felt
that the state has certain moral ends and that citizens
have a moral obligation to help to promote the moral
goods of the state. We have already mentioned that
moral and legal responsibility are linked together.
All these points are implicit in Aristotle's work on
politics and ethics.
There is, of course, not always an overlap between the
law and the moral code. We can distinguish between
those acts which are evil insofar as they have a moral
content, for example, murder, and those acts which are
evil because they are pronibited by law, for example,
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CHAPTER 9 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECONDARY AND PERFECT 
HAPPINESS. 
9:1. Introduction. 
The realms of perfect and secondary happiness are 
separate and different in terms of Aristotle's thought. 
It has been shown that no direct relationship is possible 
in terms of the clear separation between theoretical and 
practical wisdom as well as the diff,erent standards of 
value applicable in each sphere. However, it is also 
clear that the life of moral virtue must in some way be 
a prerequisite for contemplation .lest Aristotle be forced 
to admit the possibility of a morally wicked philosopher 
achieving perfect happiness. When dealing with the 
possible connection between theoretical and practical 
wisdom, Aristotle's only remark in the Nicomachean Ethics 
ts that practical wisdom provides for theoretical wisdom 
coming into being. It issues order for the sake of 
theoretical wisdom. (l) It now becomes necessary to
explicate this contention in order to clarify the relation­
ship between man's ends. 
It will be argued that there are three "aspects" 
to this relationship, namely the perfection of man's 
rationality; the role of leisure which, as an end product 
of moral virtue, is a necessary requirement for contem­
plation; and the role of the legislator, the man of 
practical wisdom, in organising the state in such a way 
that firstly, the theoretical disciplines form part of the 
educational curriculum and, secondly, that the young are 
encouraged to form good habits so that the opportunities 
for happiness are greatest. 
9:2. The perfection of man's rationality. 
A morally virtuous act is one in which goodness of 
character is combined with the exercise of practical 
wisdom which discovers the mean. The performance of 
morally/ .••. 
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morally virtuous acts insofar as man uses his practical 
reason may be said to help to perfect the intellect or 
man's rationality as a whole. As Gauthier puts it, 
"Virtue prepares for.its (reason's) flowering."(
2)
In terms of this argument, the vicious man is 
precluded from becoming a philosopher, for vice degrades 
the intellect. (J) It seems therefore that a vicious act 
must be an.irrational act. But as we have seen, there 
is evidence in the· Nichomachean Ethics of calculating, 
rationally chosen vicious actions being performed. (4)
It would therefore be possible to argue that the vicious, 
clever man is perfecting his rationality by his skilful 
planning and execution of evil acts. But this would be 
an untenable position for Aristotle. It is clear that 
the argument that reason is perfected in the practical 
sphere of action presupposes that these actions are 
directed towards morally good ends. Only insofar as 
man is morally virtuous can his rationality be said to 
f1ower in terms of Aristotle's arguments. The role of 
moral virtue is clear. It is because Aristotle operates 
within the teleological framework that he requires 
activities directed towards good ends to have the quality 
of moral virtue so that the ends will also have a moral 
excellence. (S) 
It is surely in the above sense that we must 
firstly interpret Aristotle's argument that practical 
wisdom provides for theor�tical wisdom coming into 
being. (G) For the morally virtuous man not only helps 
to perfect his reason through the exercise of his 
practical wisdom, but insofar as his passions are there­
by controlled, he is able to contemplate. A man 
constantly beset by his appetites could hardly be in a 
position for concentrated intellectual activity.(?) 
This interpretation is confirmed by Aristotle's 
remarks that the best activity, that activity which is 
most complete (that is, good in the metaphysical sense)
and / .... 
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and the most pleasant is that of the best conditioned 
organ in relation to the finest of its objects. (S) 
Yet, on the other hand, it must not be forgotten 
that Aristotle does seem to admit the possibility of 
philosophising without speaking of the necessity for 
being morally good as well in his remarks on Thales 
and Anaxagoras. ( 9) However, the passage must be inter­
preted as a piece of careless writing, for its admission 
would render Aristotle's ethical system incoherent. 
9:3. The role of leisure and the task of the legislator. 
"Happiness", says Aristotle, "is thought to depend 
on leisure, for we are busy that we may have leisure."(lO) 
In order to be able to contemplate, a man must 
have leisure. Aristotle's argument is that only in a 
good city state will this leisure be provided. It is 
therefore on this point that ethics and politics very 
conveniently overlap in their respective discussions on 
the good life. 
The essential task of the legislators, the planners 
of the constitution, is to ensure that men will be good. 
It is therefore necessary that they know the aim of the 
best life and what practices will lead towards men 
becoming good. (ll) Aristotle holds that the best
constitution will be one so well ordered that any person 
may live happily. <12> However, as we have already seen,
Aristotle makes it quite clear that not all inhabitants 
will participate in the virtues to the same extent. 
Slaves do not possess the deliberative faculty at all. 
(Presumably slaves can do good deeds mechanically, 
having been trained in good habits, or perhaps they are 
naturally virtuous.} Women and children also possess 
the deliberative faculty imperfectly and are happy by 
analogy, insofar as their rationality is exercised to a 
limited degree. (l3)
When does the good citizen overlap with the good 
man ? / •••• 
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man ? Aristotle says of the former that he knows 
well how to rule and be ruled. (l4) This definition
applies'equally well to the constitution of any 
particular state. But it is only in the case of a 
good constitution, when a man who is able-and chooses 
to rule and be ruled, does so with a view to the good 
life, that he will be both a good citizen as well as 
a good man ·simultaneously. When the end of his life 
is the same, from the point of view of his being a 
political and an ethical being, the two concepts co­
incide. 
The phrase "to rule and be ruled" is therefore 
extremely significant. In the case of the good citizen 
it obviously has a political significance. But as a man, 
the good man (who is also a good citizen) does rule and 
is ruled by his reason. The good man "gratifies the 
�ost authoritative element in himself, and in all things 
obeys this; and just as a city or any other systematic 
whole is most properly identified with the most 
authoritative element in it, so is a man."(lS)
The legislators, men of practical wisdom, must 
have virtue in its entirety for their task is that of 
chief makers, and reason is the chief maker. (l6) They
will understand Aristotle's political and ethical works, 
having been brought up to have good habits and there­
fore able to listen intelligently to arguments. (l?)
It is clear that only in a good state, a state 
aiming at the good life, will morally virtuous acts co­
incide with acts of civic virtue. The aim of these 
acts is ultimately to provide leisure and peace, for 
the culmination of man's rational activities is to 
contemplate. 
"Since it is clear that men have the same 
purpose whether they are acting as individ­
uals or as a state, and that the best man 
and the best constitution must have the 
same / .•.• 
137 
same distinguishing features, it becomes 
evident that there must be present in the 
state the virtues that lead to the cul­
tivation of leisure; for, as has often 
been said, the end of war is peace, and 
the end of work is leisure. Of the virtues 
useful for the employment of leisure some 
are exercised in a period of leisure, 
others in a period of work, because a lot 
of things need to be provided before 
leisured activity can become possible. 
Hence a city must be self-restrained, 
courageous, steadfast. We need courage 
and steadfastness for the work, intell­
ectual ability for cultivated leisure, 
restra'int and honesty at all times, but 
particularly at times of peace and 
leisure." (18) 
It is surely in terms of the above passage that 
Aristotle says that "the end is the same for a single 
man and for a state", but that the end of the latter is 
greater. (l9) For only in a well-ordered state will
the majority attain secondary happiness, and the leisure 
thereby be provided which will enable an intellectually 
gifted few to reach perfect happiness. A further 
elucidation of the way practical reason provides for 
theoretical reason coming into being has therefore been 
provided. For insofar as the legislator, the man of 
practical wisdom, designs a well-ordered state which 
ensures the provision of leisure for its inhabitants, so 
is the opportunity for philosophising provided. 
The legislator will also plan the educational 
system in such a way as to include in its curriculum the 
study of the theoretical disciplines, including theology, 
these being necessary in order that the mind be well­
stored with the materials for contemplation. 
In the Metaphysics Aristotle speaks of the 
evolution of the theoretical sciences in those places 
where men had plenty of free time. For example, 
mathematics originated in Egypt where, as Aristotle 
points out, "a priestly class enjoyed the necessary 
leisure."/ 
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leisure." <20>- Aristotle also writes that "philosophy
arose only when the necessities and the philosophic 
comforts of life had been provided· for. 1 (2l) In a lost
work De Philosophia a similar argument is presented. 
In it Aristotle sees the various elements of civilisation 
culminating in philosophy. Firstly, men are compelled 
to create those necessities which are required for their 
survival. The next stage is the emergence of the arts 
which refine life. This is followed by politics which 
ensures the emergence of a well-regulated state and 
finally the leisure for philosophising. <22)
The Magna Moralia sums up the links between man's 
ends in a succinct manner. 
"Practical thought is a dispenser or 
steward to philosophical thought, 
ministering to it leisure and the 
freedom to perform its task, by 
restraining and disciplining the 
passions of the soul." (23) 
9:4 Hardi.e's thes·is of an inclusive and dominant end. 
Another possible way of explaining the relation­
ship between secondary and perfect happiness is by making 
use of Hardie 1 s <24> distinction between an inclusive and 
a dominant end. Hardie maintains that Aristotle's thought 
contains a certain confusion regarding the notion of 
man's end. For he speaks about it both in the sense 
of its being an inclusive as well as a dominant end. Let 
us briefly elaborate on what Hardie means by these two 
concepts. 
Happiness in the sense of an inclusive end is 
interpreted as a planned life embodying "the desire for 
the orderly and harmonious gratification of desires. 11 <25>
For, as Hardie puts it, men do require to live their 
lives according to some plan, and "the inevitability of 
a plan arises from the fact that a man both has, and 
knows that he has a number of desires and interests which 
can/ .... 
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can be adopted as motives either casually and in­
discriminately or in accordance with priorities 
determined by the aim of living the kind of life which 
he thinks proper for a man like himself ... (26)
Hardie quotes various passages in Aristotle's 
ethical thought to corroborate this interpret ation. 
Thus in the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle speaks of the 
need to regulate one's actions towards the attainment 
of happiness. 
"Everybody able to live according to his 
own purposive choice should set before 
him some object for noble living to aim 
at - either honour or else glory or wealth 
or culture - on which he will keep his 
gaze fixed in all his conduct (since 
clearly it is a mark of much folly not to 
have.one's life regulated with regard to 
some End) it is therefore most necessary 
first to decide within oneself, neither 
hastily nor carelessly in which of the 
things that belong to us the good life 
consists, and what are the indispensible 
conditions for man's possessing it." (27) 
The same sort of idea, according to Hardie, is 
implied in the various discussions about the man of 
practical wisdom who has a true apprehension of that 
end which is good for himself, and is able to plan the 
means which would enable him to attain it. <28>
The concept of a planned existence also extends 
to the political sphere where Aristotle speaks of a 
well-ordered constitution wherein the possibilities for 
happiness of its citizens are the greatest. <29> His
stress on the importance of correct moral training by 
the state implies that its citizens will follow a 
consistently well-planned life. (3o) Hence, to sum up,
"one's own good cannot exist without household manage­
ment, nor without a form of.government."(Jl)
To what extent do people plan their lives 
systematically? Hardie argues that since men do have 
many/ .••. 
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many and vari.ous aims, it is necessary for them to 
allocate priorities, to plan to achieve certain desires, 
to avoid what is undesirable as far as possible. (32>
Even if one plans in a rudi.mentary form, one nevertheless 
does plan. 
Aristotle would surely agree too with the 
Existentialist, Hazel Barnes, whose view is that an 
ethical life is one which embodies a coherent plan. 
Rejecting the arguments of an individual like Dostoyevsky's 
Underground Man, who refused to justify his life, (33>
Barnes argues as follows : <34>
"What.characterises many, if not most 
people, is precisely a lack of commitment 
and consistency. They do not have a 
coherent life plan either as ideal or 
reality. One cannot truthfully say even 
that they have chosen to respond spontan­
eously to.each new situation as it occurs, 
for their responses are frequently not 
genuine, but only what they feel is 
expected. To apply the term .•. 'ethical' 
to this sort of aimless, desultory, semi­
mechanical living is to do violence to 
language so as to destroy the possibility 
of communication." 
Perhaps, as Hardie suggests, men do impose a 
rudimentary plan on their lives. But for Aristotle, 
t�e only kind of planned existence desirable would be 
one directed towards a life of moral virtue, that is, 
directing one's actions in such a way that one 
consistently seeks to perform good deeds. This involves 
having the right ends and choosing the right means to 
attain such ends. It therefore implies the possession 
of good habits •. The problem for Aristotle is surely 
that most people do not plan their lives in this way. (35)
In terms of the function argument given in this thesis, 
this is because it is not the case that men naturally 
do follow the rule given by practical wisdom. But 
they ought to. As Kenny says, the fact that a planned 
existence is made as a recommendation shows that what is 
being/ .... 
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being recommended is something that is not "already· (36) the case in the behaviour of all men." 
It is clear that the notion of an inclusive end 
refers specifically to the idea of secondary happiness, 
, 
the life of consistently-performed morally virtuous 
acts. Why should a man plan his life in this way? 
Firstly, because, as we have seen, virtue brings its 
own rewards to the individual. (37> One oug�t to liye
rationally, directing one's acts towards .good ends in 
order to attain secondary happiness. But it is surely 
arguable that it is only if one does live in accordance 
with such a plan that one will be in a position to 
achieve perfect happiness. For the consistently-lived 
rational and virtuous life (corresponding to the life 
of civic virtue in a good state) perfects one's reason, 
ensures the subjugation of one's passions, and provides 
tor the leisure required for the sublime -activity of 
contemplation, which, in Hardie's terminology, is the 
dominant end. 
Happiness as the final ·good among all other goods 
is the dominant end, the summit of man's rational activity. 
Contemplation is loved for its own sake, being an activity 
of that which is best in man and most like the divine 
activity of God, the prime mover. It is never desired 
except for itself and is thus more desirable than moral 
virtue. <3B> The notion of a dominant end therefore
corresponds to perfect happiness. 
Hardie criticises Aristotle for confusing these 
two notions. But there are, after all, two kinds of 
happiness which we have suggested correspond to the two 
ends indicated by Hardie. It has been argued that 
secondary happiness or happiness as an inclusive end is 
a prerequisite for the realisation of perfect happiness, 
which is happiness in sense of the dominant end. 
9:5. Contemplation/ .•.. 
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9:5. Contemplation and man as a social being. 
As a social being or a political animal a 
philosopher is obliged to have contact with his fellows. 
Aristotle writes : 
11 Surely it is strange too to make the 
supremely happy man a solitary; for no 
one would choose the whole world on 
condition of being alone, since man is 
a political creature and one whose 
nature is to live with others." (39) 
The "good man qua good man delights in virtuous 
actions."(40) The philosopher, when he performs a
morally good act which at the same time helps to perfect 
his rationality, directs his acts towards ends which are 
good both in the ethical and metaphysical senses. These 
ends are morally desirable, and, insofar as they may 
each be said to exemplify the standard of rationality, 
�re each characterised by the metaphysical characteristic 
of completeness. However, the life of moral virtue is 
not good in the sense of it being complete since it is not 
man's final end, although such-a life is morally good. 
Contemplation is good in the metaphysical sense 
since it is the final end of becoming a man as a rational 
being. In terms of Aristotle's arguments it can only 
be attained by the morally virtuous man. The question 
arises as to whether contemplation is also morally 
des.irable as man's final end. 
In an interesting passage Aristotle seems to 
suggest that contemplating philosophers will not be 
ivory-tower individuals. For they are "the creators of 
external actions also."(4l) The parallel with the Platonic
conception of the philosopher king in The Republic is 
obvious • .  Aristotle is trying to imply that the philosopher, 
as the supremely creative individual, does contribute to 
the practical life of the state. Commenting on this 
passage Jaeger says that the contemplative life is 
therefore/ 
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therefore "practical in the highest sense" but he does . 
(42) not elaborate. However, whereas Aristotle would 
surely have wished to be able to argue in this way, 
there is no evidence to support such a contention. 
Contemplation itself is an activity of the dis­
embodied nous and is neither practical nor productive. <43>
These objects contemplated are not concerned with political 
matters. <44> It does not •seem to be logically possible
that philosophising can provide practical benefits for 
the state as a whole. As was pointed out in the Intro-
duction to this thesis, Plato avoided such a problem for 
the underlying unity which the Forms provided to this 
thought ensured the reconciliation of the theoretical 
life with the realm of political action. Furthermore, 
in Plato's early thought as evidenced in The Republic, 
for example, practical wisdom is conceived of as con­
stituting a·unity with theoretical wisdom. We have shown 
how, within the theoretical/practical wisdom dichotomy 
{n the Nicomachean Ethics, an explanation may be provided 
for the way that practical wisdom legislates for the sake 
of theoretical or philosophic wisdom. But the converse 
is impossible within the framework of Aristotle's thought. 
Indeed, Aristotle does actually speak of the contemplative 
life as one which is free of all commitments. <45)
Aristotle's supremely happy man, insofar as he 
contemplates only, stands apart from the state. As a 
virtuous man, happy in the secondary sense, he does 
contribute-to the welfare of the state as a whole. But 
perfect happiness is a-social, it is a solitary activity, 
politically unproductive. It may be desirable for the 
. 
. 
individual himself since it does, after all, constitute 
his own perfect happiness. But it cannot be shown to be 
morally good within the larger context of the state as 
a whole •. It does therefore seem to be a selfish activity. 
How far Aristotle has moved from his initial 
conception of happiness is clear from this early passage 
in/ .•.. 
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in the Nicomachean Ethics : 
"Why then should we not say that he 
is happy who is active in accordance 
with complete virtue, and is suffic� 
iently equipped with external goods 
not for some chance period but 
throughout a complete life." (46) 
It is surely arguable that in this passage, like 
most of the Nicomachean Ethics, the emphasis is on 
secondary happiness. Aristotle was, however, reluctant 
to abandon the Platonic conception of contemplation as · 
constituting the ideally happy life, But his conclusion 
that contemp�ation is perfect happiness is not consistent 
with his conception of man as a political animal. It is 
true that the perfectly happy man is also a morally 
virtuous individual and a good citizen (in a good state), 
but insofar as he is a morally good citizen he is, after 
all, only secondarily happy. 
145. 
Appendix: The concept of self actualisation. 
The Aristotelean conception that the man who is 
happy is the man who has actualised his possibilities 
is .held to be an extremely important one. This view 
may be assessed with specific reference to the thought 
of the contemporary psychologist, Abraham Maslow, whose 
thought may be regarded as being distinctly Aristotelean. 
Maslow himself shows how closely his starting 
point overlaps with that of Aristotle when he writes 
"We may agree with Aristotle when he 
assumed that the good life consisted 
in living in accordance with the true 
nature of man, but we must add that he 
simply did not know enough about the 
true nature of man." (47)
Maslow points out, for example, that we now have 
a deeper understanding of man's unconscim;is, of 11 what 
lies hidden in man, what lies suppressed ·and neglected 
and unseen. 1 ( 4B) Another advantage modern thinkers
, 
have over Aristotle, according to Maslow, is that they 
have learned that self-realisation cannot be attained 
by man's rationality alone. Maslow rejects the con­
ception of reason, accorded a dominant role, being 
contrasted with man's emotions which constitute his 
11 lower" nature. (49> We may agree with Maslow that when
Aristotle describes perfect happiness he does conceive 
it in a narrowly rationalistic sense. However, the 
performance of morally good actions is a.necessary 
requirement for the contemplative life. Insofar as 
Aristotle deals with happiness in general terms he is 
concerned with "a realisation of man's total person­
ality."(SO) Aristotle's man who is happy is in Maslow's 
terminology an "integrated" individual; he is not at 
odds with himself, his reason struggling against his 
emotions. (Sl) Indeed, when Maslow's conception of the
self-actualised man is examined, parallels with the 
Aristotelean view become apparent. Certainly Aristotle 
did / .... 
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did not take into account man's unconscious, yet his 
understanding of hum an nature was profound. It is 
also undeniable that his inability to free himself 
from the Platonic emphasis on "pure" rationality and 
the contemplative ideal led Aristotle to identify 
perfect happiness with an exclusively intellectual 
activity. 
Maslow interprets man's essential nature in 
terms of certain "needs, capacities and tendencies that 
are genetically based. 11 <52> Some of these needs,
capacities and tendencies are characteristic of the 
human species as a whole; others are unique to each 
individual. Maslow argues that "full health and normal 
and desirable development consist in actualising these 
potentialities, and in developing into maturity along 
the lines that this hidden, covert, dimly seen essential 
nature dictates. 1 ( 53) The self-actualised individual is
one whose needs, both basic and meta- have been satisfied 
(Maslow uses the word "needs" to cover "needs, capacities 
and tendencies"). The basic needs listed by Maslow are 
physiological, safety, love, esteem and self-actualis� 
ation. <54> The met�- or higher needs, which include
beauty, justice, order and goodness, generally emerge 
after the prior satisfaction of basic needs, although 
there may, of course, be exceptions. <55> Like Aristotle,
Maslow stresses the importance of the environment in 
ensuring the actualisation of man's potentialities. 
Although Aristotle does not speak in terms of 
needs it is arguable that he does recognise their 
importance. He would surely agree with Maslow that 
whilst it is true that man lives by bread alone when 
there is no bread, when man's hunger needs are satisfied, 
higher needs emerge. (56) These are filled and still others
appear. In other words, basic human needs may be 




Aristotle recognised the importance of physio­
logical needs (provided the mean was operative} as 
well as the significance of safety needs. This is 
clear in his insistence on the formation of habitual 
behaviour, which promotes a sense of security in the 
individual, as well as the need for a well-run state 
which will ensure that the lives of individuals do 
appear to have a meaningful coherence. Man's need for 
self-rsteem and self-respect, as well as the need for 
the esteem of others, is clearly understood by Aristotle 
in his discussion on the proud rnan {5S} (even though this 
picture may be somewhat exaggerated). Maslow argues 
that the man whose self-esteem needs are satisfied is 
self-confident; he feels himself to be a useful and 
necessary part of his society. <59> The Aristotelean
portrait of the good man's relation to himself provides 
a clear parallel. <60>
When these needs are satisfied there emerges the 
need for self-actualisation. At this point Aristotle 
may be criticised, for in his discussion on man's 
function he has divorced man's actualisation of his 
potentialities from a man's special calling. The good 
for man is the good for man as man, and Aristotle does 
not include the good for man as a parpist, a craftsman, 
an author and the like. It is, of course, true that 
the good for man as man overlaps with man as a statesman 
or perhaps with man as a philosopher, in some instances, 
provided the state itself is a good one. But it is 
surely arguable that the happy (61> man i� also he who is 
expressing himself by doing that for which he is best 
fitted, by becoming what he is best capable of becoming. 
Plato seems to have recognised this in his version of 
the ideal state, The Republic. Apart from Aristotle's 
reference to slaves, females and children participating 
in the virtues to the extent required by each for the 
exercise/ ...• 
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exercise of their proper function, ( 62) he does not
pursue this point. The importance of vocation in the 
self-actualised individual is well-argued by Maslow. 
The extent to which one's work becomes a part of the 
self is shown in the sentence: 
"If I were not an x, then I wouldn't be me. 11 <63)
The self-actualised individual, satisfied in his 
basic needs, now becomes motivated by the higher or 
metaneeds which, as has already been pointed out, include 
beauty, justice, order and goodness. Maslow suggests 
that the self�actualised individual, insofar as he 
practises his calling, is ultimately concerned with these 
metaneeds. Such people may meaningfully be said to be 
working for beauty, justice, law and order. <64> Hence
the self-actualised lawyer, for example, would be 
ultimately motivated by these higher needs rather than 
the accumulation of monetary rewards for his services. 
These metaneeds, according to Maslow, constitute man's 
,
spiritual life which he regards as the defining character-
istic of human nature. (6S) Maslow does not conceive of
this "higher" life as being in a different realm to the 
so-called more "animal" life. Rather the former, being 
on the same continuum as the latter, requires the latter 
as a necessary ;re-condition. <66) Although Aristotle
does conceive of perfect happiness as the intellectual 
activity of contemplation, it has nevertheless been 
argued that the life of moral virtue is a necessary pre­
condition for the attainment of that state, and therefore 
Maslow's "continuum" argument is implied to a certain 
extent. (6?) The philosopher's basic needs require
fulfilment before he is motivated by metaneeds. In the 
realm of secondary happiness, the self-actualised 
legislator, for example, has his basic needs satisfied 
as he pursues the higher needs of justice, law, order 
and goodness in his ruling of the state. (GB)
It is clear that for Maslow a man is not good in 
the/ .... 
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the Aristotelean sense of behaving in a desirable way 
if he is merely morally good. Indeed, in a sense, that 
would be to put the cart before the horse • .  A man is 
good, that is, his actions are motivated by higher 
needs, precisely because he is a self-actualised 
scientist, artist or musician. In Aristotelean terms, 
his moral goodness is a consequence of his having attain­
ed metaphysical completeness as an individual with his 
own unique calling. The good of man as man presupposes 
the good of man as an individual doing that job for which 
he is best suited. The word "good" is thus used both 
in the metap4ysical sense of completeness as well as 
referring to what is desirable or moral goodness • 
. But of course one may give the same sort of 
objection as was given against Aristotle. (G9) Does Maslow
allow that a competent thief, or perhaps a Mafia_ "God­
father" be considered as a self-actualised individual? 
Presumaly Maslow would exclude them for he uses words 
like "law", "justice" and "goodness" in the ordinary 
sense. Maslow based his arguments on self-actualisation 
on his association with men who would ordinarily be 
called "morally good". But insofar as the thief could 
say:"If I weren't a thief I couldn't be me", he could 
surely be said to be a self-actualised thief. A Mafia 
'�Godfather" might even be said to be concerned with law, 
justice and order within his own particular·society, 
in terms of the values of that society. In view of an 
argument put forward in favour of ethical relativism, (70)
it may be suggested that the rightness of any action 
depends on one's perspective. 
It is perhaps because of this possibility that 
Aristotle did delimit his discussion on function to that 
of man as man. Yet it is held that the particular 




Of course our understanding of human nature is
far from complete despite the recent contributions of 
the biological and humanistic sciences. Maslow's 
interpretation of the concept of self-actualisation is, 
like that of Aristotle, merely one possible view. But 
attention has been drawn to Maslow in order to point 
out.the "modernity" of that concept and the continuing 
relevance of the Aristotelean model, as well as to 
illustrate what is held to be an extremely important 
factor in ethics, namely the inter-relationship between 
man's nature, self-actualisation and the performance 
of morally gqod actions. Both Aristotle and Maslow 
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It should be ·noted that not all commentators accept 
such arguments. Monan, for example, would reject this 
solution. Rejecting what he calls the "rickety 
amalgam" in Book X of the Nicornachean Ethics in which 
Aristotle does make some attempt to fuse the life of 
secondary happiness with contemplation, Menan argues 
that the only way to achieve a coherent account of 
happiness is to reject contemplation altogether as 
constituting a component of it. Monan's thesis is 
that Aristotle's treatment of contemplation belongs 
to an earlier period of thought which preceded the 
development of Aristotle's account of practical wisdom 
and the moral virtues (cf. Jaeger: Op.cit. p.334). 
Monan accordingly interprets happiness in terms of the 
"integrated activity of both intellectual and moral· 
virtues" (p.132). This interpretation excludes the 
Nicomachean Ethics for happiness there is situated in 
the activity of the theoretical .intellect. Marian says 
that happiness as "complete" virtue is to be identified 
with nobility as described in the Eudemian Ethics. 
There Aristotle says that "nobility then is perfect 
goodness." (E.E. 1249al8). In other words, the supreme 
good is to be found in the integrated virtues which 
comprise the virtue of nobility (p.153). Only this 
conclusion, according to Menan, presents us with a 
unified good for man in terms of the complex of virtues 
in / .... 
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in the Eudemian Ethics. 
Monan: Op.cit. 
We have argued that Aristotle's arguments on 
happiness do present problems for interpretation. 
It is not possible to argue for a unified 
structure comprising perfect happiness, and 
secondary happiness as a direct means for its 
achievement. Nevertheless, in view of the 
argument given on function as the coming to be 
of man's essence, it is held that contemplation 
must stand as the chief good for man, despite the 
attendant problems of such a conception. Further­
more the idea of an evolutionary development 
within Aristotle's thought has been rejected. It 
has been argued that Platonic and empirical elements 
are often juxtaposed within single works. 
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Despite this admission Aristotle does, in reply to
his own query as to which life is more desirable,
namely that of the active citizen or that of the
philosopher, reject each as an extreme. Each man
must strive towards the perfection of his reason,
but insofar as even the philosopher is a man, he
has social and political commitments. The good
state contains examples of both kinds of happiness.
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Ibid: Chapter 5. 
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"It is clear that the whole hierarchy of basic needs 
is prepotent to the metaneeds, or, to say it in 
another way, the metaneeds are post potent (less 
urgent or demanding, weaker) to the basic needs. 
I intend this as a generalised statistical statement 
because I find same single individuals in whom a 
special talent or a unique sensitivity makes truth 
or beauty or goodness, for that single person, more 
important and more pressing than some basic need."· 
Maslow: The Farther Reaches of Human Nature, p.323. 
Maslow: Motivation and Personality, p.83. 
There may, of course, be exceptions. Maslow lists 
seven possibilities. For example, in some individuals 
self-esteem seems to be more important than love. 
There are many "innately" creative people in whom 
"the drive to creativeness" seems to be more important 
than any other need. 
Maslow: Motivation and Personality, p.98. 
N • E • Bk • lV : 3 • 
Maslow: Motivation and Personality, p. 91. 
N • E • Bk • lX: 8 • 
"Happy" is used here in the Aristotelean sense of 
well-being or well-doing. 
Politics 1260al3. 
Maslow: The Farther Reaches of Human Nature, p.307. 
Ibid. p. 301. 
Ibid. p.325. 
Ibid. p. 32 4 • 
See Chapter 9:2-4. 
Maslow does not make it clear whether one's meta­
needs are ever completely fulfilled. Presumably, 
however, they are not. The self-actualised 
individual would constantly seek these higher needs 
in the practising of his calling. 
Chapter 2. 
See Chapter 5:4:2. Berger and Luckmann: Op.cit. 
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CHAPTER 10 : THE NOTION OF A FINAL END 
Let us now examine the well-known sentence 
which occurs at the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics 
in the light of some of the points already elucidated 
ideas. 
"If, then, there is some end of the 
things we do, which we desire for its 
own sake (everything else being desired 
for the sake of this) and if we do not 
choose everything for the sake of some-
thing else (for at that rate the process 
would go on to infinity, so that our 
desire would be empty and vain), clearly 
this must be the good and the chief 
good.•� (1) 
Aristotle seems here to be putting forward two 
Firstly he is arguing that however long or 
short is the chain of activities, that is, activities 
directed towards ends which then become means to further 
ends, that chain must culminate in something which is 
d�sired for itself alone and not for the sake of any-
thing else. As Hardie puts it, "if we wish to avoid 
infinite regress, it must be allowed that, if there is 
anything which is desired but not desired for itself, 
there must be something which is desired for itself. 1 ( 2)
This, however, is not all Aristotle is contending, 
for he does also assume that all chains of activity 
culminate in the� final end which he says is the 
chief good, happiness. Furthermore he is claiming that 
"there is a single end which is aimed at in every choice 
of a human being. " ( 3)
Commentators on Aristotle have generally accepted 
the Aristotelean argument for the need for a final end 
but have queried his equating of such a final end with 
happiness. Kenny, (4) for example, has shown that
Aristotle's contention could be regarded as a logical 
truth, or an empirical observation or as a moral 
imperative. Which of these is it? 
10: 1. / .... 
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10:1. The contention as a logical truth? 
It certainly is not a truth of logic. O'Connor, (S) 
Geach, (6)and Anscombe (?) all point out that it is
fallacious to reason from saying that all actions have 
one and only one final end, to conclude that all actions 
have the same final end. As Anscombe puts it, "There 
appears to be an illicit transition in Aristotle from 
'all chains must stop somewhere' to 'this is the some­
where where all chains must stop.'"(B) 
Hardie, however, denies that Aristotle is guilty 
of this fallacy, that is, that he intended the assertion 
as a logical truth. For Aristotle does acknowledge the 
possibility of there being more than one final end. (9 )
He admits too that honour, 
times sought for their own 
pleasure and reason are some-
' 
sake. (lO)
Kenny (ll) points out that, in fact, it does seem 
false that it is logically necessary that there should 
b� one end which is sought after in each choice. For 
even if we define this end in a vague way, for example, 
"the satisfaction of our wants", it would still be a 
fallacious argument. There are, as Kenny puts it, "as 
many different satisfactions as there are- desires to 
satisfy." (l2)
10:2. The contention as an empirical observation ? 
Is the passage therefore intended as a statement 
of an empirical fact? It is clear from what has 
already been said that this contention cannot be an 
empirical truth. We have seen from the various dis-
cussions in this thesis, that vicious, incontinent and 
and unnatural men are all eliminated from the claim made 
in the passage quoted at the beginning of the conclusion. 
Von Wright suggests that Aristotle sometimes 
seems to write as if he were advocating the doctrine of 
psychological/ 
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psychological eudaimonism which Von Wright defines as 
follows : (l3)
"The·doctrine ••. that every end-directed 
human act is undertaken ultimately for 
the sake of the acting agent's happiness 
we shall call psychological eudaimonism. 11 
But as Von Wright points out, to hold such a view 
would be contradiction for Aristotle does admit pleasure, 
for example, as an end in itself. Furthermore Aristotle 
does also say that sometimes the performance of a 
courageous act aims at self-sacrifice. (l4) We have also
seen that the desire for happiness in the secondary sense 
does not specifically occur as the major premise of the 
practical syllogism. Nor is it possible for the activity 
of contemplation to do so in terms of the theoretical/ 
practical reason dichotomy in Aristotle's thought. 
Von Wright interprets Aristotle's contention about 
a final end as follows : 
"I would understand Aristotle's so-called 
eudaimonism in the foilowing light: among 
possible ends of human action eudaimonia 
holds a unique position. It is that 
eudaimonia is the only end that is never 
anything except final. It is of the 
"nature of eudaimonia that it cannot be 
desired for the sake of anything else." (15) 
We would agree with Von Wright. But is Aristotle 
not saying something more than this ? This question 
then leads us to examine whether Aristotle's contention 
is a moral imperative. 
10:3, The contention as a moral imperative ? 
The point made very often in this thesis is that 
men do not naturally seek secondary happiness. Aristotle 
mentions that there are several kinds of life of which 
the life of pleasure is dominant and characteristic of 
the majority. (l6) Few men are naturally virtuous, hence
the need for correct training. If we think of secondary 
happiness/ •... 
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happiness in terms of a planned existence, it is clear 
that few people do so in terms of the performance of 
morally good actions. That this is so is also clear 
from the discussion by Aristotle on the function of 
man. Since the Aristotelean definition of function 
excludes the majority who live by their passions, the 
vicious, the incontinent, as well as slaves, women and 
those performing unnatural actions, man's function does 
not consist in implying and following the rule supplied 
by practical wisdom. There is therefore a gap between 
man as he is and man as he ought to be. Man as he is 
would appear_ to be man dominated by his passions, <
17>
man whose acts are directed towards apparent goods. 
Man as he ought to be is man as morally virtuous. In 
other words, man's function ought to be an activity of 
the soul which follows or implies a rational principle. 
Man ought to direct his actions towards morally good 
ends, and choose the right means to attain those ends. 
He ought to plan his life so that he lives in accordance 
with moral virtue and practical wisdom. This "ought" 
is not a Kantian concept of duty. Men ought to become 
virtuous for their own sakes as well as for the benefits 
the good man brings to his fellows and the state as a 
whole. Not only does the life of moral virtue imply 
that the morally good man is at harmony with himself, 
his actions exemplifying the mean and affording him 
pleasure, but it is only such a man who can use to 
greater heights and attain perfect happiness through 
contemplation. 
Aristotle has claimed that happiness is attain­
able and achievable. {lB)_ Not all are secondarily happy
and it is arguable that only a few intellectually 
gifted individuals will achieve the ideal state of 
contemplation, and then only for short periods of time. 
But a man ought also to aspire towards perfect happiness; 
he should strive to live in accordance with what is best 
in/ •... 
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in him. <19> For perfect happiness is the most
pleasurable of all activities, being most akin to 
tbat of the prime mover. 
There is, therefore, a gap between man as he 
is and man as he ought to be. Bridging this gap is 
achieved through the acquisition of both moral and 
intellectual virtues. But Aristotle's starting point 
is arguably man as he ought to be. 
This view is therefore at odds with that express­
ed by Mure, <20>for example, who holds that "Greek
ethical theo�y starts from what is, not from what ought 
to be� 11 In short, it is held that Aristotle does 
violate his so-called empirical starting point. <21>His
work is a moral imperative; it deals with what ought to 
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CHAPTER 11 : CONCLUSION 
This thesis has attempted to explain why 
Aristotle's thought does not constitute a "systematic 
treatise." Indeed it has been pointed out that there 
are fundamental inconsistencies in Aristotle's 
argwnents which preclude his ethics "enunciating a 
single straight-forward doctrine." 
Having attempted to effect a clear distinction 
between metaphysics and ethics, in opposition to the 
unified thought of Plato, Aristotle did nevertheless 
retain the Platonic ideal of man's ultimate end and 
perfect happiness as the intellectual activity of the 
contemplation of metaphysical truths. However, without 
the Doctrine of the Forms to justify the ideal life of 
the philosopher, it is logically possible in Aristotle's 
thought that a wicked man become an excellent philosopher. 
However, such an admission would render Aristotle's 
ethics totally incoherent. Thus although·the life of 
moral virtue is characterised by practical reason and 
essentially moral standards of value, it must neverthe­
less in some, albeit indirect way be a necessary pre­
requisite for contemplation, characterised by theoretical 
reason and metaphysical standards of value. 
This argwnent may be ·elucidated by a consideration 
of the teleological nature of Aristotle's ethical thought. 
Actions may be said to derive their worth in terms of 
their relationship to the end or good of that activity. 
In the metaphysical sense, the word "good" means complete 
and hence Aristotle speaks of 'the possibility of a good 
thief, that is a thief who lacks nothing insofar as he 
has achieved his own particular excellence. However, 
this goodness or excellence of a thief is not generally 
held to be desirable or moral goodness. Hence Aristotle 
does introduce what does seem to be an inappropriate 
distinction between good and bad actualities in his 
discussion/ 
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discussion on the metaphysical notion of completeness. 
This distinction is, however, under$tandable since 
man as a ·rational being is perfectly capable of 
choosing what is morally evil just as well as what is 
morally good. The opening sentence of the Nicomachean 
Ethics does seem to assume that the ends chosen will 
always be good actualities. However, one of Aristotle's 
central tasks was to clarify precisely what activities 
would ensure a morally desirable end as well as one 
which was good from the "neutral" perspective of complete-
ness. This task involved a consideration of man's 
function. 
In defining man's function as implying and follow­
ing a rational principle, Aristotle is, in fact, telling 
us what men ·ought to be like. When function is then 
treated in terms of excellence, the inclusion of moral 
yirtue and practical wisdom are made to follow. However, 
following Siegler, it has been suggested that Aristotle's 
argument on this crucial point is fallacious. For 
whilst he draws an analogy between the harpist and man 
as man, the excellence of the former is a metaphysical 
one. Insofar as a man can act rationally, deliberately 
choosing evil ends and cunningly planning those means 
which will ensure the attainment of such ends, he may 
be said to be acting with a metaphysical excellence and 
he will become the complete evil man. But since 
Aristotle's concern in an ethical work is to ensure 
that man's activities will be directed towards morally 
desirable ends, he makes an illicit transition from the 
metaphysical goodness of the harpist's function to the 
morally desirable goodness of man. For the crucial 
role of moral virtue is to direct man's activities 
towards noble ends: practical wisdom ensures that the 
correct means will be chosen to achieve these ends. 
Whilst the life of moral virtue, the consistent 
performance of virtuous actions is good in the. sense of
being / .... 
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being morally desirable, for the good man benefits 
himself, his fellows and the state as a whole, it is 
not good in the metaphysical sense of completeness. 
(Each particular moral deed is, however, good in both 
senses.) For secondary happiness does not constitute 
man's final, ultimate end. Man's rationality is not 
completely perfected in the performance of moral acts. 
The contemplative life or perfect happiness, on 
the other hand, is good in the metaphysical sense of 
completeness. It is the fina.l end of becoming of man 
as a rational being. The problem is whether it can be 
good in the moral sense for it is an activity to which 
only metaphysical standards of value are applicable. 
Yet it is clear that Aristotle was forced to try in some 
way to include the notion of desirability into his 
conception of contemplation in order to preclude the 
rossibility of a vicious yet happy philosopher. He 
had therefore, firstly, to show that morally virtuous 
activities were necessary for the attainment of man's 
final end and, secondly, that .the life of the philosopher 
itself was morally desirable. 
In terms of the dichotomy between man's end of 
perfect happiness and the end of secondary happiness, 
characterised by different standards of value and 
different kinds of reason, the relationship between the 
latter and the former could only be indirect. The 
standards of value applicable in the realm of secondary 
happiness are essentially moral, being Aristotle's 
clarification of the values of his own society, although 
he did extend his analysis to suggest these values were 
in accordance with transcendent metaphysical standards 
having a universal application. (This contention was 
challenged in terms of Berger and Luckmann's thesis which 
supported the idea of ethical relativism.) Metaphysical 
standards alone apply to contemplation. Unlike Plato, 
moreover / .•.. 
moreover, Aristotle confined practical reason or 
phronesis to the realm o·f the doable good. Al though 
it has been argued that the exclusion of theoretical 
reason from the sphere of moral action is not tenable, 
in terms of the Aristotelean position there can be no 
direct relationship between the two spheres of reason 
which have different objects of knowledge. Moreover, 
as an intellectual virtue contemplation can have no 
mean which would be given by practical wisdom. 
The single phrase in the Nicomachean Ethics 
linking practical and theoretical wisdom, namely that 
the former provides for the latter coming into being, 
has been interpreted in terms of an indirect relation­
ship. The life of secondary happiness characterised by 
moral virtue and practical wisdom helps to perfect man's 
reason. The legislators, those who are pre-eminently 
men of practical wisdom, have the task of creating that 
constitution which will encourage the inhabitants of 
the state to form good habits. In planning such a 
state the greatest opportunities for happiness for as 
many as possible are provided. The necessary leisure 
required in order to contemplate is ensured. An 
educational system incorporating the study of theoretical 
disciplines in order that the mind be filled with the 
necessary material for contemplation provides a further 
link between the two kinds of reason. In Hardie's 
terms, happiness in its secondary sense, as an inclusive 
end or planned existence, is a necessary prerequisite 
for happiness in its perfect sense as a dominant end. 
However, these arq1.µt1ents are seriously weakened 
unless Aristotle's remarks on Thales and Anaxamander are 
regarded as a piece of careless writing. For he has 
implied that they are not also practically wise. 
The desirability of the contemplative life is not 
completely established by Aristotle. Like Plato, 
Aristotle / .•.. 
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Aristotle conceived of the life of the philosopher as 
constituting the summit of intellectual, moral and 
political achievement. But without the Doctrine of 
the Forms to provide an underlying unity to those 
disciplines, the justification for the philosopher's 
life in the moral and political spheres becomes extremely 
difficult within the framework of Aristotle's ethical 
thought. In discussing what we have called "moral 
obligation" it was seen that Aristotle's treatment of 
the good man's relation to himself and others was limited 
to the realm of secondary happiness. Insofar as the 
philosopher performs morally good actions he brings 
rewards to himself, his fellow man and the state as a 
whole. But whilst Aristotle would clearly have wished 
the activity of contemplation to make a contribution to 
the state, the nature of ,such a possible contribution 
is extremely obscure. Jaeger has argued that the 
contemplative life is intended by Aristotle to be 
regarded as creative and practical in the highest sense. 
But the evidence available does not support such a view. 
For perfect happiness, the activity of the disembodied 
� is a solitary activity. Since, moreover, theor­
etical wisdom does not legislate for the sake of practical 
wisdom, contemplation is an essentially a-social, 
politically unproductive activity. It may therefore be 
concluded that contemplation does constitute man's end 
or good in the metaphysical sense of completeness, but 
that it cannot be shown to be morally or politically 
desirable in the larger context of the state itself. 
However, insofar as·it does constitute man's perfect 
happiness, being the most pleasurable of all activities, 
it is desirable from the point of view of the individual 
himself. The conclusion that perfect happiness is a 
selfish activity can hardly be avoided. 
The uneasy juxtaposition of the essentially 
Platonic notion of a purely intellectual activity by a 
disembodied/ .... 
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disembodied element of reason beside the thesis of the 
substantial unity of body and soul further challenges 
the possibility of a consistent treatise. The like­
lihood of a synthesis of both views seems remote. 
The tenability of the concept of contemplation 
is weakened by the fact that the objects of that activity 
are not clearly formulated. Nor can it be definitely 
established whether contemplation involves a religious 
dimension. Although works like the Eudemian Ethics 
and De Philosophia might seem to support such a thesis, 
there is little or no evidence in the Nicomachean Ethics 
for adopting·such a view. 
It is clear, however, that contemplation obeys 
the first criterion which characterises happiness, namely 
it is final. It is loved for its own sake and not for 
any result it produces beyond the pleasure of contemplating. 
Indeed, if it were politically creative it could not be 
f.inal. Whether it is completely self-sufficient is less 
certain. For it does presuppose prior theoretical study 
in order to discover the necessary material for contem­
plation. As a man, the philosopher does require "external 
equipment", but Aristotle insists that philosophising will 
need little or less than moral virtue does. (l) In short,
contemplation is the most self-sufficient activity. 
Taylor, <2>somewhat humorously, suggests that the
end of Aristotle's argument in the Nicomachean Ethics 
seems to forget the beginning. Indeed, Aristotle's 
contention that the activity of contemplation, separate 
from the world of ordinary social interaction, constitutes 
man's final end of perfect happiness is a far cry from 
the early characterisation of happiness as living well, 
or what seems to be happiness in the secondary sense. 
It is true, of course, that the philosopher insofar as 
he is a man will also be happy in this secondary sense. 
But it must not be forgotten that living well is only 
secondary/ 
166 -
secondary happiness. Yet it is surely this happiness 
which is closest to the ordinary view which had been 
'· 
Aristotle's starting point. The purely intellectual 
activity which we may enjoy by virtue of having a 
divine spark within us does not seem to be the way the 
"general run of men" nor even perhaps "people of superior 
refineme
1
�t 11 would conceive of it. (3) Furthermore, even
if we were to agree that·man's ·ultimate end lies in a 
purely intellectual activity, such happiness is enjoyed 
for short periods of time only. It is surely secondary 
happiness which obeys the criterion of enduring "not for 
some chance period but throughout a complete life.'.' (4)
Despite these criticisms of contemplation its 
influence on Catholicism as exemplified in the thought 
of St. Thomas Aquinas was considerable. (S) 
The view that Aristotle gradually abandoned the 
'Platonic element in his thought in favour of a eonsist­
�ntly empirical position has been rejected. In fact it 
has been argued that it is his reluctance or perhaps his 
inability to free himself f�om his Platonic education 
which underlies so many of the problems associated with 
man's end in the Nicomachean Ethics. 
Furthermore, the consistency of Aristotle's claim 
that he takes as his point of departure what is the case 
has been challenged. It has been argued that Aristotle's 
conception of function is a consideration of the function 
of man as he ought to be. Whilst Aristotle suggests 
that all men seek happiness it is clear that not all men 
will achieve either secondary or perfect happiness. 
Aristotle's discussions on various other aspects 
of secondary happiness have been dealt with in some 
detail with particular reference to the crucial role of 
moral virtue or the possession of a good character. His 
treatment of incontinence, often interpreted as incoherent, 
has in fact been shown to be perfectly consistent, 
though/ .... 
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though admittedly this conclusion applies only to the 
syllogism dealing with the tasting of sweet things. 
Although Adkins has d�nied that Aristotle deals with 
moral responsibility, it has been argued that this 
concept is covered in some detail. Aristotle's treat-
ment is, however, not completely satisfactory because 
he does not follow up the implications of his admission 
of determining influences on a man's character to their 
logical conclusion. The tension between the freedom 
which is accorded to the moral agent and those factors 
which have contributed towards the formation of his 
character remains unresolved • 
. The supremely morally virtuous individual, 
exemplified in Aristotle's characterisation of the proud 
man, is infallible. Insofar as he is eminently _self­
controlled he will never err. Therefore implied within 
the Aristotelean notion of self-control is the idea that 
there will be a certain predictability in the performance 
of morally good acts. It is held that the concepts of 
self-control and predictability do characterise ethical 
behaviour. The Existentialist Barnes, for example, 
rejecting the extreme views of Dostoyevsky's Underground 
Man, argues that one must impose some sort of order or 
plan ·on one '.s life so that it may be characterised as 
"ethical". Furthermore, insofar as the need for inter­
personal relations is included as an integral part of 
the Existential conception of authenticity or good 
faith, som� degree of self-control and predictability 
in ethical acts is ensured. The Behaviourist, Skinner, 
who holds that moral struggles waste valuable time which 
the self-controlled man could far more profitably employ 
in what Skinner calls "more reinforcing behaviour", says 
that such an individual's behaviour in any contingency 
will always be characterised by his self-control. 
The question now arises as to the content of 
such acts performed by individuals possessing self-control. 
Existentialists/ ..•• 
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Existentialists and Skinner do not offer a blue-print 
for action. The content of any moral act is contingent 
upon the circumstances in which the individual is 
placed. · For Existentialists, provided one guards and 
respects one's own freedom and that of others, one may 
choose in any way. Skinner argues that the self­
controlled· individual can adapt to any situation. 
Aristotle's conception of the minor premise of the 
practical syllogism does imply that the way a good man 
actually applies a gener.al moral rule to a concrete 
situation depends on his temperament as well as the 
circumstance.s of the particular situation in which he 
finds himself.· The mean is relative to each individual. 
Yet whilst such acts are judged in terms of objective 
values recognised as such by those who have a good 
character and are.also practically wise, Aristotle does 
also have an implicit conception of absolute, universal 
standards (comparable to the idea of natural law} which 
�ct as measures of all moral actions in any particular 
society. Hence it may be argued that the good state 
in Aristotelean terms would be so rationally organised 
that the eccentric and possibly some creative individuals 
would be regarded as behaving in a non-rational way. 
Certainly in terms of the Existential thesis, it is to 
the extent that the individual is able to free himself 
from the bounds of his society that he is said to be 
truly creative. Yet without the implicit idea of 
universal, rational standards of behaviour, the Aristot­
elean view of moral behaviour, expressed formally in 
terms of the practical syllogism, could have been 
regarded as an effective solution to the problem of 
discovering a compromise between ethical relativism 
and moral anarchy. For the acts of any individual 
would always exemplify the moral values of his own 
society. But the particular way he interpreted these 
values would be contingent upon his own personality and 
the actual situation. 
Whether / ...• 
169 
Whether infallibility constitutes a summit of 
moral achievement is a contentious point. MacIntyre, 
as we have seen, feels that the notion of fallibility 
is an integral characteristic of_the perfect�­
Existentialists, stressing the anguish and risk involved 
in any moral choice, would hardly conceive of the 
possibility of an infallible man even if he were self­
controlled. Of course self-control need not imply 
infallibility. However, in terms of the practical 
syllogism, the good and practically wise man never fails 
to choose what is right in accordance with the rational, 
objective standards as clarified by Aristotle. It ,is 
an empirical question as to whether or not men are 
capable of infallibily moral ,J;>ehaviour at all times.
It is clear from the discussion above that the 
question of self-control and moral �ehaviour is related 
to the larger problem of the nature of man. This leads 
us to the concept of what has been called self-actualis-
ation or self-realisation. For the Aristotelean view 
of man•'S happiness which may be interpreted in terms of 
the actualisation of his potentialities, has as its 
basic premise the idea that the good life for man is 
somehow based on the nature of man. Self-actualisation 
may be regarded as a metaphysical concept embodying the 
notion of completeness. But in terms of the views of 
the contemporary psychologist, Maslow, it has also been 
suggested that insofar ·as a man has actualised his 
potentialities as a craftsman, harpist and the like, so 
are his actions motivated by ethical ideals such as 
justice, order and goodness. Maslow <6> a1so argues that
traditional dichotomies such as that between reason 
and desire, or the head and the heart, are resolved in 
the self�actualised individual. Self control is there-
fore a component but also perhaps a consequence of self­
actualisation. 
In terms of this discussion, the relationship 
between/ 
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between man's· nature, the notion of the actualisation 
of his potentialities and the performance of morally 
good actions is therefore of great importance in 
ethical thought. Our understanding of human nature
is, however, far from complete . .  The discoveries of 
the sciences of physiology, psychology, sociology and 
anthropology will undoubtedly enlarge our knowledge and 
our conception of the good life will therefore have to 
be revised constantly in the light of such information. 
Hence as O'Connor (
?) has pointed out, Aristotle's 
belief that "ethics must somehow be grounded in the 
nature of the moral agent" constitutes an important 
insight. Aristotle must also be accorded much credit 
for being the first thinker to attempt to investigate 
that relationship in a systematic way. 
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Appendix: The- meaning of the word nhappiness 11 • 
How does Aristotle's concept of two kinds of 
happiness relate to his theory of meaning? 
In her study of language in Aristotle's philosophy, 
Larkin (B) has investigated his theory of meaning in some 
detail. 
Aristotle rejected the Platonic theory of Forms 
and the theory of a natural relationship between names 
and the things named. ( 9) But he was concerned with the
way words relate to things. Thus Aristotle speaks of 
"words as the symbols of mental experiences which are 
signs of thi�gs. 11 (lO) Words, argued Aristotle,· are. not
significant naturally, but by convention, for "letters 
and syllables have no natural likeness to the object 
named • 11 ( 11)
He was also concerned with the way words have 
meaning, especially in philosophy. As Larkin shows, 
Aristotle held that in order to achieve clarity in 
philosophical arguments it was necessary to avoid 
equivocation, ambiguity and metaphors. (l2) Yet he did
not merely divide words as equivocal and univocal, for 
he admits that there are certain words which are midway 
between the two. 
trate this point 
Larkin quotes this passage to illus-
"It follows, therefore, that there are 
thr�e sorts of friendship, and that they 
are not all so termed in respect of one 
thing or as species of one genus, nor yet 
have they the same time entirely by 
accident. For all these uses of the term 
are related to one particular sort of 
friendship which is primary - as with the 
term 'surgical' - we speak of a surgical 
mind and a surgical hand and a surgical 
instrument and a surgical operation, but 
we apply the term properly so that which 
is primarily so called." (13)
It is surely possible that the same argument 
may/ 
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may be used of the two'kinds of happiness. Let us 
substitute "happiness'.' for "friendship" in the passage 
below : (l4)
"'l'he only remaining alternative, there­
fore, is that, in a sense, the primary 
sort of happiness alone is happiness, 
but in a sense both are, not as having 
a common name by accident and standing 
in a merely chance relationship to one 
anothe.r, nor yet as falling under one 
species, but rather as related to one 
thing." 
There must therefore be·a relationship between 
the two happtnesses named. La�kin points out that 
Aristotle does not specify exactly what the relations 
between the things named must be. But "the definition 
of what is logically prior is included in the definition 
of the thing to which the name is secondarily imposed."{lS)
The relationship between the two kinds of happiness must 
lie in the fact that bqth are activities of the rational 
eiernent of the soul. Undoubtedly perfect happiness is 
the primary sort of happiness .. Secondary happiness is 
happiness not by accident or chance, it does not belong 
to the same species, but is related to perfect happiness 
insofar as it involves the exercise of man's rationality. 
Hence we see that Aristotle distinguishes a third 
type of word apart from the univocal and equivocal. 
They are·analogous words, what Aristotle calls pr�s h:n 
equivocals or words_ related pr�s h�n. These are "words 
said in many different ways in which different senses 
are derived from and related to a prior meaning ••.. The 
criterion of. pr�s h�n equivocals is that.the primary 
meaning is implicit in the definitions of all secondary 
meanings because there is some relation between the 
(16}things named • " . 
Aquinas'(l?) work on the doctrine of analogy is 
clearly much indebted to the pioneering efforts of 
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5. Aquinas held that man-' s end as the contemplation of
metaphysical truths and a life of moral virtue was
concerned solely with man's imperfect, temporal
happiness. -For, according to him, man's end is
supernatural consisting in the Beatific Vision of
God in the next life. Man, however, cannot know 
this end through his reason. It is revealed to him 
by faith. Furthermore, Aquinas argued that man's 
intellect and his rational will were not fully 
perfected in the contemplation of metaphysical truths. 
Only in the Beatific Vision is, firstly, the intellect 
perfected in its possession of God who is the universal 
true and, secondly, the will perfected in its initiat­
ion of this movement towards God who is the universal 
good, and _in the joy of attainment of God. This vision 
which therefore consists in man's participation in the 
divine nature is called connatural knowledge of God. 
It depends on the gift of grace for its attainment 
and presupposes faith and hope and can only be achieved 
through charity. 
6'. Maslow:·Motivation c;t.nd Personality, p.23_3.
7. 0 'Connor: Op.cit. p. 60.





13. E.E. 1236al6 cf. Metaphysics 1006bl0.
14. E.E. 1236b24 - a few minor modifications have been
made to Aristotle's text for the sake of greater clarity
in illustrating our point.
15. Larkin: Op.cit. p.69.
16. Ibid. p.100.
17. Aquinas: S.T. I Ql3.
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